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
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The other but a slave,
Yet monarch still who ruled
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Alone, undimmed, they burned
Above a world of doom
Until the morning-red
Flamed crimson in the east,
And the ascending dawn
Of an immortal Christ
Filled the blue heavens with light.

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I LIFT the cup of Brahma high!—
The cup and liquor both are his;
That flowing draught is perfect rest,
For Brahma's self the liquor is.

Let endless kalpas still revolve,
Who quaffs, no grief shall e'er befall;
For he shall dream the dream of God,
And never know he dreams at all.

My transmigrating days are o'er;
God's hand presents the sacred cup;
I eager grasp the chalice now,
And drink the Godhead's liquor up.

And while the sacred wine I quaff,
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THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

KIKUYU.

THE VERY REVEREND H. HENSLEY HENSON,

Dean of Durham.

THE Kikuyu controversy has come upon the Church very suddenly, but (though the place and occasion were surprising) the controversy itself could not have been postponed much longer. For the Church of England seems to be in danger of becoming "an organised hypocrisy," pretending to be something that it is not, speaking like Pascal's Jesuits with two voices according to the suggestion of its immediate interest, destitute therefore of any valid claim either on the loyalty of individual Christians, or on the continued support of the nation.

Three factors may be distinguished in the volume of discontent which has found violent expression in the Bishop of Zanzibar's "Open Letter"—conservative opposition to doctrinal "restatement," sacerdotalist resentment against the attempt to restore order in the Church, and revolt against the conditions of national Establishment. To these must be added, as the Bishop's personal contribution, the discovery, for one can hardly suppose that it was anything else, of the dramatic discrepancy between the actual procedure of the English Church in the mission field and the theory of English Churchmanship which passes for axiomatic in the assemblies

of "High Anglicans," and in the columns of the *Church Times*. The Bishop of Zanzibar exhibits the acute distress of the disillusioned neophyte, as well as the cold severity of the ecclesiastical theorist. He is indeed disturbing the familiar habit of Anglican missionaries when he protests against the proceedings at Kikuyu. The application of his doctrine of Anglicanism to the missionary action of the English Church would involve the resignation of most of the missionaries, and the closing of many missions. It may be safely asserted that such a notion of Anglican obligations as he outlines receives no acceptance outside a few semi-private missions like that which he himself directs in East Africa, and perhaps in that Paradise of Tractarianism—the South African Church.

Theories must needs yield to the grim realities of life in the mission field, and, in face of pagans and the prairie, the most reluctant of Churchmen has perforce to distinguish between the things which matter and the things which are of little worth. Perhaps the best answer to the Bishop of Zanzibar's indictment of the Bishops of Mombasa and Uganda would be a statement of the actual happenings throughout the Anglican Diaspora. As the facts are reported it is becoming evident that the assumptions of the "Open Letter" were hardly less grotesque than intolerant.

"The questions at issue," writes Bishop Stileman, "profoundly affect the position of Church of England missions in a Moslem country like Persia, where most of our fellow-workers for the extension of the Kingdom of Christ are American Presbyterian missionaries who have always worked with their brethren of the Church Missionary Society and the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews in the closest and most brotherly fellowship."

The Bishop proceeds to describe his ordinary method, which appears to include everything which has outraged Bishop Weston in the incidents at Kikuyu (v. *Record*, 6th February 1914). Bishop Stileman speaks for the work in Persia; another bishop, the Bishop of Caledonia, bears similar testimony from British Columbia. He describes an Easter Communion at which the representatives of many denomina-

tions united in receiving the Sacrament of Unity. "Together we knelt side by side and partook of those sacred elements which, variously interpreted, meant for each and all the Holy Communion, the Fellowship Divine" (v. *Ibid.*). Such evidence could be easily multiplied. In China, India, Polynesia, and elsewhere, the application of the rigorous exclusiveness, which the Bishop of Zanzibar identifies with Anglicanism, would revolutionise the conditions under which the foreign mission work of the Church of England has hitherto proceeded, and would create a situation in which much missionary work could not proceed at all. For it is common knowledge that the main burden of foreign missions is sustained by non-Anglicans, since Anglicans, in face of the heathen and Mohammedans, are a "feeble folk" when compared, not merely with the disciplined legions of Rome, but with the enthusiastic forces of non-episcopal Protestantism.

It is precisely because co-operation has been common in the mission field that the notion has arisen, and obtained wide extension in ecclesiastical circles, that the problem of "Reunion" will find solution first in that sphere, and that the home Church will then be drawn into an endorsement of *un fait accompli*. The proofs of Divine acceptance of non-episcopal ministries being too plain for the most rigorous logic to dismiss, and too emphatic for the least fraternal to ignore, it will follow everywhere that the insistence on a monopoly of Divine favour for specific systems must fall out of Christian acceptance. Recognition of non-episcopal Churches will be seen to be required by the same reasoning as that which led the Apostle of the circumcision to admit Gentiles to baptism: "*Can any man forbid the water, that these should not be baptized, which have received the Holy Ghost as well as we?*"

The gravity of the Bishop of Zanzibar's "Open Letter," therefore, is little connected with its indictment of the proceedings at Kikuyu, which may fairly be regarded as illustrative of well-understood Anglican principles, and which

certainly stand in line with similar action in many parts of the mission field. The real importance of the "Open Letter" will be determined by its reception at home. If the authorities of the Church of England were to give formal countenance to the conception of Anglicanism which that document expounds, and if the general sentiment of English Churchmen were to endorse the Bishop of Zanzibar's denunciation of the Bishops of Mombasa and Uganda, a situation of the utmost gravity will undoubtedly have been created. For the whole future of the Church of England will necessarily be compromised by the deliberate adoption of a policy which not only implies the categorical repudiation of its character as a Reformed Church, but also can by no means be reconciled with its history and constitution as an Established Church. Yet it must be admitted that the adoption of such a policy is no remote or improbable danger, for, though it is evident that the general sentiment of religious Englishmen remains still essentially Protestant, and though it cannot be denied that the "Open Letter" has shocked deeply the general body of English Churchmen, yet it is the case that the clergy and bishops have within recent years accepted so generally a view of Anglicanism indistinguishable from that which the "Open Letter" expresses, that it is not difficult to imagine formal decisions being taken of a very deplorable character. The "Open Letter," therefore, has become a test of current Anglicanism. It must be placed alongside many happenings in England which clothe it with a representative character, and give it something of the importance of a formal challenge to the Church itself. The leaven of Tractarianism has been working within the Established Church for two generations, and it has not merely brought about an almost complete paralysis of law, but has so effectually destroyed the older conception of the English Church as embodying a moderate form of Protestantism, conservative in system, liberal in temper, that the most reluctant understanding has now to admit that under the name of the Established Church, and

with its authority, two mutually contradictory versions of Christianity are being offered to the nation. Perplexity and weakness at home must needs appear in confusion and conflict abroad. The natural evolution out of insularity into a larger view is in danger of being arrested by the triumph of a specific conception of Anglicanism, which is not only unhistorical and illogical, but also totally inconsistent either with the maintenance of the Establishment at home, or with the "comity of missions" abroad.

The *Church Times* has been at the pains recently to state this conception in the clearest terms, so that "he who runs may read." It begins by setting forth the unbridgable chasm which parts Catholicism and Protestantism :

"The entire outlook on religion is different. If one is right the other is absolutely wrong, and where these essential differences are present there can be no question of union, or even of united action, whether in the face of aggressive heathenism abroad or religious differences at home."

It proceeds to state the "Catholic theory" of the ministry :

"It is said that for valid Sacraments a valid ministry is needed, and that no ministry is valid unless there is a regular ordination by a Bishop who has himself received his Orders through an unbroken chain from the Apostles, and so from Jesus Christ Himself."

It sweeps away the notion that such a succession could be secured through presbyters, and insists that the Church of England absolutely denies the validity of all non-episcopal ministries. But it is careful to insist that the bishop is only entitled to obedience when he rules "in accordance with the law and tradition of the Church. When he does not do so he ought to be disobeyed" (v. *Church Times*, 13th February 1914, "The Position of the Church of England").

The theory, it will be perceived, is not only prohibitive of any reconciliation with non-episcopal Churches, which must be regarded (to use Bishop Weston's language) as "bodies whose very existence is hostile to Christ's Holy Church," but also absolutely paralysing so far as any doctrinal restatement is concerned. Episcopal Orders, in fact, commit the man who receives them to a purely obstructive attitude towards every

proposal, however reasonable in itself, or imperatively demanded by the needs of the Church, which involves a departure from "the law and tradition of the Church."

When we inquire where precisely this immutable law and binding tradition of the Church are to be found, we are referred, partly, to the "undivided Church" of the early centuries and, partly, to the agreement of the modern Episcopate. The one justifies the Bishop of Zanzibar in repudiating the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the other permits him to claim authority for all the latest Roman devotions, which, simply by the fact that they are Roman, are sufficiently certified to have the approval of the existing Episcopate! Nothing is judged on its merits. Everything is brought to the test, not of the New Testament, or of English law, or of reason, or of expediency, but of the "Catholic tradition," disclosed in patristic literature where that serves, and in current Roman practice where it fails to serve the requirements of the moment. Of this "Catholic tradition" the Bishop is the exponent and guardian.

The *Church Times* expounds Bishop Weston's position thus:

"It comes to this: he called upon the Church of a certain province (i.e. Canterbury) to intervene in a grave matter concerning Churches which belong to no province. *We have said that in the present conditions of the mission field, precedents of the fourth century, or earlier, are more applicable than those of a later period.* We are now reminded of the frequent references to the special authority of Apostolic Sees which were made in circumstances of difficulty before the development of the metropolitical and patriarchal system. But as in those days, with all his reverence for the Apostolic See of Rome, St Cyprian could stoutly maintain the independent and equal authority of bishops in Africa, rejecting the judgment of the Apostolic See when need arose, *so now the Bishop of Zanzibar hints plainly that he is prepared to fall back upon the inalienable powers of the Episcopate, vested in him, should the occupant of the chair of St Augustine take action that is to be blamed.* 'Unless the two bishops are found to be faultless,' he says, 'by an authority that is beyond question, it is clear that I shall still be in the position of having to determine for myself whether I can remain in communion with them or not.' We were inclined to blame him for not taking independent action in the first instance; we are glad to find him ready for it in the last resort. It is evident that he will recognise no papacy at Lambeth. We will only add that as the Archbishop of Canterbury evidently

has no thought of any aggrandisement of his See, and intends to refer the matter to a fairly general Council, the Bishop of Zanzibar might have spoken his mind, we will not say with less firmness, but with less asperity" (v. *Church Times*, 20th February 1914).

I have italicised the salient passages. When it is remembered that six-sevenths of the mission work now proceeding in the world is carried on by non-Anglicans (apart altogether from the Roman Catholic missions), and that "the precedents of the fourth century or earlier" assume the existence of an undivided Church, it will need no argument to show the practical fatuity of seeking in that remote period the precedents which should govern ecclesiastical action at the present time. Besides, it is evident that the Bishop of Zanzibar is not really submitting a case for decision, but only demanding the confirmation of action which he has himself taken on grounds which do not in his mind admit of discussion. All this parade of an appeal to his metropolitan is delusive, for he is not prepared to accept his metropolitan's decision. What he wants is not an authoritative verdict on a disputed question, but a formal confirmation of the views which he proclaims to be "Catholic." Bishops, he holds, *must* agree with him, for, if they disagree, they transgress the very assumption of the Episcopate, and forfeit all title to the regard of the faithful! Canterbury may fail, but Zanzibar can suffice. There are always "the inalienable powers of the Episcopate vested in him" to fall back upon. We incline to agree with the *Church Times* that it might perhaps have been preferable if he had taken "independent action" at first. We should have been spared reams of controversy, and the true character of his conduct would have been more easily perceived.

In passing, it may be well to remind our modern Cyprian that the famous Bishop of Carthage was wrong on the main question, however admirably independent in maintaining his error. He will be ill-advised if he finds in the history of the controversy between Rome and Africa in the third century nothing but a precedent for kicking against superior authority in the twentieth.

This conception of the bishop, not merely as essential to the very being of a Church in the true sense of the word, but also as in the Church serving the purpose of a barrier against all departures from precedent, is infinitely suggestive.

Two consequences follow at once. On the one hand, no man of competent knowledge and independent character can accept the episcopal office on that view of it. On the other hand, an episcopal college composed of men who so interpret their office must be totally destitute of judicial competence, as well as of governing initiative. On the last point, the *Church Times* is quite explicit :

"It is not required in a judge of heresy to be free from prejudice in favour of the Catholic faith. Reference is not made to impartial unbelievers. There was never a Council of the Church, the assembled Fathers of which had not for the most part made up their minds on the matters to be discussed. *The ideal austerity and aloofness of a civil tribunal is not here to be imitated*; both accusers and defenders of the accused are commonly included among the judges" (v. *ibid.*).

It may be observed, however, that the "defenders" can only declare themselves to be such under the heavy risk of being immediately translated from the bench to the dock! This notion of the Episcopate, and, we must add, this view of judicial procedure, are purely mediæval. It explains the resolute "Erastianism" of our Reformers, and the extreme reluctance of liberal-minded Anglicans to accept an episcopal tribunal as a substitute for the Privy Council for the final court in matters doctrinal. It explains also the hesitation which is moved in some Anglicans by the present agitation for more "liberty" to the Church of England.

"To allow religious liberty to a community," wrote Archbishop (then plain Mr) Temple, "is very often only another phrase for allowing the oppression of the members by the leaders, of the quiet by the busy. The concession of religious liberty to a religious body means the permission to exercise their own laws and their own discipline over their own members; it means the permission to inflict any penalty not exceeding excommunication. Now of what do these communities consist, and how are they governed? They generally consist, first, of a considerable body of steady, but not very eager, adherents, who either belong to the sect by birth, or have found in its worship,

for one reason or another, a sort of religious resting-place for their lives; and, secondly, of a much smaller body of warm partisans, who are what they are by conviction, and who take the lead by virtue of their greater zeal and activity. The former are very often earnest but quiet Christians. The smaller and busier section, however, look on themselves, and are looked on by a sort of tacit consent of the rest, as the truly religious" (v. *Frederick Temple*, ed. Sandford, i. 124).

The tyranny of the zealous minority is not unknown in any Church, but in Protestant Churches there is at least no organic incapacity to admit new truth. On the episcopal theory exemplified by the Bishop of Zanzibar, and expounded by the *Church Times*, the Church is absolutely bound by the precedents of the "Catholic" past. This circumstance vitiates the parallel often drawn between the Established Church of England and that of Scotland. Why should not the autonomy of the latter be conceded to the former? The answer must be that spiritual autonomy in a National Church implies the acceptance of the principles of Protestantism, and the Church of England appears to be disposed towards a formal repudiation of those principles. In a Catholic Church *sensu Zanzibarbarico* the tyranny of the zealous minority means the despotism of the Dead Hand.

If the view of the Episcopate now being pressed is to be generally accepted, it must affect importantly the action of those who are responsible for advising the sovereign in the appointment of bishops. For the humble purpose of religious obstruction (which is *ex hypothesi* the whole duty of a "Catholic" bishop in matters doctrinal), there is little need of ability, and none of knowledge. A modern education, indeed, is likely to have a disturbing effect on the simple positiveness of personal conviction which befits a "Father in God" when he has to speak with authority on the difficult and debated questions of modern criticism! The faithful are to expect from the successors of the Apostles, not the deliberate wisdom of the scholar, or the large prudence of the statesman, but the reassuring echo of their own prejudices, and the dogmatic reaffirmation of their own beliefs!

It may be conceded that the English bench tends to match the requirements of the theory.

In the course of the controversy which has filled the newspapers during the last two months, it has become clear that the general sentiment of English Churchmen repudiates heartily the exclusive attitude disclosed in the "Open Letter," and resents as altogether unworthy of the English Church the gratuitously offensive terms in which that attitude is set forth. But it has also become no less clear that the Bishop of Zanzibar can count upon the support of large numbers of clergymen, and that his action, though crude and unexpected, accords too closely with the main lines of Anglican policy in recent years to be easily rejected and rebuked. With some adroitness he has succeeded in mixing up two sets of issues, not properly connected, and thus drawn to his side, or, at the least, partly incapacitated for acting against him, considerable numbers of religious men, who, while heartily opposed to him in some things, are no less heartily agreed with him in others. On the old issues of the Reformation, Englishmen are for the most part still agreed. They are in principle and feeling as decisively Protestant as their fathers. But on the new issues, which the advance of science and the advent of Biblical criticism have created, and which confront all the Churches of Christendom, as well reformed as unreformed, they are much divided in opinion and exercised in mind. Probably the rank and file in all Christian Churches are hostile to theological change, swayed by emotion rather than by intelligence, easily captured by appeals to that conservative feeling which is the raw material of fanaticism. Accordingly, it is an obvious device of ecclesiastics, threatened with defeat in one direction, to seek escape by a diversion in the other, securing as champions of orthodox belief what they could not hope to win as reasonable men or charitable Christians.

We notice, not without some surprise, that this very obvious and often-used device is commanding a large measure of success. Nearly seven hundred clergymen of the London

diocese, including perhaps half the incumbents, have signed an address to the Upper House of the Convocation of Canterbury, expressing their "grave anxiety," not only at the doctrinal developments of the time, but at "the widespread tendency to approach the problem of reunion among Christians in a way that is clearly inconsistent with the belief that Episcopal Ordination is essential to a valid Ministry of the Word and Sacraments." They ask, therefore, "for the help of themselves and their people," that their "Spiritual Fathers" should give them assurances in both respects. The clergy are very explicit in their demand. The bishops are asked--

First, to repudiate the claim of some clergy to reject the Miracles of our Lord's Birth of a Virgin and the actual Resurrection of His Body from the tomb, *because we believe* that these truths lie at the very centre of the Faith and that *the statements of the Bible and the Creeds with regard to them are perfectly plain and unambiguous.*

Second, to make it plain that, in accordance with the teaching of the Church in all ages, *the Church of England has always taught, and must continue to teach, the necessity of Episcopal Ordination* as a condition of exercising the Ministry of the Word and Sacraments.

The clergy add a paragraph illustrative of their position, and, we may say, also indicative of its fatal defect :

"We desire to express our unwavering belief that the Church of England is a true part of Christ's Holy Catholic Church, and, *whilst recognising the fact that freedom must be allowed within well-defined limits*, we humbly ask to be reassured as to the two principles to which we have referred, being convinced that on this basis alone the Church of England can make the most of its opportunity and best fulfil its mission."

It must be admitted that this is a very surprising, and a very disheartening document. It is the one, because at this late stage of religious development, one had assumed that educated Christians in the centre of the world's culture had moved beyond the point of offering their own personal opinion

as a final argument for the truth of anything; and that fair-minded men, even although they were clergymen, had realised that the inevitable doubts of thoughtful students were not rightly met by mere assertions. It is the other, because it had not seemed possible that gross and patent untruth should so easily receive the signatures of responsible and presumably informed men. To say in the teeth of the notorious facts of Anglican history, that the Church of England "has always taught the necessity of Episcopal Ordination" is a false statement, whether you test it by the Prayer-book, or by Anglican literature, or by the history of the Church as expressed in law and practice.

Moreover, the clergy are curiously inconsistent. While they profess their own confident belief as the justification for their attitude, they seek some "reassurance" from the bishops. While they concede that "freedom must be allowed within well-defined limits," they refrain from indicating what those limits may be, apart, of course, from their own profound conviction at the moment; and actually ask the bishops to affirm that, with respect to the points on which liberty is in some quarters being sought, no liberty shall be given! What is it they look to receive from the bishops? A vote in convocation, hardly unanimous, probably nearly so, to the effect that the bishops agree with the signatories, will change nothing in the situation which so distresses the London clergy. The difficulties raised by textual criticism will remain precisely what they were. The arguments of scholars will lose nothing of their weight, and gain nothing. No doubter will have been assisted; no enemy defeated. That the Church of England "is a true part of Christ's Holy Catholic Church" is an evident truth, but therein the Church of England does not stand alone. So far as I know there is no Church anywhere which does not make the same claim, and support it by the same assurance of "unwavering belief."

In recent years the London diocese has not been associated conspicuously with the intellectual efforts of the Church of

England. The signatories of the petition to the bishops are more suggestive of parochial activity and party zeal than of scholarship, research, or large statesmanship. St Paul's is represented by Canon Newbolt and two minor canons: Westminster Abbey by four minor canons. For the rest, the published names appear to include no recognised authority on the questions with respect to which the document dogmatises. Still, I do not wish to be supposed to underrate the melancholy suggestiveness of the petition, whether the type of Churchmanship it discloses be considered, or the number of names attached to it.

More significant, and certainly not less melancholy, is the declaration by the Bishop of Oxford in a letter to the *Times*:

"I feel quite sure that to the great mass of High Churchmen such an open Communion (as at Kikuyu) seems to involve principles so totally subversive of Catholic order and doctrine as to be strictly intolerable, in the sense that they could not continue in a fellowship which required of them to tolerate the recurrence of such incidents" (v. *Times*, 29th December 1913).

If words mean anything, these words mean that unless the Church of England cuts the last links of its ancient fellowship with "the other Protestant Churches," Bishop Gore and his followers will secede. I think there are some reasons for thinking that this kind of threat has lost its terrors for Evangelicals. They have learned something, and unlearned something in recent years. Never again will they be the party of prosecutions. They have no use for "No Popery" fanatics. They are realising that they have no need to apologise for their position in the National Church, but are standing for its true tradition, when they insist on seeking a *modus vivendi* with their fellow-Evangelicals in other Reformed Churches. They are no longer content to stand outside the intellectual movement of the age, but perceive that they, just because they glory in the large liberty of Protestantism, and stand in the true succession of those courageous innovators to whom the world owes the Reformation, are called to take their part in the indispensable process of assimilating knowledge, and giving it just expression

in theology. They claim special authority in determining the missionary policy of the English Church by the best of titles—their own prominence in the work of foreign missions. Their acceptance of the new episcopalian organisation of the Anglican Communion is conditioned by their loyalty to evangelical principles, and these disallow such rigidity as that which perpetuates and even emphasises denominational divisions in the face of the unconverted world. Accordingly, if the Bishop of Oxford and his friends secede, it will be solely by the exercise of their own free choice. Only they must face the fact that Evangelicals will in the future use, responsibly but freely, their lawful liberty as members of a Protestant Church, which interprets the tradition of ancient faith and practice by the light of the Reformation. If “Catholicism” be unable to endure such liberty in fellow-Anglicans, then it must once more inspire a secession. The Church of England has sustained more formidable secessions in the past than any which the Bishop of Zanzibar is likely to effect in the present, even with the potent aid of the Bishop of Oxford.

While Evangelicals are learning the lesson of tolerance, liberal Anglicans have been learning the not less important lesson of reverence. Both are beginning to perceive that they have the same objective—the assertion of the essential ideas of the original Gospel; and that both have the same opponent—the legalism of Christianity conceived of in terms of system. In the mutual understanding and frank co-operation of Evangelicals and liberal Anglicans lies the best hope, not only for religion in this country, but also for unity throughout the Protestant world. And that unity, once achieved, must lead on to a still larger reconciliation. This is the natural order of Christian effort: first, union with the nearer, then with the remoter. To reverse that order by turning our backs on our fellow-Protestants, and seeking an union (really impossible save by mere incorporation) with the unreformed Churches of Rome and the East, is to defeat everything.

Kikuyu has revealed a startling dualism within the

National Church, a dualism indeed which was not unsuspected but was not adequately realised. Comfortable platitudes about the Anglican Via Media will hardly pass so easily in the future, for the co-existence of two mutually irreconcilable types of Churchmanship is not equivalent to any moderate blend which can be described as a Via Media. We have Romanism without the Pope, and we have Protestantism with the Bishop: and there is only this to distinguish the two in their ecclesiastical title, that while the one is habitually and avowedly contemptuous of the law under which the Establishment is secured, the other is frankly loyal to it. That is a significant difference, and ought not to be ignored in a just estimate of claims.

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SACRAMENTS AND UNITY.

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WHAT is the present position of Christian thought and feeling on the subject of the sacraments? Do the old lines of demarcation still persist, or have these been modified in any way during recent years? What has been the influence of Biblical criticism and modern speculation on our theory of the sacraments, and what part may we expect the sacraments to play in the movement towards reunion?

At first sight it may seem that nothing but confusion reigns over the whole subject, and that, so far from drawing together on sacramental questions, we are rather drifting farther and farther apart. Is not the Christian Church hopelessly divided to-day on the very things that should most unite it, the one baptism, the one bread, and the one cup? Some insist on seven sacraments, some will have only two, others are of opinion that we need none at all. Grave differences of belief exist as to the fundamental nature of a sacrament, the relation to be discerned therein between outward material form and inward spiritual substance, and the place to be assigned to personal faith as a condition contributory to its efficacy and power. Who are the persons rightly qualified to administer the sacraments? Who are the persons proper to receive them? Do the sacraments merely symbolise, or do they convey, grace? Does grace, sacramentally conveyed, differ in quality and power from grace not sacramentally conveyed? What was the exact meaning of

Christ's words in instituting the sacraments? Did He conceive them as mysteries in the Greek sense or simply as memorials or covenant seals of His approaching Kingdom? Did He intend them to be permanent and of universal obligation? Did He even institute them at all? These are questions that give rise to the acutest controversy among us. On the one hand, large and influential communities, such as the Society of Friends, the Salvation Army, and members of the Brotherhood and Adult School movements feel that they can dispense with sacraments altogether, without sacrificing anything essential to the Christian life. On the other hand, among those who retain them may be found every possible variety of belief, from the view that the Eucharist is a propitiatory rite requiring a sacrificing priesthood, to the view that it is no more than a simple memorial observance, quickening our recollection of a bygone Christ. How, then, can anything even remotely resembling Godly union and concord be attained on sacramental lines?

It is impossible to ignore the force of these considerations, yet signs are not lacking that modifications are taking place and concessions are being made which, though no more than tentative at present, may nevertheless prepare the way for a better understanding in the future. Before dealing with these movements, however, it may be well very briefly to review once more the chief theories of the sacraments as they have emerged in history, and as they prevail to-day. These may be roughly divided into three outstanding types, the Catholic view, the Rationalist view, and the Evangelical view.

I.

We begin with the Catholic view, which is operative and influential, not in the Roman Church only, but in other communions outside it, and which claims to be a simple and legitimate explication of the original deposit of faith, as once for all given to the apostles and their successors. According to this conception, the sanctifying grace of God is "the Divinely

infused supernatural quality which permanently divinises the human nature to make it proportionate to its Divine end."¹ It is a spiritual substance or transcendental presence, committed by the heavenly Lord to the keeping of His earthly Church, which is the storehouse or treasury of His grace. From Christ's broken body and shed blood this grace is diffused like a sweet fragrance among mankind, by means of the Spirit, through the sacraments, within the Church, which is the historical extension of His incarnate life, and the perpetual creation of His transcendent power. These sacraments convey renewing, enlightening, and sanctifying grace, not as mere symbols, but as authentic channels. They are the rivulets to the Church's reservoir. The grace they impart is, as it were, a supernatural deterrent, antidote, or antiseptic against sin, the medicine or elixir of immortality, and the stimulant or cordial of every virtue. Their action is essentially objective and divine, since they rest on the sure promise and covenant word of the Redeemer who instituted them and gave Himself in them. Christ, that is to say, is a Real Presence in the sacraments. He is there to quicken and to sustain that supernatural life which it was the purpose of the Incarnation first of all to bestow. The Lord's presence in the sacrament is not conditional upon our faith, or merely concurrent with it; still less is it occasioned by it. Rather is it independent of our faith and its predisposing cause, conferring new life upon the mind or soul before faith can be. The efficacy of the sacraments is intrinsic, if administered according to the intention of the Church, and to such as do not interpose the obstacle of unbelief or mortal sin. Why not? Is anything impossible with God? Who so bold as to assert that the Divine Spirit may not operate freely upon the nether springs of our being, through materialistic media, in ways that the understanding may not grasp, and to which the will itself gives no consent? May not a seed be planted even if it does not fructify? God's gift of Himself in grace, it is maintained, and man's recognition

¹ *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, s.v. "Grace (Roman Catholic)."

and appropriation of that gift in faith, are ever to be treated as separate and distinct things. And the former is prior to the latter. Christ in the sacrament comes to His own, even if they receive Him not. If they receive Him, He empowers them to become sons. But ere they can receive Him, or even reject Him, in some real manner He must be *there*.

From this governing conception every part of Catholic belief and practice may be logically deduced. It is clear that so precious a gift as Christ's sacramental presence must be reverently conserved in a pure channel and authoritatively bestowed only by appointed hands. It is clear, also, that where such consecration is validly secured, in the name and by the authority of the whole Church, this grace of sacraments must inevitably flow, apart from the personal character and worth either of the celebrant or of the participant. There need be, of course, and there ought to be no kind of impediment in this respect. But if such should arise, and a strain be put upon faith because of the evil lives either of the priests or of the laity concerned, it must be firmly and emphatically maintained that sacramental grace accompanies valid orders *rather* than the pure faith by which it is either mediated or received. It is Christ and not the priest who gives the sacrament, and the priest acts, not in his personal, but in his official capacity, as a representative of Christ and of the whole Church. Similarly, it becomes a matter of urgent practical importance that this sanctifying virtue of Divine life should be received as soon as possible after birth in Holy Baptism, as frequently as possible during life in the Holy Eucharist, and as late as possible before death in Holy Unction. One cannot go too far in showing respect and veneration for so heavenly a gift. It must be diligently prepared for, splendidly accompanied, jealously guarded, and meekly and lovingly adored. It should be received fasting, and reverently reserved for the sick and the infirm. For is it not Bethlehem, Nazareth, and Calvary here in England? Does it not do for us now precisely what Christ Himself did for His first disciples in the flesh? Finally,

although grosser magical ideas are not necessarily present in this conception of the sacraments, it is easy to see how readily it lends itself to superstition and abuse. The presence of Christ in the elements comes to be materialistically conceived, and even a St Teresa can write, "We know that our good Jesus remains with us until the accidents of bread have been consumed by our natural heat."¹

II.

In sharp contrast to this entire system stands that of Rationalism. According to its view of the sacraments, the whole idea of a supernatural revelation or transcendent life objectively mediated to us through incarnation and sacraments must be given up, and all the phenomena under examination be interpreted in terms of the purely natural subjective experience of spiritual humanity. Sacraments, it is pointed out, are by no means peculiar to Christianity. Parallels to them may be found abundantly in the Greek mysteries and other pagan cults. Nor does this in the least detract from their validity and value. Religious sacraments arise out of the needs of humanity itself, and register in symbolic form the old ingrained instincts and aspirations of the heart. No kind of objective efficacy resides in them. It is absurd to claim that they distil or materialise the Infinite for us, or are endowed with any thaumaturgic power. They fulfil a purely social and psychological function in life, and all the significance and efficacy they possess is conferred on them by auto-suggestion from ourselves. This is not to say that their value is imaginary or unreal. Sacraments are most necessary to us and they are rooted in reality. They focus, externalise, and make vivid to us, in symbolical language far more eloquent than speech, those thoughts, needs, and feelings which we share in common, and which are among the most precious constituents of our higher psychic life. In their origin the sacraments are associated with magic. They are erratic boulders, so to speak, stray

¹ *The Way of Perfection*, ed. B. Zimmerman, London, 1911, p. 231.

surviving relics of the animistic age of thought and feeling, when the boundary lines between the inner and the outer world were more blurred than they are now. And still they are of value to us, inasmuch as even yet not all truth can be said to lie above the threshold of lucid self-consciousness. Sacraments render us the service of providing a means of needful emotional discharge in the region of dim mystery and subconscious automatism in which self and not-self, subject and object, blend. Even as such, however, the sacraments *are* sacramental. They are sacramental to minds so mystically attuned as to receive them, in the sense that an ivy leaf taken from the grave of Keats may be sacramental, and mediate some of those spiritual realities for which Keats stands. The sacraments enhance our sense of living, and enable us to feel that we are merged into a larger whole. The life they convey is a real life, even though it defy all ordinary modes of definition. As such they may be acceptable to minds which regard the credal statements of the Church as either unintelligible or absurd. So long, then, as the sacraments legitimately satisfy, as they arise from, the emotional needs of man, so long as they yield him that peace, security, consolation which his religious consciousness requires, it is superfluous to ask whether they be true or false or have any counterpart in an objective realm of reality at all. He that is wise will accept the evolved system of the Church, receive her sacraments, and abandon himself gladly to the vague sweet comfort they afford, without troubling to inquire whether they be pagan or Christian in their origin, subjective or objective in their operation, so long as they satisfy the cravings of the soul and soothe the dull achings of the troubled heart.

III.

The Evangelical view of the sacraments, to which we now turn, occupies a position midway between the two that have just been discussed and adopts a critical attitude to them both. On the one hand, it rejects what it considers the too objective

realism and externality of the Catholic view, in the interests of a more spiritual and subjective faith. On the other hand, it rejects the too subjective impressionism of the Rationalistic view, in the interests of a more definite and objective truth. The one system, it contends, impoverishes the sacraments by reducing them too readily to a lower, and earlier, magical and materialistic level. The other falsifies the sacraments by substituting a system of ideas for the supernatural energy and power of Christ in the Holy Ghost.

To the Evangelical, the one supreme sacrament is the sacrament of the Divine Word, by which God gave Himself in holy and loving judgment for the salvation of the world. Baptism and the Lord's Supper placard this redemption before mankind. They derive their validity, not from their formal correctness of institution, nor yet from the official authority of the priest who administers them, but solely from the Gospel which they were created to express. As Luther so earnestly insisted, they are subordinate to the Gospel and an appanage of the Word. Did not St Paul himself loudly proclaim that he was sent, not to baptize, but to preach the Gospel? In the Evangelical view the sacraments are the public, corporate, and dramatic acts of the confessing and experiencing Church, as it symbolically commemorates, corroborates, and represents the timeless, saving, historic, and objective facts by which it lives. Such declaratory acts are sacramental because, as effectual signs and seals of God's grace, they exhibit and apply the blessings of His Gospel, and truly interpret and convey Him who once made a sacrament of Himself. And the grace they bestow is no *donum superadditum*, no spiritual substance or divine essence, drawn from the storehouse of the Church, that can be infused into the soul through valid sacramental and external channels, in however rarefied and refined a manner. That is considered a Greek conception of salvation, too long dominating Christian theology, and leaning to metaphysics rather than to ethics. Grace, rather, is to be conceived strictly in terms of personality. It is a moral relationship between

two wills, something that knows only spiritual channels of communication, and must be always dynamically and never mechanically conveyed. For clearly the mode of its communication to the soul must be in keeping with the moral character of grace itself, and the nature of that great redeeming act of holy love from which it derives its authority and power.

As in the case of Catholicism, so here also the governing conception moulds and determines the details of belief and conduct. In the Evangelical Churches the institutional or mechanical element in the sacraments is reduced to a minimum, and the utmost importance is attached to their religious elements, the meeting of free grace and believing faith. The centre of gravity is shifted from the material elements to the Church's communal act, and even from both Church and sacraments to the Gospel they proclaim, and the faith which Christ demands. The position is reached, not that faith is the determining feature in a sacrament, a kind of meritorious state of feeling or belief within ourselves which attracts Divine Grace and guarantees its efficacy, but rather that faith is a conditioning and essential part of a true sacrament, and that it is through the purity of faith, rather than through the due authorisation and validity of the act, that the divine grace of sacraments normally operates. The Evangelical takes his stand upon the conviction that the Divine life within the soul never is, and never can be, begun by an ordinance, however it may be ratified or sustained by one, and a large section of the Free Churches powerfully insists that an antecedent hearing of the Word, and an act of intelligent and personal faith in the offer of the Gospel, is as truly an integral part of the sacrament of Baptism as it may be and ought to be an integral part of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper.

IV.

It is impossible to believe that the types of theory here outlined are sacrosanct and final. Each has passed through many phases in its long history, and there is nothing now to

indicate that the process of development is closed. Each has been able to persist because of some vital truth it holds in trust, and each must be made willing to recognise the claims of the other two. But if this is ever to be brought about, certain concessions and modifications would seem to be necessary.

In the first place,¹ Catholics, whether Roman or Anglican, may surely go some way towards meeting Evangelicals by granting a fuller recognition of non-sacerdotal ministries of grace, without any waiving of their own distinctive claims. There are already some indications that this is taking place. Many of the most responsible leaders of Anglicanism hold a view of the priesthood that is official and representative rather than substitutionary or sacrificial. Even in his most holy eucharistic functions the priest, it is maintained, acts solely in the name of God and of the universal Church, doing, on their behalf, what both God and man desire should be authoritatively done. At the kernel, that is to say, of the whole subject of the sacraments, lies the question of Holy Orders. Granted that historical criticism no longer permits an appeal to strict apostolical succession, it is nevertheless needful that the entire body of the Church be organised, and articulated, and knit together by a duly commissioned priesthood, whose acts shall be official and valid and representative.

Now this point of view does not necessarily involve a theory of *exclusive* sacramental grace. Anglicans are increasingly willing to concede that a valid gift of prophecy is granted to Nonconformists, and indeed the wide distribution of free Evangelical Churches throughout the world, and the manifest fruits of the Spirit which they bring forth, make it hardly possible that they should do otherwise. It is also frequently admitted that non-sacerdotal sacraments may be spiritually valid, and that the Real Presence may be bestowed where two or three are gathered together in Christ's name, if

¹ I am here much indebted to a paper on "The Sacraments" by Canon Adderley.

the words of institution be in order and the intention of the worshippers be sincere. Even an assembly of working men, reverently adoring Christ in a P.S.A. or Brotherhood meeting, at which neither bread nor wine is so much as thought of, may be more truly sacramental than the solitary communion of a highly respectable Anglican according to the official rites of his parish Church. This view implies no real surrender of sacramental claims. These are still affirmed while the efficacy of something else is not presumed to be denied. The unbroken testimony of history, it is contended, and the profoundest spiritual experience of Christian believers, still make the Church's official sacraments unapproached and unapproachable as the pledges of Christ's presence and as a means of grace. Yet, inasmuch as they are to be regarded as a means and not as themselves the end, the claim which others make that they can attain to the same end by other means ought not to be denied. Further than this Catholics can scarcely be expected to go, without directly repudiating the grace of orders.

On the other hand, if Catholics show themselves thus willing to take their stand upon a purely representative official priesthood of the ministry of the Church, may not the Evangelicals be prepared to meet them on the same ground? Theoretically, it is already occupied by them in advance, since they claim to make a distinctive principle of an elected or delegated ministry within the Church. But, as a matter of fact, the ministerial office in the Evangelical Free Churches is only partially or sectionally representative. Whom does a Wesleyan or Baptist or Congregational minister represent? Apart from the question of his faithfully representing Christ, he represents either a single Church or a group of Churches, or else, alas! no one but himself. He cannot be said to be there as the officially commissioned delegate of the whole Church, even of so much of it as is outside Romanism and Anglicanism. This is what makes it so difficult for these two great historic communions to come to terms with Nonconformity. There is no uniform, recog-

nised, official ministry. Here again there are indications that a better state of things is in store for us. In all the Free Churches greater care is being taken in the selection of their ministers, more attention is being devoted to their education both spiritual and intellectual, endowments are being raised and larger responsibilities assumed for their maintenance and support. All these are steps in the right direction. Could but Free Churchmen agree on some uniform scheme of ministerial commission and ordination, which would give to ministers of all the Evangelical Churches an equal official and representative standing within the Church, and to the sacraments administered by them some kind of accredited communal validity, would not the ground be prepared for a much closer rapprochement with Anglican and Roman Catholicism than is possible at present? The real crux, with us as with them, is the question of valid orders. Were that settled, differences of theory as to the Real Presence in the sacraments and other things would not long divide us, any more than they divide widely divergent schools within Anglicanism and Romanism at the present time. These would be held in solution within the common life, if only some outward order and unity were recognised.

The Rationalist Sacramentalists above referred to need give but little trouble in this connection, partly because they are few in number and partly because they are willing to come into any sacramental system of the Church, if only their dogmatic reservations are respected. A greater difficulty might arise in the case of the Society of Friends and other bodies at present choosing to dispense with sacraments altogether. But would not their need be met, not by the abolition, but rather by the multiplication of symbols as a means of grace and by their fuller spiritualisation? Non-conformity has surely gone far enough in the direction of laying stress on freedom, prophecy, subjectivism, and ideas. Has not the time come for restoring the balance a little and recovering the lost emphasis on the more outward

symbolical and institutional aspects of Christianity? What is to prevent the Church from hallowing several different sacraments or symbolic acts, provided it differentiates their significance and value? This is no new proposal. St Bernard advocated a sacramental ordinance of Foot-washing. The Apology for the Augsburg Confession was willing to allow Penance as a sacrament instituted by Christ, and Melancthon approved the inclusion of Ordination. All the sacraments of Roman Catholicism might be admitted in this way, and even some others suggestive of child training or civic patriotism or social service. It is true that not all these could plead our Lord's own institution or the consent of antiquity and the universal Church. But may not some notice be taken of differing degrees of symbolical suggestiveness in matters of this kind? David had a group of mighty men that "were more honourable than the thirty, but attained not to the first three." Might not the Church, acting in Christ's name, institute certain acts or ceremonies which are more honourable spiritually than the multitude of things that are in a sense sacramental, yet attain not to the first two which come to us from Christ and directly show forth the passion and resurrection of our Lord?

In any case surely it may be said that it must be by means of sacraments, more than anything else, that the essential unity of the Church will ultimately be realised. The glory of sacraments is that they are symbolical dramatic acts, performed in common and so shared by all, yet patient of many interpretations according to the worshippers' varying points of view. Sacraments visibly set forth what they do not too narrowly define. They embody spiritual truths in outward concrete forms that can be appreciated by both the learned and the ignorant, the child and the grown man. Hence their infinite superiority to any spoken word and even to the ministry of art. Was not the Redemption itself a dramatic act, something not said merely, and hardly as yet explained, but mightily and effectively and finally done by

God the Father and placarded in Christ before all the world. And it is by the rehearsing of this great deed together in fitting symbolic action, rather than by the reciting of any creed, that the differing minds of Christendom must be gathered into one. Symbols and ceremonies and sympathies may unite men where creeds and theologies do nothing but divide them. Ours is an age which believes in unity and passionately desires it. But it must be a unity large and comprehensive enough to include all distinctive elements in the truth, and to exclude none. Also ours is an age which is quick to discern the importance and significance of symbols. We do many things daily that are almost sacramental. Our instinctive reverence for the national flag, the widespread popularity of freemasonry among us, our love for the insignia of public office and of royal state, all show that a fertile soil for the sacramental idea is already prepared in our hearts and minds. We need but to give this instinct its widest and noblest application, and to utilise it in setting forth worthily the central and universal things of the Christian faith. Already the Church of England and the Church of Rome can hold together in one sacramental communion the most widely differing sympathies and opposing creeds. May not the time come when a wider Christendom will find a uniting bond, not in social service merely, or acts of practical utility, but in forms of common worship and true communion, when one sacramental act shall unite all, yet the widest latitude of interpretation be allowed to each. and when no man shall need any more to say to his brother, "Know the Lord, for all shall know Him, from the least even unto the greatest."

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INSPIRATION.

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THE term *inspiration* is a difficult one to handle. More especially is it difficult for a layman who is aware of its almost overwhelming theological associations. Still, its associations are not exclusively theological, since the poets with a praiseworthy unanimity advanced an early claim to inspiration—a claim which can hardly be judged less venerable than that urged in the interest of the earliest religions. The idea of inspiration appears in the most primitive period of human thought, the belief that chosen spirits among men became at times the channels of divine wisdom or warning, and were thus enabled to speak with an authority and power far beyond their own—an authority and power of which they were never the assured possessors, but only the occasional and honoured recipients. In some cases the god was supposed to possess and control the body of the prophet and to speak directly through his lips; in others he was thought to communicate his message in dream or vision, or through voices which by the gifted ear were heard amid the sounds of nature, the murmur of the forest or the monotonous music of the stream. So literal an interpretation of the word is somewhat out of fashion. It is still, however, employed by writers on religion and on art; but though the term *inspiration* preserves in theology something of its ancient sense of actual divine control, it has ceased in art to be more than a mere suggestive or

illuminating phrase. An inspired painter or poet—what do we take him to be? We take him to be a highly gifted person, so eminently superior in talents to his fellow-men that his work is most easily described in language properly appropriated to messages or mandates once believed to display supernatural sanction and sanctity. Or if we are of that opinion which prefers to eliminate the distinction between inspiration in art and inspiration in religion, we do so, not by ascribing poetry to any supernatural source, or regarding the poet as in any sense the mouthpiece of divine wisdom, but by classing religious utterances, formerly placed apart as more than human, among the examples of that kind of insight which appears in the work of men of genius. Something is doubtless gained by reducing the matter to a single issue; but it is, of course, apparent, however we shift our ground, that the nature of this peculiar type of insight remains in obscurity. Goethe, like most other philosophic minds, pronounced it inexplicable and beyond analysis. "In poetry," said Goethe, "especially in that which is unconscious, before which reason and understanding fall short, and which therefore produces effects so far surpassing all conceptions, there is always something dæmonic." Yet, though ultimately no doubt inexplicable, the attempt to state and to understand such a problem as that involved in the phrase *Inspiration in poetry* may perhaps be admitted as legitimate and interesting.

All great men have not been thought of as inspired, nor all great achievements. Inspiration has commonly been supposed to operate in two regions: the region of religion and the region of art—the regions where the spirit of man is brought more directly into contact with the mystery, the pathos, and the beauty of human life. "Verse," says Hobbes, "among the Greeks was appropriated anciently to the service of their Gods, and was the Holy stile, the stile of the Oracles, the stile of the Laws." If we confine ourselves to the sphere of art, the point of interest lies here, that the priceless things, the moving things, that have given and continue to give the

highest pleasure, that best illuminate human experience, that produce emotional exaltation, appear in all cases to be beyond the reach of the strongest ambition and the most untiring industry, joined with the most searching intelligence. That is the first point of interest. We might be willing to ascribe these priceless and moving things simply to unusual talent, as indeed we are accustomed to ascribe them; but in these cases where we have any account of their genesis it seems that they belong to a category of their own, that they are not produced under the direct and conscious guidance of the artist. They are, as Goethe said, "dæmonic,"—due, that is, to some impulse from beyond the artist, and usually described by him as "given" or "found," as having their source in a power of which his nature was the servant rather than the master. They appear, also—and this is the second point of interest—to have their birth in an exalted and ecstatic condition of the mind, of which psychology has so far rendered a very meagre account, and often appears able to help us only by insisting that this exalted or ecstatic condition is pathological, and bears a close similarity to hysteria or dementia. There is, indeed, nothing novel here. For, as Plato pleasantly remarked, "he, who having no touch of the Muse's madness in his soul, comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the temple by the help of art—he, I say, and his poetry are not admitted; the sane man is nowhere at all when he enters into rivalry with the madman." But the description of the great artist as a sort of madman does not take us far. Sophocles satisfied his judges that he was not beside himself by the quotation of a passage from the play he had just written, the *Œdipus Coloneus*, and, however numerous the eccentricities of mind and character to be found among poets, it is not the eccentricities, but the remarkable breadth, insight, and distinction of their work—in a word, its high sanity—which captivates and commands attention. They appear in the main to be singularly successful in preserving their productions from any taint of the disease from which they are popularly supposed

to suffer. "I hold," said Emerson, with fine discrimination, "that ecstasy will be found normal, or only an example on a higher plane of the same gentle gravitation by which stones fall and waters run."

There exist—and in some ways it is an unfortunate circumstance—few and slender records by poets of their methods while composing, or of the mental state in which composition was most successfully accomplished. When they do exist, however, they dwell with almost unanimous emphasis upon the unsummoned, the involuntary, and spontaneous nature of the best work. "Just as the man of destiny does not execute what he wills or intends," said Schelling, "but what he is obliged to execute through an incomprehensible fate under whose influence he stands, so the artist, however full of design he is, yet . . . seems to stand under the influence of a power which separates him from all other men, and compels him to declare or represent things which he himself does not clearly see through, and whose import is infinite." But it is best to take the evidence of the artists themselves. Here is the testimony of Scott, simple and direct: "I don't wonder that, in dismissing all the other deities of Paganism, the Muse should have been retained by common consent, for in sober reality writing good verses seems to depend upon something separate from the volition of the author. I sometimes think my fingers set up for themselves, independent of my head; for twenty times I have begun a thing on a certain plan, and never in my life adhered to it (in a work of imagination, that is) for half an hour together." Scott was not a mystic nor an introspective poet, and one is here perhaps less prepared for transcendental experiences than in the presence of such artists as Goethe or Shelley, who express themselves as similarly affected. Of some of his poems Goethe speaks as having come suddenly upon him: "They insisted on being composed immediately, so that I have felt an instinctive and dreamy impulse to write them down on the spot. In such a somnambulistic state, it has frequently

happened that I have had a piece of paper lying askew before me, and I have not discovered it until all has been written, or I have found no more room to write." "I appeal," wrote Shelley, "to the greatest poets of the present day whether it is not an error to assert that the finest passages of poetry are produced by labour and study. The toil and the delay recommended by critics can be justly interpreted to mean no more than a careful observation of the inspired moments, and an artificial connexion of the spaces between their suggestions by the intermixture of conventional expressions." Clearly, as Balzac said, "the artist is not in the secret of his intelligence." Such sentences of deliberate prose are, perhaps, more convincing than similar assertions conveyed in verse, which may be passed over as fanciful, as when Milton speaks of—

"my celestial patroness, who deigns
Her nightly visitation unimplor'd,
And dictates to me, slumb'ring, or inspires
Easy my unpremeditated verse";

or as when Herrick ascribed his productiveness to a "brave spirit," in whose absence he could not write—

"'Tis not every day that I
Fitted am to prophecy;
No, but when the spirit fills
The fantastic panicles
Full of fire, then I write
As the Goddess doth indite."

The peculiar impulse here described is not, indeed, confined to poetry, but appears as the agent in all forms of high imaginative creation. "I wonder," says Thackeray, "do other novel-writers experience this fatalism? They *must* go a certain way in spite of themselves. I have been surprised at the observations made by some of my characters. It seems as if an occult Power was moving the pen. . . . What if there is an *afflated* style—when a writer is like a Pythoness on her oracle tripod, and mighty words, words which he cannot help, come blowing, and bellowing, and whistling, and moaning through the speaking pipes of his bodily organ?" Or take the case of George

Eliot, of whose literary method we have an account given by her husband. "She told me," he wrote, "that in all her best writing there was a 'not-herself' which took possession of her, and that she felt her own personality to be merely the instrument through which this spirit, as it were, were acting." Recall also the humorous account given by Stevenson of the secret operations of his inspiring Brownies. "The more I think of it, the more I am inclined to press upon the world my question: 'Who are the Little People?' They are near relations of the dreamer's beyond doubt . . . they have plainly learned, like him, to build the scheme of a considerate story, and to arrange emotion in progressive order; only, I think, they have more talent; and one thing is beyond doubt—they can tell him a story piece by piece, like a serial, and keep him all the time in ignorance of where they aim."

With such writers the pieces seem to move themselves upon the board, and they as spectators appear merely to note the progressive stages of the game. With them Schopenhauer's "dreaming omniscience" comes to the assistance of their "waking ignorance."

"Yea, when it sleeps the mind is bright with eyes:
But in the day it is man's lot to lack
All true discernment."¹

If such experiences are not unknown among writers of imaginative prose, it may well be that to the more fervid mind of the poet his imagination must at times appear, as it did to Wordsworth, a mighty and compelling fate.

"That awful Power rose from the mind's abyss,
Like an unfathomed vapour that enwraps,
At once, some lonely traveller."

Turn to another art, and there is the often-quoted account given by Mozart, in one of his letters, of the involuntary character of his musical conceptions. "Whence and how I know not—I cannot make out. . . . All the invention and construction go on in me as in a fine strong dream." And again,

¹ *Æschylus, Eumenides, 104-106.*

elsewhere : " You will never do anything if you have to think how you are to do it." In these cases of unusual intuition the work seems to be performed by some prior agency and to reach completion without effort on the part of the artist, who is a passive rather than an active instrument in its production. " Considered in its positive aspect, inspiration has two essential marks," says Ribot,— " suddenness and impersonality." The marks of such inspiration are well illustrated in the spiritual experiences of such mystics as John of the Cross : " He who is in this state cannot believe that the words do not proceed from some third person ;" or Boehme ; " I, in my human self, do not know what I shall have to write ; but whatever I am writing the spirit dictates to me what to write, and shows me all in such a wonderful clearness that I do not know whether or not I am with my consciousness in this world." Of Henry More, the Cambridge Platonist, we read, " From the beginning all things in a manner came flowing to him." Like Socrates, he had his monitory impulses also, borne in upon his spirit in an irresistible fashion, and experienced " very great rapture when he was thus affected." His thoughts " went faster than he always desired," swept by " a divine gale," and " all the while he seemed, as it were, to be in the air."

Some at least of the poets appear to belong to the family of the mystics, and poetry might almost be regarded as a species of divination. If we accept the idea for a moment, an interesting parallel becomes possible between the processes by which some of the ancient oracles were obtained and those employed by the poets. The favourite seat of an oracle was in a grove of trees, or in the hearing of a mountain stream, and it is remarkable in how many cases the responses seem to have been associated with rhythmical sounds—a murmuring of waters or a whispering of leaves, or, as in the case of the oracle of Zeus at Dodona, a chiming of metal caldrons. In the *Odyssey* this oracle is described as situated in " the high leafy oak tree of Zeus," and at this famous shrine there appear also to have been sacred doves, from whose crooning music

the answers of the god may have been gathered. The oracles of Apollo were probably in some cases similarly obtained. It is related by Virgil that when Æneas landed at Delos to consult the god, at the approach of Apollo the sacred laurels trembled, as the laurel grove by the Parnassian shrine of the same god was wont to stir and rustle at his entry. There are, too, in Old Testament history references such as that to "a going in the tops of the mulberry trees," which incited Israel to war; or that to the vision of the angel, which, we are told, was beheld by the prophet Elijah under a juniper tree; or that, again, to the oak, which, according to the Scripture narrative, was by the Sanctuary of the Lord, under which Joshua set up a great stone as a witness against the people—all of which suggest that in the early history of mankind the rhythmical sounds of Nature might be pressed into the service of religion, and might aid the priest or worshipper to attain that emotional exaltation and aloofness from the things of common consciousness which in modern days we seek in music or the melodies of verse. At least it is curious to observe how many are the references to the stimulating influence of rhythms, real or fancied, which meet us in history. Leaving music aside and confining ourselves to literary history, we may pass by that long tradition of the spiritual effects of melody of so profound a psychological interest; we may pass by such cases as that of Joan of Arc, to whom the heavenly voices which directed her career were only audible in the forest—"If she were in a wood, she could well hear the voices coming to her"—and note, for example, the statement that Elisha required music before he began to prophesy, and the sound, as of whirring wings which Heine heard about his head when in the mood for composition. We may recall the case of Wordsworth, who composed much of his poetry to the murmur of a running brook; or that of Coleridge, who declared that he could write as good verses as ever he did if he were perfectly free from vexation and in the *ad libitum* hearing of good music; or that of Schiller, whose poetical

ideas germinated in what he himself described as "a certain musical mood"—"The music of a poem floats before my soul when I sit down to write it, far more often than the clear concept of its content, concerning which I have often scarcely made up my mind"; or, again, the case of Burns, whose verses rose into his mind to the accompaniment of old and remembered airs, and took their perfect shape, as when Ilion to Apollo's lyre, "like a mist rose into towers."

Such cases illustrate the compelling power of rhythm, which, disengaging the mind from its imprisonment in the web of customary associations, enables it to draw upon resources beyond its normal reach, the resources of depths not often and not strongly stirred. For there appears little room to doubt that the full powers of the mind are but rarely exerted. It appears certain that by exclusive attention to the immediate environment, essential to the preservation and well-being of the organism through which it manifests itself, the mind is continually distracted to external issues, and becomes, so to say, a stranger to its own profounder and less familiar powers. Too little is asked of it, and the response is only equal to the habitual demand. Rendering us forgetful of the world of outer interests, rhythm, whether in music or poetry, gives the soul freedom to enter its own natural home, and draws around it a protecting screen. It sinks within itself to commune with itself and with the spirit of unseen reality,

"and to know
Rather consists in opening out a way
Whence the imprison'd splendour may escape,
Than in effecting entry for a light
Suppos'd to be without."

Rhythm is thus not only the natural expression of emotional experiences of more than ordinary intensity, but in some sense the password which opens to us the gates of the unconscious mind. It assists us to strike

"the hollow caves of thought, and wake
The infinite echoes hid in each."

In music and poetry we continually experience its power of liberating and supporting the imagination; but what is imagination? We may take it to be the power possessed by the mind of operating as a whole and operating without restraint; mental activity, that is, conducted in freedom and with no practical end to serve, as contrasted with the activities linked to ordinary life and action, and carried on in a restricted sphere of determined interests, cribbed and confined to single issues by social, logical, or physical requirements. The appeal made by music or poetry is an appeal to the mind as a whole, undistracted by immediate and mundane considerations, freed from the preoccupations of its daily business, and thus capable when deeply stirred, and acting at the higher or extreme limits of its power, of an insight and sagacity at least analogous to inspiration or spiritual vision. Imagination in this sense would be, as described by Wordsworth—

“Reason in its most exalted mood.”

The place of imagination in the history of the human race is a yet unwritten chapter in psychology. Nor will it be an easy chapter to write, since, like the pervading air we breathe, it supports the whole structure of our mental being. “Every man,” as John Stuart Mill said, “imagines, nay, is constantly and unavoidably imagining. He cannot help imagining”; or, as it has been otherwise expressed, “The habitual occupation of the mind is not thinking, as we fancy, but dreaming.” To imagination belong the empires and civilisations, the theologies and philosophies, and all the wonder of man’s ways. By its aid he places the actual beneath his feet, for he can dream a better than the world he inhabits.

And it may be claimed that in this faculty we have the veritable source of inspiration. Doubtless the word *imagination* will serve as well as another—it has often so served—to name the source of poetic power. Yet it is but a word and carries with it no revelation. In certain of its aspects, however,—that, say, in which it may be looked upon as a decorative art, or as, with some of our poets, an art barely to be dis-

tinguished from music,—the inspiration of poetry need raise no further problem of difficulty or moment. We recognise it as a legitimate function of art to adorn and gladden existence. And a great body of verse aims at no more than this, to steep the spirit in a bath of delightful sensation, to chant some thought-dispersing lay. “The only way not to be unhappy is to shut yourself up in art” is the argument, “and to count everything else as nothing.” Out of his emotional experiences and their associations, the dim and flitting shapes of memory, is drawn the material upon which the artist imposes an exquisite order, and shapes to music the substance of his dream. We read, and, as with the opening bars of some persuasive melody, like a cloud the present hour recedes, new hues and images invade the conquered mind. Take these verses translated¹ from an Irish poem, entitled *The Dead at Clonmacnois* :—

“In a quiet watered land, a land of roses,
 Stands St Kieran’s city fair;
 And the warriors of Erin in their famous generations
 Slumber there.

There beneath the dewy hillside sleep the noblest
 Of the clan of Conn,
 Each below his stone with name in branching Ogham,
 And the sacred knot thereon.

There they laid to rest the seven kings of Tara,
 There the sons of Cairbré sleep—
 Battle banners of the Gael, that in Kieran’s plain of crosses
 Now their final hosting keep.

And in Clonmacnois they laid the men of Teffia,
 And right many a lord of Breagh;
 Deep the sod above Clan Creidé and Clan Conaill,
 Kind in hall and fierce in fray.

Many and many a son of Conn, the Hundred-Fighter,
 In the red earth lies at rest;
 Many a blue eye of Clan Colman the turf covers,
 Many a swan-white breast.”

It matters little if these are unfamiliar names or if the poem tells us nothing new. It evokes a mood, it recites an

¹ By Mr T. W. Rolleston.

incantation, and from the many-peopled underworld there troop the forgotten shades. It weaves a music from the glories of old days and vanished youth and beauty. The pleasure hid in such a poem depends upon the skill of the artist and the depth of the reader's responsive emotion, upon the number of the reverberating echoes, since it is true, as Whitman tells us, that "all music is what awakes in you when you are reminded by the instruments."

In poetry, as in music, we may thus be for the moment entranced by the strangeness and beauty of our new surroundings, or, again—and this is peculiar to poetry—we may be spell-bound by an illuminating image. Entrancement of this kind may be brought to many readers, for example, by such an image as this of Browning's:—

"I will keep your honour safe.
With mine I trust you, as the sculptor trusts
Yon marble woman with the marble rose
Safe on her hand, she never will let fall."

Here the illumination of a poetic moment may be admitted, or in such a famous passage as that in which Homer describes Achilles, when by divine mandate, though still abstaining from the war, he appears upon the trench to hearten the Greeks by his mere presence and voice—a passage of which the fire cannot be extinguished even in the inadequate medium of translation. Again, poetry may be rich in interests other than emotional. It may charm us by its wit and surprise us into intellectual pleasure by the skill with which a body of evasive thought or delicate fancy is reduced to simple and lucid expression. Who could have believed that our vague and wandering ideas, the twilight weavings of the brain, could be caught and rendered into words, and words, too, which seem to have floated of their own impulse into the pattern of the rhythm? Exquisite adjustments of language to thought, such as meet one in Horace or in Pope, a happy coincidence of mood and modulated speech—these are properly reckoned among the attractions of the art. And this may be met with

in poems charged with no loftier inspiration than a light heart and an amiable good-will, such as, for example, we find in Cotton's *Ode to Winter* :—

“ We'll think of all the friends we know,
And drink to all worth drinking to . . .
We'll drink the wanting into wealth,
And those that languish into health.
The afflicted into joy, the oppress
Into security and rest. . . .
The brave shall triumph in distress,
The lovers shall have mistresses,
Poor, unregarded Virtue, praise,
And the neglected poet, bays.”

But as Leigh Hunt expressed it, “There is one genius of the South, another of the North, and others uniting both.” And probably the word *poetry* connotes for its more diligent readers a place of higher enchantments than these. They ask from it more than that it should treat “human life,” as Sir William Temple said, “like a froward child that must be played with and humoured a little till it falls asleep, and then the care is over.” For these readers it is more than decoration and more than music; it is their philosophy. And in the higher strain appears a certain authority: it offers a criticism or an interpretation of life. So that if we could admit, as Bergson says, that “Poetic imagination is but a fuller view of reality,” admit it in the fullest sense, admit that in the case of the best poetry its authors were, as Blake asserted of himself, “under the direction of messengers from heaven, daily and nightly”; if we could allow that their work was produced, as he tells us his *Jerusalem* was produced, “written from immediate dictation, twelve or sometimes twenty or thirty lines at a time, without premeditation, and even against my will,” we might well have no further diffidence, but place ourselves under the immediate guidance of the seer in the revelation of his impassioned yet strangely impersonal song. Blake's creed is, however, scarcely one for general acceptance, since he was minded to look upon art as the chief end of man. For him the world of spiritual vision provided the only cer-

tainties, and he conceived of the great masters of reason, Bacon and Locke and Newton, as no better than the misguided ministers of Satan. Fallen from the state of grace, as allegorised in the Scripture narrative of the Garden of Eden, shut up in the prison of the senses, we are subject, in Blake's phrase, to the deadly dreams of "single vision and Newton's sleep"—that is, the poisoned sleep of a blind and insolent rationalism. Through art lay the pathway to freedom, through poetry and painting and music, "three powers in man," as he finely phrased it, "of conversing with Paradise." But, as Swinburne has said, "Blake was possessed of a fervour and fury of belief. He had a devil, and its name was Faith." Only those can climb to these rare elevations of thought who have shared Blake's transcendent experiences—

"He had seen the moon's eclipse
By the fire from Ætna's lips;
With Orion had he spoken,
His fast with honey-dew had broken."

These things are too high for the majority of us. Let us allow great privileges to the poet as "a holy and wonderful being," as Plato called him, but it is inevitable that we should ask ourselves how far he is to be trusted. Grant the beauty and the power of his utterances, grant that they are of the nature of oracles and that he himself is a diviner, it is still not easy to determine the precise weight to be attached to his doctrine, the inspired messages. For, not content with discoursing music to us, the poets constantly pronounce, as Sophocles, Dante, and Wordsworth pronounced, opinions and convictions upon the nature, meaning, and destiny of human life. They set up a cosmic philosophy. How far may this philosophy and these pronouncements be trusted? Are their rhythmical utterances in any measure more authoritative than prose? Poetic ideas, based upon no assigned or assignable premises, apparently derive their authority, and induce assenting emotion because they are accompanied by a seductive music which disarms the critical faculties and insidiously overpowers the

soul. The melody induces sympathy for the chosen ideal, "as if it would bribe the ear to corrupt the judgment." Thus it would seem that the artist employs hypnotic arts, lulling to slumber the wary and protecting intelligence, casting his rhythmical sop to Cerberus, that he may win for his doctrine unchallenged passage into the depths of the mind. Instinctively he makes his appeal to instinct, for his art is the art of evading that watchman of the intellect, that sentry who challenges all comers and demands from them the utilitarian password. In the struggle for material existence his challenge is a necessity. Evolution favours those powers of the mind which keep the organism in close touch with its immediate environment. Powers not in the present hour required, forces to meet situations still to arise must wait their time. The army is in motion, but the van only has taken the field. Thus it is that we are left with the ancient problem which clothes itself in so many disguises, of the conflict between the conscious and the unconscious reason, between intellect and imagination, between logic and instinct, the apparent conflict between the mental forces already and those not yet fully engaged. Or we may speak of it as the conflict between things achieved and things looked for, things won and those seen yet a great way off. For while science and the practical intellect move by the law of their being within the circumference of matters partially understood and for certain ends mastered, the imagination constructs its own world in the light of superb possibilities. And the poets, it may be allowed, possess at least one advantage over the men of science and reason—they have no rivals as interpreters of the world's desire. If not of what life is, they give the best account of what it should be—

"Eternity is in their looks and eyes."

If now we are told that there is no correspondence between the cosmos as it is and as we would have it to be, we touch upon the nerve of the matter at issue. Among the postulates required by science, the most fundamental and significant is that of the intelligibility of Nature. We look out upon the

world and find that in part we can understand it, for answers are in a measure yielded to our inquiries. Nature is not a blank wall scrawled over with meaningless hieroglyphics, to which we have no clue. Patient study elicits principles and discovers adjustments and meanings. The history of science is itself, indeed, a triumphant exhibition of the thesis that Nature is intelligible, that mind meets mind. Her movements, her laws, her methods gradually reveal themselves to persistent and detailed examination. And in its mechanical and organic aspects, in its physics and chemistry, the world is daily better understood. The moral and spiritual order, with which art is concerned, has not, however, clearly emerged, and we are forbidden in this region to require any correspondence between man and his environment. The harmony here is more difficult to establish, and we are often asked to believe in a universe rational and intelligible in part, but in part also perverse and disappointing, a universe responsive to our intellectual but without response to our emotional and spiritual requirements. Such a breach in the continuity of Nature was discovered by Professor Huxley—a breach which, in his view, compelled man, the last and most splendid product of the cosmic process, to turn upon it in anger, and bid defiance to that very evolution which had blindly carried him into existence. At the bar of human justice the morality of the world system was pronounced inferior to the morality of the being it had produced. The same strain of mingled thought and emotion led to the remark by another writer: "Man has this cause of pride; that he has bethought himself of justice in a universe without justice, and has put justice there." Science may, indeed, accept so singular a conclusion, but it would be fatal to poetry. The imagination admits no such lack of correspondence between ourselves and the world to which we belong. The universe cannot be at variance with itself. "We have bethought ourselves of justice in a universe without justice." It is impossible, for if we have bethought ourselves of it, there surely it is, and that we should find it

there a part of the high design. And as for justice till it appear, so for a moral and spiritual order as lucid and convincing and complete as the mechanical and organic, the poetic creed asks and will continue to ask. It requires a cosmos not in part but throughout intelligible, the beatific vision of perfect beauty and absolute rationality. "It aims," in the language of Hegel, "to present in forms for the imagination features of the ultimate ideal of the harmonised universe." And therefore poesy "was ever thought," as Bacon said, "to have some participation of divineness, because it raises and erects the mind by submitting the shows of things to the desires of the mind, whereas reason doth buckle and bow the mind into the nature of things." No arguments will reconcile the poet to an imperfectly responsive world. For if irresponsible, there can be no alternative but to regard art as a manufactory of delusions, and poetry in particular as elaborate "nonsense-verse." In the sphere of mere mechanical evolution there is no room for ideals. Ideals are for it the disastrous consequence of a mental and emotional development far beyond the needs of man's material and temporary needs, since, to employ again the language of Hegel, "he has transcended in his thought the possibilities of existence, and elicited from and for his supposed structure an emotion which has no justification." Take it as you will, poetry appears meaningless except as a revelation of the possibilities of the soul. Narrow life to its more obvious appearances, decline its larger suggestions, and we must count ourselves betrayed by a vast conspiracy of the poets, who, in their fancied inspiration, have followed not a *vera lux* but the marsh fires of a night of storm. And Nature is herself in the conspiracy, the prime author of their delusions, since they have found in themselves no other instincts than those she has implanted, and nursed only the fires she has kindled. At least the poets, even if deceived, have honourably fulfilled their obligations; they have been the just and unswerving interpreters of the heart's desire.

Poetry, like all art, is then best understood as an expression

of the inner necessities of human nature, a gradual unfolding to itself of the unconscious mind of humanity. And poetic inspiration I take to be an unusual exhibition of the power to discover and make known, as far as the imperfections of human speech permit, the true nature of the objects from which the spirit of man derives the fullest and most enduring satisfaction. "Of genius in the fine arts," said Wordsworth, "the only infallible sign is the widening of the sphere of human sensibility." It is indisputable. Inspiration, that is, discloses the things which once seen are appreciated; it opens to us, step by step, the world with which we are in secret but unconscious sympathy. Thus, in the phrase of Keats, "the imagination may be compared to Adam's dream; he awoke and found it truth." In the final computation of values we accept the disclosures, the predictions of the diviners. And if this be so, the best poems are simply those which are truest to human nature, to the latent, however, no less than to the developed powers, affections, aspirations. The best poets are those who know the minds of men better than they themselves.

There resides, indeed, in oracular utterances, as there resides in miracles, no power to coerce the unwilling mind. And if one be asked, therefore, to supply a test, to enumerate the convincing signs of genuine inspiration, one is compelled to decline such a responsibility. Time was when men in doubt about the inspiration of a book consulted other books on the matter, to read and perhaps to be persuaded by the rigour of the argument. They have ceased to do so. And it would certainly be unwise to offer any criterion by which the message of the true prophet may be distinguished from that of the false. "Therein the patient must minister to himself." There is no other criterion than the answering impulse, and who will analyse for us the emotion of conviction, the mystic union of the mind with itself?

But the existing order? How if the inspired doctrines clash with this? On one side we may have the oracular delightful poet, enamoured of liberty, capable of charming our souls

with his honey-sweet minstrelsy. How if on the other we have the established social system, a network of conventions and restrictions? The poet representing the desires and ideals of the soul, the divine passion of the soul to be itself and to be happy, encounters; it may be, the laws and prescriptions of society. At every point he is met with "Thou shalt not" and becomes resentful and indignant and claims a perfect freedom. What is to be done with him? Well, said Plato, when he comes to our city "we will fall down and worship him as a sweet and holy and wonderful being, but we must also inform him that there is no place for such as he in our state—the law will not allow them. And so when we have anointed him with myrrh, and set a garland on his head, we shall send him away to another city." But let us remonstrate with the philosopher. Clearly in the best appointed states things are not altogether as they should be, and the good citizen is continually employed upon the effort to improve them. Can we then accept the dream world of the poet as the pattern to be followed? There would seem, indeed, to be no alternative. Plato's method of dismissing him with formal honours would serve admirably if we were assured that he represented no opinions but his own, if we were assured that he was not the mouthpiece of some divine and universal requirement. But in that case what hinders to keep him with us as a harmless social entertainer? The difficulty lies here, that the poet is no source of danger unless he happen to give expression more boldly, more lucidly, more convincingly than others, to the still unconscious mind of humanity. An ideal community would have nothing to fear from him. It is the imperfect society which is alarmed, and has reason to be alarmed, lest his restless probing of the mind may raise the unconscious spirit to a knowledge of its true necessities, and fill it with resistless passion for a fuller self-realisation.

The more excellent world of the poet, in so far as it is a more excellent world, can hardly be denied inspiration, but it is a perpetual menace to the inferior and existing order.

Amid things incomprehensible it provides things lucid and satisfying, amid things painful and disordered things joyous and shapely. And it would therefore appear to be best for reason to make her peace with the poet, and, with what haste she may, construct an objective world after the pattern he so persistently supplies, in such measure as within the conditions of time and space and the weakness of human nature the pattern may be realised. For until some means be found to drug or destroy the imagination it will continue to drag the reason at the wheels of its victorious car, to proclaim unceasingly the "ultimate angel's law," and announce with inexpugnable conviction the approaching ruin of "tyrannies, moulting sick, in the dreadful wind of change."

W. MACNEILE DIXON.

GLASGOW.

WHERE FAITH AND MORALITY MEET.¹

JOHN JAY CHAPMAN.

AMONG all the changes of creeds and of customs, there are in any society always two types of men. There is the man of good conduct, whose life illustrates moral truth, and there is the religious person who consciously experiences moral truth. Even in ancient Egypt or in ancient Rome these types must have existed—the ethical person and the religious person. And if we were forced to choose between them we should prefer the man of conduct to the man of feeling. We reverence the good man who is not interested in religion more than the religious person who is not good; and in so doing we cast a doubt upon all dogmatic formulations of truth. There is something in religion which can only be expressed through conduct. This is the reason for parables, which are mere pictures of conduct, and leave the mysteries of faith unsolved. We may consider ethics as life in the round, or as religion in practice. The distinction is convenient, but not ultimate. It is easy to see that ethical conduct must somehow be a form of religion. Any statement of ethical truth comes into competition with religion. Your Ethical Society, for instance, treads on the toes of the churches. The teaching that goes on in this building is, in a sense, religious teaching. By calling it ethical you do not prevent it from being a branch and form of religion.

¹ This was delivered in a course (before the Ethical Culture Society in New York) where each lecturer assigned some book to be read in connection with the lecture. The New Testament was the book recommended.

Ethics is separated from religion very much as the churches are separated from one another—by wavy lines of prejudice and education. It is with these lines that we have to do. It is they that rule our philosophy; I do not say that they rule our lives so much as they rule our statements. There is a realm of discussion, and it is in this realm of dissension that words become important. Words are powers—like water power and electricity; and we find them running and circulating about the world with natures and meanings of their own which we cannot control. History has determined the matter and has bound us up as with chains in the meanings of these creatures, words. For instance, anyone to-day who uses the word *God* is talking Hebrew, not the Hebrew of Palestine, but that Hebrew of modern accent, with two thousand years of Western Christianity in its voice. You cannot wash the significance out of the word nor cast another meaning upon it, though you speak with the tongue of genius. The quandary of the scholar becomes very apparent when he translates the Greek and Roman classics. In this case the modern writer has difficulty in attributing to the pagan gods the right kind of divinity. When he uses the God with a capital G in depicting classic mythology, he not only gives us a qualm on behalf of Jehovah, but he does a refined kind of violence to the pagan myth. He owes two apologies.

Symbols mean so much, and become so identified with particular causes that we fear to use them. The thing we are afraid of is lest *they* shall use *us*. Every man I meet is afraid of a different kind of a surplice. Some dread gestures, as implying they know not what of dogma or claim. To bow at the creed or not to bow gives equally sincere shivers to opposing classes of persons, who in dress, food, and moral code are indistinguishable. How explain these labyrinthine antipathies, this deadly war of masonic signs and murderous shibboleths? Each one of them must for explanation be looked up historically. Each one of them has a most simple

explanation—an explanation *in fact*. Some disagreeable episode is at the back of each and every ebullition of sentiment. These rancours are the fumes of old controversy. We are still carrying on the animosities of the wars of religion. The Reformation is still in progress. The smell of incense continues for generation after generation to arouse the strongest animosities known to human nature. The Gothic Church may crumble, but the sentiment of hostility to all it once typified endures. So also the counter sentiment of attachment to it and hatred of the Reformer endure. If I am a Roman Catholic I may not sing “Lead, kindly Light” till *after* Newman’s conversion. To do so might imply something that I do not mean. Thus are we all slaves to formula, and slaves to the fear of formula—slaves as it were to history.

Thoughts like these passed through my mind as I left this building the last time I was in it. The occasion was about a year ago. I had come here to attend a lecture of one of your foremost teachers—one of the pillars of the Ethical Society, and one of the most notable saints in the city. This man was lecturing to young men on Epictetus. It was a strange academy—a kind of mad tea-party. The students were most of them muscular young Hebrews, with an immense reverence for their instructor’s character and a marked scepticism as to his modes of reasoning. Not one in the room—myself least of all—knew anything about Epictetus. The system of instruction was as follows:—The master read a few sentences out of Epictetus, and then asked a question of the nearest Hebrew. If the teacher did not like the answer he received—and he never did like it—he flung the young Hercules to the ground and pounded his head with the volume till the boy cried for mercy. Then he patted the boy’s shoulder, gave him an affectionate hug, the protagonists took their places again, and the séance was resumed. At times the contagion of argument spread, and the whole class fell upon the floor in *mêlée*, while Epictetus scored a touch-down. At the end of the lesson we were not fatigued, but exhilarated. It was good

to have been there. These boys went home stirred and filled with vitality. I understood why it was that the Ethical Society was one of the religious bodies which constantly sends forth young men into practical reform work.

During the *conférence* I kept muttering to myself from time to time, "Why Epictetus?" You see I was trying to fix my mind on Epictetus and to remember who he was. Of course some word was mentioned now and then about morality and religion, duty, service, and so forth; but I could not seize or identify these flying thoughts. I knew that I had read about all these things somewhere before, but I could not remember where it was. At last my eye caught sight of a small grey volume, which did not look like a book, but like—like an object, a clothes-brush perhaps. It was a little hotel Bible, which was part of the furniture of the room, but which had not been noticed or mentioned during the proceedings. It seemed to be shrinking and fading away. I picked it up. It was quite illegible and had never been legible. No wonder the volume had never been opened. Yet it was there—a Bible. There in that little wizened package lay the great Hebrew mind, the only mind that is worthy to be called mind at all, so far as Ethics goes, the fountain of all enduring ethical thought, the source of all enduring ethical power. There lay the A B C of Western religion, if one desired the historic view; there the symbols of living ethical faith—that faith which is the nearest one we could reach if we threw a stone out of the window. I am speaking of the whole Bible, the Hebrew contribution to the world, the Old and New Testaments as a single body of thought. For the philosophic content and the mode of looking at life is the same in all parts of Jewish literature. It is impossible to understand the New Testament except through the Old, and *vice versa*.

In the class-rooms of the Ethical Society the Bible seemed to be a thing aloof—perhaps a delicate subject. Why was this? Because Christ was rejected by the Jews two thousand years ago, and because Christ said many things that people

have since disagreed about. The prejudices of the Ethical Society are easily explained. It was founded in the nineteenth century, chiefly by Hebrews, and in order to rescue ethical truth from the clutches of dogma—the dogmas of Western Christianity and Western Judaism. The clouds that hung about its birth trouble the manhood of the Society. The same thing is true of the Protestant Episcopal Church. The same thing is true of all churches and of all institutions: their origins limit their influence. Their origins live along with them and cramp their mind.

The Ethical Society was to have been pure intellect, and lo, it is almost as full of prejudices as the next religious body. This is no one's fault; it is a process in human affairs.

I will tell you another anecdote which illustrates the reverse action of Ethical force, that is to say, it illustrates how benevolence is able to make use of all sorts of creeds, races, and dogmas without causing any trouble. The story is also about Jews. A very important Hebrew in Chicago, a man of great benevolence and vast wealth, wanted to help the Southern negroes. He got the negro question on the brain. He found by consulting with the best authorities that the most valuable thing he could do for the negroes was to raise the character of the white men at the South. One way of doing this was through the Y.M.C.A. So then this Hebrew of the Hebrews subscribes enormous sums to found white Christian Associations (from which negroes are excluded) as his best way of reaching negro conditions. It required the discovery of America to provide a field which should show up phenomena of this kind. The real forces of goodness and badness run right through every person and every institution, and the notion of segregating truth into churches, schools, and theories is becoming visibly more absurd as the years go by.

There is no doubt that humanity is held apart by dogmas and statements of truth, by attempts to define truth. Humanity is drawn together by warm-hearted conduct. And yet the conduct we approve often rests upon dogmas which

we do not approve. The dogmas then are as important as the conduct. While reasoned and sensible statements of Ethical truth seem well enough for a certain class of minds, there are great realms of power where Ethics does not run. Nay, if you examine closely you will find that these sensible statements are always criticisms and qualified acceptances of religious truth. They are finger-posts pointing to religion.

Moral truth is born in the form of religion. Afterwards comes ethical theory and rakes in the ashes for precepts. You cannot run the Salvation Army upon Ethical statements, nor abolish Slavery through Ethical Culture. The movement would have to be heated and vaporised into steam power before its blows would tell. In the process God would be discovered. Pure Ethics has a weak voice. She has no poets of high rank, no prophets with heart-cleaving words. She is a handmaid, a note at the bottom of another's text. Ethics has a weak voice, it is true, and has said little of importance to humanity or about humanity; but she has a strong hand and has done much for humanity. She sometimes saves the fragments where theologies clash and hope to destroy one another. But let me tell you my belief. Without Theology she would perish, for Ethics is a feeble plant, hardly self-perpetuating. Ethics must draw constant life from religion—and ever new life from new religion, or it becomes a husk, and humanity discards it.

If these things are true, then your Ethical Society must live by becoming to some extent a Theological Institute. Nay, it is one already. Your programme this Winter shows eighteen meetings of which the subjects have been announced. Ten concern Robert Browning; one is on Dante. Now Browning and Dante are pure Theology. Thus Ethical theory camps out on the abandoned farms of Theology.

The thing I would say to you young people is this: Pursue the road you are in. Follow the stream to its source. Read Browning and Dante and Milton and then go to the source of them, which is the New Testament, and read that. Read it

not merely for Ethics, but unreservedly for all that comes out of it. If Theology comes to you out of it—and it will—accept it, and have no fear of it. The fear men have of Theology is due to the political abuses of the past. We go on trembling at the robe, after the tyrant is dead. Some people fear candles on an altar. There is no harm in candles. If you light candles each one of you on the altar of his own heart, there will be more light in the world.

Those dim poets, Dante and Browning, shed a light and show a sort of beam out of the infinite; but you must be a beam in yourself, and not fear the glow and heat that may come from a deeper understanding of life—when it begins to reach you from behind the poets.

There has recently been an age of agnosticism: it is closing. An age of faith is in progress. The Desert of Agnosticism has been crossed; and some of those leaders who helped multitudes to pass across it, were destined not to enter the promised land themselves. Such men are ever among the greatest of their generation. I am thinking of William James, who was in himself more than he either saw or thought. At the time he was writing I saw in him only the ineffectual thinker, but later I came to see in him the saint. The vice with which his mind was tainted was the very vice of which I should accuse the Ethical Society—a fear of the symbols of religion. His heart had been a little seared by early terror. The intellectual part of him was enfeebled by the agnosticism of 1870. And yet what difference did it make? Some sort of light shone out of his cloud as he took his way across the sands, and men followed him. I speak of him here, because his life is a type of mystery. He is there before us, but he can no more be grasped than a phantom.

We also, in like manner, are mysteries, and our words, deeds, and notions are merely phantoms. Behind each one there is something which others see better than the man himself sees. The controlling element in our lives is unknown to us. All our language is personal; we cannot hand our faith

to another. This has always been true. Even in the Middle Ages when faith was theoretically uniform it was always practically individual. Every mind has a law of its own. The idiom of it is formed slowly in each one of us and must be waited for patiently. You must not accept another man's terms of thought or sacrifice the integrity of your mind at any time. It may be that you are not destined to experience religion. Very well, accept this destiny; acceptance is the beginning as it is the end of religion. We must each walk our own path and move in that direction where glimmers the dawn—or what looks like the dawn leaving the rationale of our conduct to the outcome. By following our inner feeling, no matter how quaintly it may express itself, or how remote it may seem from the usual modes of expression, we shall set ourselves on the road towards the great discoveries. I say, accept your powerlessness and accept your peculiarities. There was no one ever exactly like you. No wonder, then, that other people's statements means little to you. Those statements may hereafter come to mean something, by looming up behind the things that have been revealed to you through your own conduct. All the great temples have been dedicated to this same inner God, and have been builded in this silence. The secret of the heart—a thing personal and intimate—being expressed, stated perhaps with diffidence, turns out to be the great lamp of truth, an axis on which human life turns, and has ever turned.

The New Testament is the Thesaurus of sacred wisdom compared to which there is no book or monument that deserves to be named. It is a personal record and contains things—one might say—almost too personal to be published. Of this nature is its importance, and from this source—neither from Church nor from commentator—flows its power.

JOHN JAY CHAPMAN.

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THE MIDDLE AGES, THE RENAISSANCE, AND THE MODERN MIND.

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THE coloured windows of the Gothic cathedrals and the dazzling lights of Dante's *Paradiso* are no mere accidental expressions of the medieval spirit. It demanded bright and gorgeous colouring for the expression of its intense emotional life. — The *Romance of the Rose*, the story of *Abelard and Heloise*, the ideals of chivalry and the love poetry of Provence are as truly medieval as are the lives of the saints, so full of fervour and poetry, or the magnificent Latin hymns. Dante fainting at sight of Beatrice is medieval in the intensity, the almost morbid intensity of the medieval spirit. The fine-spun, over-subtle distinctions of scholastic philosophy are indeed frequently pedantic, but it was a pedantry largely due to love of traditional forms which were closely knit into the general mind and sanctioned by the emotional life which they expressed and nourished. Frequently, too, it was due to a love of symbolism, of the word as more than the thought, of language as an instrument of power and not merely of expression, as valuable for its emotional suggestiveness as well as for its intellectual content. The Holy Mass of the Roman Church, symbolic in its every word and action, is a no less typical creation than is Gothic architecture. All the best medieval thinking is impassioned thought, emotionally charged with love and fear. It was spiritually intense, with all the high

lights and deep shadows of a vivid inner life. To realise how greatly the modern mind has been enriched by its medieval inheritance we have only to compare the work of Michael Angelo with that of Phidias and Praxiteles. We speak of the emotional atmosphere of Michael Angelo as being not Greek but modern—yes, modern, but only if that term is taken in its widest sense as including the medieval, and as opposed only to the ancient or classical.

Owing to the present-day predominance of science over art, we are apt carelessly to assume that ignorance of mind and poverty of soul must go hand in hand. No conclusion is more false. Anthropologists would seem to be working round to the view that imagination is the faculty which more truly than reason distinguishes man from the animals. The power to form free images has chiefly enabled man to emancipate himself from a given environment and to subordinate it to his needs. It is to imagination also that religion and the arts are in large part due; and when inspired by fitting standards of value, it will interpret the universe and human life more adequately than a more enlightened generation that has no recognised controlling values through which to master humanely and appropriate its accumulated body of knowledge. The periods of enlightenment and the periods of spiritual greatness, as manifested in the arts, in religion, and in social life, by no means coincide. And, as a rule, standards of value make their appearance in the general life long prior to any possibility of their theoretical establishment. And so it would seem to be in the development of the European mind. Modern values that have called for a reconstruction of life not yet completed, were, it would seem, first brought into existence under the stimulus and discipline of medieval conditions.

An alteration of emotional values is the most infallible sign, both in the development of the individual and in the history of humanity, of radical transformation in the structure of life, and is laden with consequences as far-reaching as any that can be caused by additions to our knowledge. Now, in

the Middle Ages the European scale of emotional and spiritual values was not only extended and enriched, but was profoundly altered in its standards. And I shall strive to maintain that the chief contribution of medieval life to modern civilisation exactly consists in this deepening and transvaluation of the standards of judgment. But, as I have said, I shall indicate only indirectly, through criticism of the defects of the classical tradition, in what this contribution consists.

In the transition to modern standpoints two very distinct sets of causes were contributory: on the one hand, the new discoveries geographical and scientific, and, on the other hand, the revival of Greek and Hebrew studies. Of the first set of causes much might be said. I shall single out for consideration only the new astronomy. The entire scheme of medieval theology rests upon the assumption that the earth is the sole planet inhabited by a race of beings similar to man. The discovery, therefore, that the stars are suns identical in nature with our own, and therefore presumably surrounded by planets similar to the earth, was most disconcerting. It is not surprising that Giordano Bruno, the philosopher of the Copernican system, should have been condemned by the Church. If it was to burn any heretic, it could not have chosen a more fitting victim. His philosophy demonstrated very clearly the necessity for a radical reconstruction of Church dogma.

But we must distinguish between the religious attitude and its theological interpretation. And in terms of this distinction we may say that though the Copernican astronomy dealt the deathblow to the traditional theology, it has strengthened the higher and deeper elements in the religious consciousness, and has favoured the elimination of its more compromising features. The religious consciousness and the Ptolemaic cosmology hardly seem to harmonise. Who has not felt in reading Dante the almost grotesque character of the cosmical setting which the current astronomy compelled him to give to the sublime mysteries of his Christian Faith?

It was excellently suited to his realistic imagination, but it was incongruous with the conceptions which he was seeking to body forth.

Calvin was no scientist, and held to the traditional cosmology, but in cutting away from the medieval theology those doctrines which seemed to him inconsistent with the teaching of the Old and New Testaments, he developed a religion which at its best breathes the very spirit of the new astronomy. The Calvinist teaching almost demands a Copernican astronomy as the only appropriate setting for human life, the fitting manifestation of a Divine Being before whose perfection, as Calvin delights to insist, even the Cherubim faint with fear and shade their eyes. What I mean will become clear if we take a passage from the opening chapter of Calvin's *Institutes*:

"Very remote from the divine purity is what seems in us the highest perfection. Hence that horror and amazement with which the Scripture always represents the saints to have been impressed and disturbed, on every discovery of the presence of God. For when we see those, who before his appearance stood secure and firm, so astonished and affrighted at the manifestation of his glory, as to faint and almost expire with fear, we must infer that man is never sufficiently affected with a knowledge of his own meanness, till he has compared himself with the Divine Majesty. Of this consternation we have frequent examples in the Judges and prophets; so that it was a common expression among the Lord's people: 'We shall die, because we have seen God.' . . . And what can man do, all vile and corrupt, when fear constrains even the cherubim themselves to veil their faces? This is what the prophet Isaiah speaks of: 'The moon shall be confounded, and the sun ashamed, when the Lord of Hosts shall reign'; that is, when he shall make a fuller and nearer exhibition of his splendour, it shall eclipse the splendour of the brightest object beside."¹

The new astronomy has been one of the abiding sources of the ineradicable differences between Greek and modern interpretations of life. It has tended to confer upon modern modes of thinking something of that spirit of moral intensity and religious humility which are so characteristically medieval. It has brought us into closer sympathy with, and better understanding of, the Hebrew attitude of mind—the attitude of

¹ Allen's translation.

inspired humility, which teaches that fear, and not wonder, as the Greeks in their intellectualism have sought to maintain, is the beginning of wisdom. Not a craven fear that swamps the mind, but a fear that searches the spirit, steadying it to clearer vision, and awakening it to consciousness of the serious issues of life.

But I turn to the second main set of causes, generative of the Renaissance, the revival of Greek, and in minor degree of Hebrew, studies. The Renaissance in its earlier periods largely consisted in a twofold attempt to restore antiquity. The majority of the humanists were chiefly interested in classical antiquity, but others, among whom we must count Reuchlin and Erasmus as well as Calvin, were much more concerned in penetrating to the sources of the Christian tradition. The *Hebrew Rudiments* of Reuchlin appeared in 1506. Erasmus published his edition of the Greek New Testament in 1516, and his editions of the Christian Fathers appeared in succeeding years.¹ Calvin, who came in the second generation of the Reformation movement, when it could first hope to succeed in adequately formulating to itself its philosophy of life, especially concerns us, and I may briefly dwell upon the profound influence which he has exercised.

Calvin is a modern, and belongs to the modern world. He was a very competent humanist, and his first work was a commentary on Seneca's *De Clementia*. But his historical significance is due chiefly to his sympathy with what we may call medievalism, to the fact that he reformulated medieval ideals in austere and noble form, and that he successfully carried them forward as living forces into the modern world.

¹ Cf. Bacon, *Advancement of Learning*, bk. i. iv., s. 2: "Martin Luther, conducted (no doubt) by a higher providence, but in discourse of reason, finding what a province he had undertaken against the bishop of Rome and the degenerate traditions of the Church, and finding his own solitude, being no ways aided by the opinions of his own time, was enforced to awake all antiquity and to call former times to his succour to make a party against the present time: so that the ancient authors, both in divinity and in humanity, which had long slept in libraries, began generally to be read and revolved."

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Professedly what he sought to do was to return to Christian antiquity, and to restore it in its pure and pristine form. What he actually achieved was to formulate the strictly medieval view of human life and destiny in the most unrelieved and definite manner. This success was due to his elimination of ecclesiastical and secondary considerations of every kind. His teaching is the teaching of St Paul, as interpreted by St Augustine. In this respect it is exactly analogous in character to the Jansenist movement, which in the seventeenth century and within the Roman Church generated the noble group of the Port Royal. It makes everything rest upon the doctrine of original sin, and views that doctrine not as a mere dogma, referring to a long-past historical event, the sin of our first parents, but as a correct and literal reading of human nature as it presents itself in each and every man. It declares that man is defective in will power, and is helplessly enslaved by passions and desires which in the most insidious fashion flatter his human pride and conceal from him his weak and evil state. I may cite the passage which in the *Institutes* immediately precedes that above quoted:

"It is plain that no man can arrive at the true knowledge of himself, without having first contemplated the divine character, and then descended to the consideration of his own. For such is the native pride of us all, we invariably esteem ourselves righteous, innocent, wise, and holy, till we are convinced, by clear proofs, of our unrighteousness, turpitude, folly, and impurity. But we are never thus convinced, while we confine our attention to ourselves, and regard not the Lord, who is the only standard by which this judgment ought to be formed. . . . The eye accustomed to see nothing but black, judges that to be very white, which is but whitish, or perhaps brown. . . . Thus also it happens in the consideration of our spiritual endowments. For as long as our views are bounded by the earth, perfectly content with our own righteousness, wisdom, and strength, we fondly flatter ourselves, and fancy we are little less than demigods. But if we once elevate our thoughts to God, and consider his nature, and the consummate perfection of his righteousness, wisdom, and strength, to which we ought to be conformed, . . . what strangely deceived us under the title of wisdom will be despised as extreme folly; and what wore the appearance of strength will be proved to be most wretched impotence. So very remote from the divine purity is what seems in us the highest perfection. Hence that horror and amazement with which the Scripture always represents the saints to have been impressed and disturbed, on every discovery of the presence of God."

Thus at the very time when the Greek spirit, in its freedom and self-assurance, was gaining converts on every side, Calvin reformulated the alternative interpretation of life. His theology is, like all the best medieval thought, genuinely mystical. It is Augustinian, and that is to say medieval, in the intensity of its emotional force. It is intense in exact proportion to its self-restraint, and to the narrowing of the channels in which it is made to run. Not expansiveness but sincerity and intensity are its ideals, not self-realisation but self-mastery, not happiness but discipline for the sake of a supreme perfection entirely transcendent of anything immediately attainable in a present successful and happy life. It would contrast the face, pale and drawn, of the Christian saint, in his never-ceasing combat for a surpassing perfection, with the ideal of health and competency, of success and achievement, to which the classical spirit pays all its homage. The one is preoccupied with the fact of inevitable failure for all who are living the religious life, who are aiming at ideals which transcend their powers and induce a perpetual humility of soul. It emphasises man's natural weakness, his lack of inspiration and lack of power. The aim of the other is health of body and social efficiency, and these being under favourable conditions readily attainable, it feels justified in maintaining that normal human powers are entirely adequate to all appeals that may be made upon them. It is, of course, to some reconciliation of these divergent ideals,—and it is useless to refuse to recognise that they constantly diverge and often conflict,—that the modern spirit aspires.

Now, as I have just said, the Renaissance was, at starting, largely historical in its interests. These historical interests originated, however, in the belief, entertained by the Renaissance scholars, that in returning to the past they were returning to the sources of all true life, secular and religious, and were therefore preparing the way for a better understanding of present conditions. Like so many reformers, they meant "forward," though their cry was "back!" Their historical

interests were only secondarily historical; they were really pragmatic in aim.

For this, and for other reasons into which I need not enter, the historical interest gradually receded, and in place of the watchword, "return to antiquity," was substituted the rallying-cry, more adequate because more truly expressive of the actual tendencies, "return to nature and to reason." And not until the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, did any genuinely historical interest re-emerge. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were centuries of unhistorical thinking, centuries that had no real understanding of their own roots, and in which therefore tendencies all too frequently brought about their own destruction by entering into confederacy with forces that were radically inconsistent with the essential values for which they themselves stood. This is especially true of the Reformation churches during those two centuries. They failed adequately to represent and enforce the ideals which were entrusted to their keeping. Their leaders lost touch with their sources, and were dragged at the chariot wheels of an overwhelmingly victorious classical tradition; with the consequence that they shed off from their Faith just those tenets which gave it meaning and a solid foundation in the psychology of the human mind. The English Deists, for instance, actually attempted to establish Christian theology upon the doctrine of the essential goodness of human nature. This was just the sort of theology to appeal to the poet Pope, to Voltaire and to Rousseau, and in their hands it became a European force. But it is the desertion of everything for which the Protestant reformulation of medieval values had professed to stand. The same criticism may be passed upon the programme of the Jesuit Order. That Society represented very different but none the less kindred tendencies within the Mother Church. They were Pelagians, and played into the hands of the secular classical agencies abroad at the time. They were the avowed enemies of Port Royal.

When I thus maintain that in the intellectual realm the Protestant churches proved false to the medieval traditions which were in their keeping, and so became a negligible influence in the philosophical field, I employ the word "intellectual" in order to mark an important limitation. For, of course, the various evangelical movements, such as Wesleyanism in England and Pietism in Germany, had a profound influence on the general life, and preserved the medieval values in an active though submerged form. But they generated no leaders intellectually capable of rendering them a force in the sphere of philosophical reflection.

The very fact that medieval sympathies were in intellectual circles in abeyance, and that the churches which stood for medieval ideals were in the main without important intellectual influence,—this situation enabled the classical tradition to develop a new vitality, and to inspire, under the altered modern conditions, a genuinely original, and astonishingly fruitful, interpretation of life. The main stages of its development appear in Francis Bacon, John Locke, the English Deists, Voltaire, the French Encyclopedists, and Rousseau. Francis Bacon strikes a note never before sounded. He was not himself scientifically trained, and in many respects, especially owing to his ignorance of mathematics, he radically misinterpreted the methods and ideals of the new science. But he prophetically expounded, in speech of magnificent power, a new vision of human possibilities upon the earth. He taught that knowledge, scientific knowledge, is power. In virtue of his intelligence man has a creative capacity, to which no limits can be prescribed, a power of subordinating nature, and of taking the destiny which hitherto nature has controlled into his own hands. If, as it seemed to the archaeologists of that time, the Greeks may be said to have created the arts, the moderns, according to Bacon, were destined for the still greater task of recasting the entire economy of human life.

The beginnings of the next step appear in John Locke.

Bacon's vision had been limited to the material conditions of human existence. Locke applied the same free and forward-looking analysis to its political and educational aspects. And the seed which he sowed, slowly maturing, came to sudden flower in what have very fittingly been named the Enlightenment philosophies, the philosophies of the Encyclopedists and Rousseau. They taught that by the radical recasting of social institutions and by the development of new and better educational methods, human life may be transformed into something very different from, and immeasurably superior to, all that it has hitherto been. The future will be related only through contrast to the past. As Godwin, an enthusiastic supporter of this teaching, declared in his *Political Justice*: "Nothing can be more unreasonable than to argue from men as we find them, to men as they may hereafter be made." The entrance of this philosophy upon the stage of history was celebrated by the great drama of the French Revolution, which was at once the offspring of its aspirations, and the proof of its almost demoniac powers. It released energies which at once transformed it from an academic philosophy into a world-force. The Enlightenment is well named, and deserves more credit than we, who have profited by its labours, and can criticise its earlier manifestations, are usually prepared to admit. Its influence seems to me even more fundamental and far-reaching than that which has been exercised by the evolution-theories propounded by Darwin. It is the specifically modern standpoint. It is the type and norm of every philosophy which seeks to justify its methods and doctrines by the future rather than by the past. It is also the legitimate offspring of the classical tradition. For it expresses, under the altered conditions of modern life, and in view of the powerful weapon which modern science has placed in men's hands, the same free self-assurance that inspired the Greeks in the upbuilding of their civilisation. It expresses the same conviction of the supreme value of intellectual enlightenment as the chief agency of human progress.

I should like especially to emphasise the humanitarian character of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. An extremely significant feature of its humanitarianism is its comparative independence of any very real interest in moral ideals. Anyone who identifies humanitarianism and morality would seem to rule himself out from understanding the movements of history. For many of those who are genuinely humanitarian in their instincts and sympathies—Voltaire is the supreme instance, Diderot is another—are almost completely non-moral in matters of the inner life. And many who are deeply spiritual are extremely indifferent to questions of social reform.

The cause is not far to seek. The spiritually ambitious value nothing so highly as the disciplinary tutelage of affliction and hardship. The only argument that they will readily listen to is that inequality, poverty, and oppression are so excessive as to remove all possibility of moral reaction. The more secularly minded, on the other hand, themselves locating the entire meaning of life in happiness and its material conditions, vividly appreciate, and cannot so easily condone or excuse, the glaring inequalities.

This explains many things. It partly explains why the Middle Ages, spiritually so ambitious, should stand notorious in history for the brutality of their political and ecclesiastical rulers. It also in part explains why the humanitarianism through which the nineteenth century is so strongly marked off from all preceding times should be due much more truly to classical than to Christian sources, and why the Christian churches should as a rule be so very dilatory in recognising that the spirit which inspires the demand for the removal of abuses and inequalities is that which is inculcated in the Gospels. It explains why, for instance, the doctrine of natural rights—a doctrine of very composite origin, issuing from Stoic teaching embodied in Roman law — why that doctrine, theoretically so unsound, historically so beneficial, should have found many of its chief supporters among the anti-religious,

and, as in Diderot, non-moral philosophers of the eighteenth century. It also suggests the reflection that a materialistic age may very easily contrive to conceal from itself its spiritual poverty by exclusively emphasising its humanitarian activities. Here, as elsewhere, the Christian and the classical traditions have each something to teach the other.

Before passing to my next main point, let me briefly indicate what would seem to be one of the chief defects of the Enlightenment philosophies, their inadequate appreciation of the truth involved in that most characteristic and fundamental of all the medieval tenets, the doctrine of original sin. The various Enlightenment thinkers one and all start from Locke's doctrine that the mind of the new-born child is a *tabula rasa*, a sheet of white paper, upon which society and the educator may inscribe whatever they please. There are, they taught, no inborn tendencies that set a limit to the possible transformations which human nature may be made to undergo. I have already quoted Godwin's dictum: "Nothing can be more unreasonable than to argue from men as we find them, to men as they may hereafter be made." They one and all trace man's evil conduct to the perverting influence of *external* causes. The explanation of the Deists and of Voltaire was that all moral evil is ultimately traceable to superstitions invented by priests for their own private ends. In place of this absurdly inadequate anti-clerical explanation Rousseau substituted the theory which has had so important an after-history—that evil is due ultimately to economic causes, reinforced by the perverting influence of the arts and sciences. But even that explanation is one which modern psychology cannot accept. Let me quote the words of a thinker who cannot be regarded as a benighted medievalist, Thomas Huxley:—

"With all their enormous differences in natural endowment, men agree in one thing, and that is their innate desire to enjoy the pleasures and to escape the pains of life. . . . That is their inheritance (the reality at the bottom of the doctrine of original sin) from the long series of ancestors, human and semi-human and brutal, in whom the struggle of this innate tendency to

self-assertion was the condition of victory in its struggle for existence. That is the reason of the *aviditas vitæ*—the insatiable hunger for enjoyment—of all mankind. . . . The maxim 'Live according to nature' has done immeasurable mischief. . . . It has furnished an axiomatic foundation for the philosophy of philosophasters, and for the moralising of sentimentalists. . . . The pertinacious optimism of our philosophers hid from them the actual state of the case. . . . The logic of facts was necessary to convince them that the cosmos works through the lower nature of man, not for righteousness, but against it. . . . The theory of evolution encourages no millennial anticipations. . . . The cosmic nature born with us, and, to a large extent, necessary for our maintenance, is the outcome of millions of years of severe training, and it would be folly to imagine that a few centuries will suffice to subdue its masterfulness to purely ethical ends. Ethical nature may count upon having to reckon with a tenacious and powerful enemy as long as the world lasts."¹

Thus Locke's doctrine of the *tabula rasa* has given place to a sounder psychology which, if less optimistic, is no breeder of idle dreams, and need not make us any the less determined upon all possible furtherance of practicable reform. It emphasises the fact that man's future is not a natural destiny but a moral vocation, and that in face of the moral dangers by which the higher civilisation is constantly menaced, what is most called for is training and discipline in self-mastery; and so, while leaving us profoundly altered in our social aspirations by eighteenth-century optimism, restores the key for the understanding of medieval attitudes—of their moods of despair as well as of their spiritual ambitions—and indeed enables us to begin to divine what it was that the medieval moralists were after when they spoke eulogistically of fear. It was because they did not trace evil chiefly to the bodily appetites. (That is the defect in Huxley's distribution of emphasis.) The flagrantly sensuous life can be satisfying only to the vulgar-minded. The supreme source of evil according to medieval teaching is *pride* — pride in all its various and esteemed forms, emulation, desire for human affection, loyalty to this or that party or institution, and the like. It is this constant and insidious body of highly respectable temptations, and the deadening of the spiritual faculties which the yielding to them may produce—this sense of the danger of allowing the

¹ *Evolution and Ethics* (1894, Eversley series, p. 27 ff.).

heart to become set upon anything short of the highest—this was the source of the haunting fear by which the finest spirits of the Middle Ages were spurred to the never-ceasing combat of spiritual endeavour. Surely I am not wrong in saying that such a mood, while extremely unclassical, and almost unknown in the typical representatives of the eighteenth century, is by no means foreign to the modern mind. Tolstoi, for instance, a genuine modern, is profoundly medieval, and not at all Greek, in many of his spiritual traits.

And now I am brought to the last main point upon which I shall dwell. As I have argued, the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers, in losing all appreciation of the Middle Ages, severed the roots of their culture, and cut themselves off from all possibility of any genuine comprehension of the tendencies which were sweeping them along. I shall now briefly trace, in bare outline, the interesting and circuitous routes by which the Christian and medieval tradition, secluded within the unenlightened church organisations, formed other channels of expression for itself, and so forced its way back into the intellectual life of the nineteenth century.

It was in and through the various tendencies that together compose what is usually called the romantic movement (a most unfortunate and inadequate title, but one which we must employ, as no satisfactory substitute has been suggested) that the modern mind resumed contact with its medieval sources. Let me recall some of the many events for which it stands. Mallet, a Genevan, who had gone to reside in Denmark, unearthed the romantic history and discovered the ancient literature of the Scandinavian countries. One of Mallet's works was translated into English by Bishop Percy, and by it he was inspired to form his epoch-making collection of old English ballads and poetry. His *Reliques of Ancient English Poetry*, published in 1765, has justly been described as "the Bible of the Romantic reformation." It was the chief cause of Sir Walter Scott's early awakened interest

in the past, and it likewise influenced Herder, the father of German Romanticism. Prior to Percy's *Reliques* in 1760 Macpherson had published his impudent but inspired forgeries, which were almost universally accepted as an ancient epic of the Celtic race. Jakob Grimm, the founder of Germanic philology, was directly inspired by a body of Celtic students—Celts—*celto-maniacs*, as they were called—with whom he became acquainted while on a visit to Paris. He returned to Germany to collect the folk-lore, fairy-tales, and dialects of the German people. He published the first volume of his epoch-making *Deutsche Grammatik* in 1819. The romance of the Middle Ages was first studied by Thomas Warton and Richard Hurd, who in 1762 published his *Letters on Chivalry and Romance*. Hurd was also one of the first to appreciate the beauties of medieval architecture, hitherto denounced as barbarous and Gothic.

Thus new and wonderful worlds full of imaginative appeal were opened out to the astonished gaze of a generation which had lost all knowledge of its own past, and which was already weary of the arid and purely intellectual dogmas of the Enlightenment philosophies.

An immense impetus was given to this historical interest in the romantic past by the discovery that the sacred language of the Hindoos, a language rich in a very noble sacred literature, is akin to those of Western Europe. This discovery worked powerfully on men's imagination and inspired the most enthusiastic study not only of Sanscrit and the Vedas, but of all the accessible sacred writings of the Oriental peoples. And in due course the Bible, especially the Old Testament, which had hitherto been more or less despised as a relic of a merely barbarous and superstitious age, was re-read with renewed interest and a deeper human understanding. The Bible soon became one of the chief sources of romantic inspiration.

That, however, was in large part also due to the influence of a work, now seldom read, and not indeed very readable,

save for occasional passages, which played an important rôle in the opening decades of the nineteenth century—Chateaubriand's *Génie du Christianisme*, published in 1802. As a European influence, awakening the mind of his generation to a keen and sympathetic interest in medieval life and ideals, Chateaubriand preceded Scott, whose *Waverley* was not published until 1814. Hitherto Christianity had been associated, in the minds of the enlightened, chiefly with the abuses and intolerance, and with all that was most odious and degenerate in the surviving medieval Church. Chateaubriand imaginatively depicted and sympathetically portrayed all that is sublime, generous, or tender in the teaching, history, and ideals of the Church. And the enthusiasm with which his message was welcomed marked the extent to which it opened out fresh sources of thought and feeling, and satisfied needs which had been starved on the scanty spiritual fare of the intellectual philosophies.

This interest in the past, though at first largely literary and imaginative, soon became genuinely historical, and finally scientific. It led, by easy and natural stages, to the creation, not only of history strictly so-called, but also of the historical sciences of philology, of comparative religion, of the development of social institutions and of morals. The historical and genetic method came more and more to be the method almost universally employed in the various human sciences. This method finally, through Cuvier, Lamarck, Lyell, and others, invaded the geological and biological sciences, and in the hands of Darwin gave rise to the modern evolutionary science of biology; and its astonishing success in this department powerfully reinforced the hold which it had already obtained in the human disciplines.

The romantic movement has undoubtedly inspired many extremely reactionary tendencies. No movement that looks upon the Middle Ages with admiration and sympathy could help doing so. But in the main its influence has been on the line of genuine progress—deepening our thought, enrich-

ing the emotional and spiritual life, and enabling us more wisely to direct those humanitarian enterprises upon which, thanks largely to the eighteenth century, the modern mind is immovably set. We have only to think of Edmund Burke in the field of political theory, and to compare him with such as Montesquieu, to realise that, profound and impressive as the latter undoubtedly is, and reactionary as Burke could often prove, a new and deeper way of thinking is making its appearance—one that in its reverence for tradition and for the organic processes that transcend the scope of the designing intelligence vindicates something very valuable in medieval attitudes, too valuable to be ever again lost. The state is an organic growth, that, like language, is capable of being altered only in accordance with *indemonstrable* laws inherent to itself. I say *indemonstrable* laws, for romanticism, at its best, culminates in a very genuine empiricism. Just as in social matters it would emphasise the analogy between the development of social life and the development of language, so in the field of logic it would stress the analogy of the work of art. The significance of a work of art is always bound up with the special detail of its uniquely individual character ; and only through patient study, specially directed upon it, can its meaning be deciphered. If all reality be interpreted in this fashion, only a genuinely empirical method can be regarded as adequate. The sweeping generalisations, and the correspondingly wide deductions, of enlightenment theory seem to the romanticist a caricature of genuine thinking. The Encyclopedists, in ignoring the specific characteristics of the individual (and they were always speaking about man and humanity in the abstract), turn their backs upon the source of all true insight.

For this reason romanticism, in its best forms, has proved extremely favourable to the cultivation of the sciences. It is inspired by the conviction that the details of nature and of history are pregnant with mysteries more marvellous than any which the discursive understanding or mere fancy can possibly divine, and are therefore worthy of the most laborious study.

And yet, being, if I may so name it, a visionary empiricism rooted in the sense of wonder, it has discountenanced the uninspired accumulation of mere detail. It has insisted upon the indispensableness of that element of hypothesis or theory, of meaning and significance, which is so underestimated in the philosophies of Bacon and Locke.

Romanticism has also, in equal degree, proved favourable to the philosophical disciplines. For the great scientific periods and the great philosophical periods have always, for very good reasons, more or less coincided. The period when the mathematical sciences were getting on to their feet was also the period of Socrates and Plato. The Middle Ages, second-rate in philosophy, are negligible in the matter of science. The eighteenth-century thinkers were, with very few exceptions, theorists, in the bad sense of that term; and they one and all followed Voltaire in denouncing metaphysics as idle, incompetent, and altogether fruitless. Nineteenth-century thinking, in becoming historical and genuinely empirical in method, led to a rejuvenating of the philosophical sciences. What Hegel, for instance, set himself to do was to rationalise romanticism, to develop the logic which its higher empiricism presupposes. And this task he fulfilled with a wealth of historical knowledge and with a wonderful felicity of illustration, in his doctrine of what he named the *concrete* universal. That is why he inspired so many of the foremost historical students of his time—Renan and Strauss, Proudhon and Karl Marx, Michelet, Taine, Ranke, Zeller, and a host of other less distinguished scholars. The measure of Hegel's success is, I should say, the degree in which he profited by the fruitful influences of the romantic movement. The extent to which he failed was determined by his retention, in spite of his deeper tendencies, of the excessive rationalism of the Enlightenment philosophies. He professed to be able to rationalise history in the light of his doctrine of logical dialectic. The result is all too frequently a flagrant violation of the fundamental romanticist principle, that only by mastery of significant detail can ultimate meanings be even approximately discerned.

But the tasks of philosophy, as formulated by Hegel, still remain the central tasks of present-day speculation. That may be seen even in the current popularity of the Bergsonian metaphysics. In his stressing of creative activity and of what he names intuition, Bergson would seem to incline as unduly towards an extreme romanticism as did Hegel towards an excessive rationalism. Bergson is, however, a comprehensive and genuinely philosophical thinker, for he at least valiantly strives to transcend the oppositions and half-truths to which all those thinkers succumb who are inspired exclusively by classical or medieval ideals, and who are therefore not prepared to look for inspiration impartially, as occasion may offer, to both of those great traditions. The really great nineteenth-century philosophical thinkers have sought, at least in aim and purpose, even, for instance, such as Auguste Comte, to fulfil the noble ambition of the medieval and early Renaissance thinkers, that of vindicating the unity of all past human endeavour, the ultimate working together of classical and Christian influences to the upbuilding of a civilisation in which both alike may find their completion and justification.

I may conclude by briefly restating my main thesis. The task of the Renaissance thinkers was that of combining, in a more adequate synthesis than was possible in the Middle Ages, the two great traditions upon which our European civilisation rests, the Christian and the classical. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the two sets of influences acted and reacted upon one another in the most complex fashion. Both are prominent in Michael Angelo, and even in Calvin. But in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the medieval forces failed to maintain themselves in the intellectual field, with the consequence that the classical tradition acquired a predominant influence and generated, under the altered conditions of modern life, a genuinely new and profoundly fruitful interpretation of life, in what have very fittingly been named the Enlightenment philosophies. To them our humanitarianism, our belief in reason and in

reasoned foresight, are in large part due. But towards the end of the eighteenth century the inevitable reaction began to appear. The medieval forces which had been driven underground, and which had actively survived only in such popular movements as Wesleyanism and Pietism, or in the corresponding movements within the Roman Church, but which, as it would almost seem, had accumulated upon themselves, rather than weakened, in the prolonged and unfavouring age of reason, now formed new channels of expression for themselves, and so forced their way back into the intellectual life of the nineteenth century. The complex of connected tendencies thus set agoing have been very inadequately named the romantic movement. Through it the modern mind resumed contact with its medieval sources. And so at last, for the first time since the sixteenth century, or, to be more accurate, since the middle of the seventeenth, the two opposed interpretations of life, the Christian and the classical, adequately represented and convincingly maintained, stood face to face, clamant for thinkers sufficiently Catholic to comprehend both, and to take up afresh, enriched by all the accumulated gains of the intervening centuries, those tasks to which such Renaissance scholars as Mirandola, Reuchlin, and Erasmus had in the early periods of the Renaissance so courageously devoted themselves, of reconciling, and, in view of modern circumstance, of reformulating, the two great traditions upon which our civilisation historically rests.

NORMAN KEMP SMITH.

PRINCETON, N.J.

CRITICISM OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

THE HEADMASTER OF ETON.

IT is probably well known to readers of the HIBBERT JOURNAL that our Public Schools are among our most distinctively English institutions ; and it may fairly be said that, excepting in the case of a few very modern imitations in America, there is nothing like them outside the Empire, and at present only rather pale reproductions of them in our Dominions. But among foreigners there exists a widespread and unfeigned admiration for some features of our Public School education, and every month of the school year leading educationists from Japan or China and various European States visit Winchester, Eton, Harrow, Rugby, etc., in the hope of catching the secret of something in the life of those places which they find themselves unable to produce in their own countries.

There is, therefore, something of dramatic irony in the fact that while this is going on there should be in England numerous and very vocal critics of Public Schools *en masse*, whose writings seem to betray a desire to abolish, root and branch, all that has been most distinctive of the schools, and to assimilate them to something of a Continental type : or merely to fulminate against huge and palpable defects, the existence of which no one but an interested partisan could doubt, and no governing body which was not inexplicably stupid could fail to remedy to-morrow. It appears, indeed, to those behind the scenes as if, at a time of much mental restlessness, supposing a newspaper editor is in want of some profitable "copy," it is

only necessary for him to turn on some ready scribe to write a vague and frothy tirade against the schools to secure the approval of a large circle of readers.

If this is so it is a singular fact, because, as far as outward indications go, the English system of boarding schools is apparently as well supported by the public as ever. In fact, so large is their clientele, that I am driven to the conclusion that some of the people who write these effusions, and many who read them, must be parents who, at the moment, are putting themselves out to send their sons to one of the schools. Such action might be thought inconsistent, but it could easily be paralleled in other departments of national life, and would not be surprising to any close observer of English society. But it has this drawback, that it blocks the way against thoughtful and intelligent criticism which might be valuable to headmasters. The diatribes with which the public is growing familiar are so unmeasured in statement, and exhibit so much of what looks like burning conviction, that a careful and accurate judgment pointing out blemishes and shortcomings, but always with knowledge of underlying facts, would fare ill, I fear, with magazine readers. It would be too barren of glitter and varnish and of heated and sweeping condemnations to attract attention; but meantime it may be worth saying that the schoolmasters cannot find time to attend to any random utterances of the kind mentioned. I doubt if they are more impervious to criticism than any other members of the body politic; but it is possible that their training makes them more ready to detect the difference between ignorance and knowledge of the important facts. Certain it is that if you wish to set busy men right you must show that you know something of their business; its setting in social life; its claims; its difficulties; its aims.

As one who would cordially welcome such criticism as fulfils these conditions, I venture to indicate certain facts underlying the work of the larger Public Schools which are very generally ignored, and the ignoring of which at once

turns any criticism that may follow into a "sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal." If, after reading them, some honest and wholly well-intentioned critic, who sincerely wishes to make things better than they are, should feel inclined to hold his peace, I shall be sorry: I don't wish for silence, but for consideration: for some insight into a problem among the most interesting of those which engage public attention, and the solution of which requires not controversy but co-operation.

In the first place, is it not true, broadly speaking, that the schools are so directly the outcome of the national life that to criticise them at all is like criticising the tone of a society's conversation? I imagine many people often think that in the talk of their friends and neighbours there are many things said which contribute very little to human happiness: which are only partially true; which reveal little or no interest in the speaker's mind, and so forth. But unless he is a prig and wholly devoid of tact to boot, he will never tell a drawing-room full of people that their talk is vapid or platitudinous, or inconsequent or acrid, though it often is some or all of these. Why not? Why, if he did so, would he be thought an insufferable ass? Clearly because talk is the product of personalities, and to stand on a hearthrug and inform a number of fellow-creatures that their personalities are unsatisfactory is conduct to which exception may rightly be taken. Not only would it be most offensive, but it would be wholly useless. Before you can raise the level of conversation you must raise the level not only of their minds but their characters: and that takes a long time.

To take one matter first which touches the intellectual output of our schools. It ought to be realised—but it is not—that if a boy of ten is badly grounded in some subject like Latin or mathematics there is a likelihood of his intellectual training being seriously marred all through his school life. Unless he is decidedly sharper than most boys he never clearly understands what it is all about; and it is certain that permanent harm is done to his powers of mind. But ground-

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ing in a difficult subject means care, discipline, and some severity in the Preparatory School. If the master of that school is a born teacher, or even short of this, if he is a man with a backbone and common sense, he will resist the pressure of many foolish mothers who have no idea of education except a wish that their offspring should write cheerful letters home. He will insist on the A B C of these subjects being thoroughly learnt, and for that purpose he will appeal, if needful, to fear. But if he is a bit of a weakling, or a poltroon anxious about his numbers, he will let the small boys down easily. I fear there are cases where this is done, and the master has his reward. Suppose the pressure from parents increases, is it likely that all masters will be able to withstand it? What the society is, so will the schools be.

Similarly, the schools reflect most faithfully the varying standards of character in the society whose sons they educate. Most faithfully I say: very nearly as faithfully as the talk of the five o'clock tea-party reflects the characters of the different people sitting round the table. If these are philosophical in mind, the talk will be of principles. If they are keen on making their surroundings better, they will talk *parochialia*. If they are eager to make money, there will be some *sotto voce* confidences about investments. If they read good books, they will mention them. So the schools are largely the product of the masters, and these are the outcome of the English home; the best thing of its kind in the world, but still not always intellectual in its interests, not very wide in its horizon, but inclined to make a young fellow think that a fair income, good fellowship, good holidays and plenty of golf constitute the main attractions of school work, the lifting the characters of the boys and opening their minds coming second. Supposing then that the homes begin to turn out rather more of the Philistine product than formerly, there will be more of this element among the boys, and soon more among the masters. If this is the case, as seems probable, is any good to be done by scolding the masters? If the scolding showed sympathy

and knowledge it would be listened to. If it shows neither, it is a heinous waste of time.

Much of what is written certainly shows astonishing ignorance not only of schools but of various departments of modern life, and among them of Government Departments. For the last diatribe which I had the pleasure of reading recommends a suddenly and greatly increased State control. What would this mean in actual fact?

We will consider the nationalisation of endowments. This would mean the transferring of the management of certain funds now administered by governing bodies to a State Board, nominated probably by the Board of Education. If there were the slightest presumption that one set of men would be superior to the other I should welcome the change. But if the new officials proved only as competent as the present ones, the only difference would be a fresh bureau and an increased burden on the taxes. Some people seem to think that in themselves these are good things, but I cannot believe that all critics of schools are among them. Anyone who has had any experience of a State Board knows perfectly well that the human characteristics of muddle-headedness, timidity, rashness, short-sightedness, ignorance of necessary facts, etc. etc., are present in State Boards as they are in every other group of men and women who manage anything on this earth. Is there the faintest reason for believing that in a matter of great intricacy and delicacy the State administration of the funds would be an improvement on that of the governing bodies?

But only a few of the gentlemen who clamour for radical changes in the schools express themselves so plainly as to let us see what their hopes are. For the most part they confine themselves to bewailing the miserable intellectual output: the number of young men who have been at school for ten years and then go out into the world with a very poor knowledge of Greek, a Teutonic French accent, and uncertain as to the latitude of Honduras.

Let me say at once that there is no zealous schoolmaster

who is not astonished at the large amount of failure which attends the intellectual work of the schools, Most of us begin by thinking certain changes would improve it indefinitely; and when our radicalism later on begins to take a less confident tone, the change is ascribed to advancing years, good salaries, or self-interest. But what if it is due to deeper knowledge?

Experience shows that here and there you may find a man who will stimulate the minds of boys with whom he takes special pains: and this he does mostly in private talks or individual work: not in class-teaching. Class-teaching is a very defective form of intellectual stimulus: and there would be less nonsense heard if it were understood that the slower the boys are by nature, the less they will learn in class, and the more dependent they become on individual training. There have been, and are, many excellent teachers in class from whom students gain much, and recognise later on that they have done so. But there are many English boys in whom no one has ever yet been able by class-teaching to kindle the love of learning for its own sake: and it is no contradiction of this to say that many of these boys become sensible men on committees or County Councils. They have in the interval learnt to some extent how to use their brains under the pressure of threatened impecuniosity. But the experience of centuries shows quite distinctly that, in spite of the high standard of industry which prevails in many schools, there is only a minority of English boys who can fairly be said to be intellectually keen, whatever be the subject on which they spend most time. Now, the number of those to whom lessons are distasteful perhaps grows less as the classes dwindle in size: because a larger proportion feel themselves advancing. That is to say, they gain in opportunity of understanding: but if the class becomes small enough to suit the very slow, it loses in corporate *esprit* and the swing which only numbers can give. But apart from that, the general benefits of school training in social matters, in the power of getting on well with

equals, has to be paid for by a loss due to the necessity of the teaching being in class. This is a kind of teaching from which boys gain in direct ratio to their alertness of brain.

Now, in intellectual matters the fact of class-teaching is so important that it throws into the shade all questions of curriculum. What boys are set to work at matters little in comparison with the brains they are born with, the man they are taught by, the size of the class they are taught in. There is one more factor in their progress, as important as any: that is, the intelligence of the boys they consort with out of school. Here again we trace the close dependence of the school on the society. But, in regard to all these factors, impatient people are far too ready to conclude that everything is wrong because the boys are not prizewinners at twenty or twenty-three. But that again is a trifle. The questions that matter are whether they have learnt how to grapple with a difficulty, and know the difference between ignorance and knowledge, and if in general they are desirous of continuing to learn. Besides this, if a boy at twenty is still very infirm in these respects, it is far from certain that he is going to remain so. There are many English boys who must develop at their own pace, or they do not develop at all: and there are not a few very brilliant boys who grow up ineffective men, not in spite of their precocity but because of it.

If critics of the intellectual output of our schools would bear these truths in mind, their suggestions would be less wide of the mark than they often are.

There are other underlying facts the importance of which has only lately been appreciated by the schoolmasters themselves: facts which have begun to tell upon the situation only in consequence of recently changed conditions. Till lately each large Public School looked upon itself as a separate entity, and with some justice, as it was thought that whatever were the antecedents of the boys the result at twenty or twenty-three was the outcome of the Public School's work. But now we know better than that. We have learnt that

the Preparatory Schools can do a great deal to help or to mar a boy's intellectual life near its starting-point. In character-building they are of course vastly less telling than the home; but as to the development of the mental faculties, the mischief anyhow which they can do is enormous; for if a boy is thoroughly muddled in brain, as some are, at fourteen, the conditions of life in the larger school and the near approach of puberty make it very unlikely that his mental air will thoroughly clear before he goes out into the world, and in a good many cases no clearance takes place at all.

Now, if there is to be, as there of course ought to be, fair co-operation and unity of spirit between the Public and the Preparatory Schools, it is necessary that the curriculum of the former shall be fairly uniform. That is to say, it is useless for any single Public School to insist on boys coming to it prepared in a peculiar way unless other Public Schools agree in demanding the same preparation. For no Preparatory School can alter its work to suit one school: it must follow the majority of Public Schools which it supplies. This fact makes an enormous difference to the possibilities of reform in curriculum. For it is no longer a question of a headmaster simply conceiving an idea—not a simple matter for any Englishman—and then converting his governing body to it and if possible his staff of masters; he has to harness other headmasters to his chariot; and each of them may have local difficulties of his own to contend with. Hence the advance of reform of the curricula is not likely to be of headlong speed.

But this collaboration and joining of hands, besides being in itself a very salutary change, is becoming necessary in view of increased State control. Only a few years ago each big boarding school could boast its independence of any outside influence, except perhaps that of the old Universities, and of general unformulated public opinion. But nowadays we are faced by the problem of admitting by degrees a considerable measure of control on the part of the Board of Education, and

combining it with liberty to make experiments, and if possible with the sense of being unshackled in our movements. This appears to be a most complex, not to say alarming, prospect. But so far I think we should all agree that the action of the State has been cautious and enlightened and certainly beneficial. There is, of course, a danger of the paralysing power of routine. It is not certain that if the present generation of officials are men of understanding and sympathy, while the new state of things is still soft and malleable, the same will be said of their successors forty years hence, when the regulations will have stiffened into formulæ, and the coils of tape will be larger and redder than they are to-day.

There is one more remark which I am constrained to make, as it bears not only upon superficial criticism of Public Schools, but on a possible danger to their efficiency.

If we clear our minds of cant we shall cease to ascribe to any kind of school the power to *produce* what is properly called character. A good school can *educate* character by fostering its good qualities, and a bad school can make some bad characters, for the time, worse. No human institution can produce character except the home. But what a good school undoubtedly can do is to give a sensibly brought-up youngster the knack of getting on with his equals without quarrelling. True, the disposition to give and take; the tolerant understanding insight; the adaptability to new surroundings, and independence of rules,—these seem to be gifts at birth of Englishmen. But unquestionably the social life of a Public School does foster these qualities, and I fancy it is that in them which chiefly excites the admiration of foreigners.

But when I say “the social life,” I mean the life that a boarding school supplies in far richer measure than a day school. In discussions on the comparative merits of the two sorts of schools this very important truism is often forgotten.

E. LYTTETON.

THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW.

ARCHIBALD WEIR.

THERE was an indeterminate moment, Professor Gilbert Murray has recently told us, when the Hellenic race attained to its peculiar position in ancient civilisation by reason of its having become "more intelligent and more emancipated from silly nonsense."¹ And this change was brought about almost unconsciously under the guise of a professed return to something very old, in the fashion characteristic of many great social movements. We also of the present day are quietly emancipating ourselves from silly nonsense, and some of us are using for the purpose knowledge about what is very old.

But at this point our procedure ceases to share in the characteristic common to so many bygone social movements. Our knowledge of what is very old is so much more extensive, detailed, and accurate than was any earlier acquaintance with the far past, that a professed return to it is the last thing that we should find attractive. In point of fact, the precise contrary results from our better information. Our interpretation of what is silly nonsense has been changed entirely, and our methods of emancipation have been revised fundamentally. Instead of identifying *εὐηθία* *ἡλίθιος* with modern sophistications, we trace much of it to the brutish stupidity of our ancestors; instead of feeling plausible any idea of reversion

¹ δεξιότερον καὶ εὐηθείης ἡλίθιου ἀπηλλαγμένον μᾶλλον, Herodotus, i. 60.
Four Stages of Greek Religion, p. 57.

to the very old, we find the thought unspeakably revolting; instead of seeking freedom in a return to the past, we tend to discredit our faulty beliefs and institutions by exposing their connection with what we have learnt to loathe.

This process is making no great stir in the world. The studies, which are disentangling the primal scheme of man's mental and social growth, are regarded somewhat airily by indifferent spectators as chiefly useful for the understanding of the more backward races surviving to the present day. When scholars compare the notices and inferences derivable from antiquity with the practices and beliefs of recent or existing peoples, it is supposed that they are but amiably striving to strengthen the web of a history necessarily too tenuous to carry much of vital import. Now and then someone charged with the protection of vested interests grows suspicious of the direction which research is taking. But such disquietude rarely leads to serious apprehension. At the utmost an effort is made to show that, if a rite or belief of the present day can be traced back to usages generally common among primitive folk, the proper deduction is to establish a radical need of human nature, however dark or bloody were the original methods of meeting that need.

Hence an apologist, greatly daring, will occasionally claim to fortify some especially perplexing tenet of his creed by accepting its obvious relationship to the doings of wild and pagan men, and by dwelling on the mystery that comprehends in one spiritual aspiration the gross atrocities of the savage and the refined obscurities of civilised religionists. The most picturesque and therefore most frequently noticed instance of this kind is that of the Christian Eucharist; but intrinsically the fundamental idea of sacrifice lends itself more appropriately to this sort of treatment, while the support that may be gained for the bewildering doctrine of vicarious atonement seems to many minds to be of still more profound significance. As yet opinion is so little aware of the real trend of investigations into the cultures which lie behind us that there is no great

danger attending tactical feints of the kind. For in thought the start is still made from present personal belief back to a conjectural past. Thus the tendency is to hallow distant crudities without impugning the sanctity of present forms. And the investigators themselves, clear-sighted and outspoken though they be, have the best of reasons for permitting the imposture to pass unrebuked.

Biologists have made us familiar with the truth that individual organisms recapitulate succinctly in their growth, and preserve vestigially in their maturity, sundry stages in the evolution of their species. Now it must be granted that analogy between the biological and sociological spheres used to be pressed far too confidently, and in the present instance we cite biology rather as an illustration than as an analogical argument. Research into the nature of man provides on its own independent authority abundant testimony that something very like the biological sequence obtains among human societies and among individual men, both in their mental and social capacities. A learned observer like Dr Frazer does not scruple to say that "superstitions survive because, while they shock the views of enlightened members of the community, they are still in harmony with the thoughts and feelings of others who, though they are drilled by their betters into an appearance of civilisation, remain barbarians or savages at heart."¹ Hence the fair-minded student has no inclination to judge severely either societies or individuals by the standard of those more advanced in the anthropological scale. He knows that societies are at different levels and contain within themselves institutions and members typical of various degrees of the scale. He has learnt that it must be disastrous to force a society prematurely to a higher grade. And he gradually discovers that individuals should be treated with even greater tenderness, because they not only share the complex constitution of their parent societies, but in their personal recapitulation of racial experience they are subject to prodigious

¹ *Psyche's Task*, 2nd ed., p. 169.

variations from the embryonic stage through infancy, adolescence, maturity, and old age.

Further consideration adds to this tenderness the conviction that it is a matter of urgent politic expediency to deal with every social, moral, and religious system as if it were worthy of respectful sympathy. No sane observer believes in a fixed series of social steps after the style of Comte's law of the three stages. But every dispassionate critic understands that man must have some rules of life which cannot be repealed abruptly without grave peril to what the Germans call *Sittlichkeit*; and all experience proves that attempts at a very rapid passage from one set of rules to a much higher set result in mere abrogation and not in progress. Only system-mongers would venture to assert that we can discover any sufficiently detailed order of development to guide pragmatically those who would replace a low scheme of culture by a higher. Work of the kind, to be successful, must be conducted tentatively, with thorough understanding and sympathy. All this is mere commonplace to those familiar with the history of Christian missions. But the case is not so obvious when it concerns our fellow-citizens, near neighbours, and relatives. Nevertheless, the silent changes now taking place around us and within us should be conducted according to the like unaggressive charitable principles, and, as a matter of fact, they are being so conducted to a far greater extent than could be inferred from the demeanour of our noisier protagonists.

In the history of Christendom this is quite a new thing. Before the rise of this great aggressive, intolerant world-religion, the usual course of religious development proceeded on the lines of gentle modification and syncretism, in the way that brought Isis to Greece, and later quietly spread Mithraism over the Roman Empire while its eventually victorious rival was battling for existence. Since then every change has been attended by fierce discord and conflict. It is only in our own day that, almost unperceived, the lessons of what is known as anthropology have begun to match, account for, and dissolve

the dogmas and doctrines which appeared on the surface unique, unaccountable, and inviolable; while the most authoritative of these lessons commands at the same time, that the process of dissolution should be tempered down to a gentle infiltration that will leave every mind, unready to rise in the anthropological scale, at peace with itself and its traditional consolations.

Hence, if orthodox teachers interpret the naturalisation of the Christian Eucharist as evidence that the mystery gains in authority by being shown to be universal as well as Christian, anthropologists will be loth to say them nay. If the want met by the mystery still survives in such strength that its *provenance* in repulsive cults is felt to support rather than to discredit it, then the want must be recognised and respected. The method which traced the connection traces still more clearly the past dependence of human nature on curious mystic ceremonies. In the name, therefore, of humanity such rites and ceremonies must be treated with sympathetic insight as long as considerable portions of society remain in the appropriate stages of mental and emotional development.

And indeed it is true that anthropology does elaborate and enforce a perfect code of the charity which rests on the maxim once expressed by Mme. de Staël as, *Tout comprendre rend très-indulgent*, and now passing under the proverb, *Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner*. It is true that a liberal and learned comprehension of man's fears and strivings in the past, as they are related to their after-effects in the present, has silently persuaded the more cultured members of society to view with gentleness the most antagonistic principles and disclaimers. We can almost recognise the arrival of a special form of sweet reasonableness from a quarter which Matthew Arnold may have had in mind when he translated the Adonis Idyll of Theocritus. For the lesson is not confined to those openly professing the anthropological point of view. So pervasive and emollient is its gentle influence that the conservative opposition tends to suffer gladly all things and be

kind. 'This is greatly to the good.' But after all, though it be of the highest importance, it only invests with a genial spirit a profoundly significant process, the quiet, unobtrusive work of emancipation from *ἐνθηθῆ ἡλίθιος*.

Happily the relevance and cogency of the anthropological point of view are not dependent on any particular scheme of anthropology. We may demur at obvious peculiarities of some of its professors. We may question the inclination to follow Herodotus in supposing that anything is possible if long enough time is assumed,¹ especially since radium removed the time-limits imposed by the last generation of physicists. We may smile at pathetic attempts to derive from an immense number of noughts the desired sum of one. We may weary sometimes of the hunt ranging in all directions, from catscradle to the taurobolium, from eoliths to circumcision. Yet the study remains in control of our criticism of life, for the simple reason that the chief distinction between man and the brutes is the historical sense, which deals with facts recognised by intelligence after inquiry (*ἱστορία*), and is accordingly concerned with facts as known to man as a rational animal.

Man is necessarily tied in action by his historical judgments, and hitherto these have been precarious and dangerous in the extreme. Not a form of forcible oppression, not a mode of voluntary suffering, not a social absurdity, but has had its fabled sanction in man's historical consciousness. Now, however, unresting critical examination of all the material accessible to him is in course of supplying him with a corrective for the rash, ill-conditioned methods of the past. Beginning with simple appeals to our unsophisticated historical sense, anthropology can lead ordinary intelligence from point to point of interest till the rudiments of human culture are reached in all their fantastic shapes. Then a survey of the whole field reveals the essential unity of the rudimentary with our advanced attainments, till the natural assumption that our

¹ γένοιτο δ' ἂν πᾶν ἐντῷ μακρῷ χρόνῳ, Herodotus, v. 9.

civilisation is uniquely rational and self-sufficient is effectually disposed of. The historical sense provides its own cure, and Clio, the Muse, is left a fair field.

In this way anthropology first admonishes by disclosing the foolish, fanciful beginnings of human improvement; then encourages by exhibiting the interconnection between all stages; then advises by showing how all stages survive in the latest results and must be provided for judiciously; and finally enjoins intellectual humility and emotional tenderness in those charged with bringing the treacherous powers of reason to bear on the difficulties of the present.

Most of these difficulties can be traced to the coexistence of elements derived from different zones of the anthropological scale. Progress is neither invariable nor uniform. Allowances must be made for what has persisted unchanged as well as for what has resulted from progress or is still tarrying on the road. Thus anthropology consoles us by accounting for the crookedness of human affairs, and gives us wary counsel for the amelioration of what might be a great deal worse. The whole pith of its lessons is the trust that the more we strive to ascertain the broad facts of our condition the better qualified we shall be to assist in social service. And all this inspiration comes to us free from any particular tenets, free from any general doctrine, conditioned only by fealty to a gracious point of view.

In the course of his comfortable meditations the gentle Stoic Emperor wrote: "Men co-operate after different fashions: even those co-operate abundantly who find fault with what happens and who try to oppose it and to hinder it; for the universe had need even of 'such men as these.'"¹ As a speculative principle this anthropological lesson avails much amid the puzzles of life, but as a rule of conduct it is of little regulative value. We may conclude that everything in the

¹ ἄλλος δὲ κατ' ἄλλο συνεργεῖ, ἐκ περιουσίας δὲ καὶ ὁ μεμφόμενος καὶ ὁ ἀντιβαλεῖν παρώμενος καὶ ἀναιρεῖν τὰ γινόμενα· καὶ γὰρ τοῦ τοιοῦτου ἔχρηξεν ὁ κόσμος, Marcus Aurelius, vi. 42; Long's trans. (1901), p. 167.

cosmos is permissible, perhaps necessary, but we have no right to infer that we as individuals should give and receive complete amnesties for whatever behaviour our limited personalities produce. Among the forces which lead to the grand result are wrong and blame and punishment, with which as individuals we cannot shirk acquaintance on the plea of cosmic necessity. Within our own narrow spheres we have to subordinate ourselves to ethical rules, notwithstanding our perception that conduct is a matter of continuous change and adaptation. And if we consider carefully the apparent contradiction involved, we shall discover that there is a master rule which reconciles for the purposes of common life the regulative order with the speculative scheme. This master principle is no other than loyalty to our own stage in the anthropological scale, and insistence that others should be true to their stage though it be not the same as ours. Whether we be among Dr Frazer's enlightened members of the community, or among those drilled by them into the appearance of civilisation, we must drill or be drilled with all honesty and zeal till the logic of events either promotes or degrades us to a different set of functions. Only thus can we avoid treason to the plan of our world: only thus can we recognise our obligations as individuals in a transitory life within an organic whole.

In everyday affairs the master rule is instinctively obeyed. We have to reflect to become aware of its authority. But there are occasions when it has to be invoked with some urgency. Ordinances transmitted from the past lose their identity and force when applied on a vastly larger and more intricate scale. They need to be developed along with the society they serve. Above all, they need to be applied so that individuals belonging to the van of the movement should not be permitted for purposes of private gain and influence to accept offices and emoluments attached to faiths of yesterday. The faiths of yesterday should be served by those still firm in the culture of yesterday. Those who have passed on

to the enlightenment of to-day do wrong when they attempt to offer traditional services in exchange for traditional pay and position. They give inferior value for what they receive, and they supplant those who could give what the pay was intended to secure. Further, they impair the efficacy of their own example and doctrine by yielding lip-service to what they have left behind, and by entering into compromises with what they feel to be effete.

In appealing to the ideas of right and honesty in this connection, we may seem to be guilty of an illegitimate extension of bourgeois morals. But in point of fact all that we are doing is to hold that in our membership of the human race inhere possibilities of righteousness which it is culpable to neglect. Aristotle recognised these possibilities when he commended the *αἰθέραστος* who is always himself, truthful in word and deed, truthful in his speech and in his life, because that is his character. And the reason why merits of this order must persist, even though all our conventional morality is analysed into non-moral constituents of the world-process, is because they represent the driving force which has made men rise to what they are. Only because men of ready insight and resource did not flinch, did not palter with their initiative, or weaken for the sake of gain, has mankind travelled to the point marked by our achievement.

The answer to the question, "When Adam dalf and Evè span, who was then the gentleman?" is that there never was an Adam, and there never was an Eve, but that there has always been the gentleman, though he might be as hard to discover as he was in John Ball's time. To him we owe what elevation we possess: to his survival the future will owe what graces it may attain. The strongest justification of the present capitalistic phase of society is the facilities, so lamentably wanting in primitive communities, which it offers for the independence and enlightenment of individuals who may show the way unhindered by economic considerations. And every influence which may corrupt their activity must be detrimental to

humanity's career. Regarded in this way, what we have spoken of as right and honest amounts merely to what conduces to the self-affirmation of society, beyond which authority there can be no appeal.

The results of the work of emancipation are already considerable, but, unless they are sought for by help of the correct clue, the observer may fail to be aware of their significance. Repudiation of tyrannical customs and duties will either be ignored or attributed to some sporadic vice. A veteran journalist has recently repeated, that believers in the permissibility of suicide under certain circumstances can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Such blindness seems incredible to one aware of the solvents which a fuller view of human existence has applied to traditional prejudices and sanctions. Again, a multitude of excellent people seem to think that mild expostulation will reimpose on society the superstitious subjection to a high birth-rate. Such fatuity can only be explained by ignorance of a study which shows that through the ages the twin curses of the human race have been erotics and religion. The new world is determined that the curses shall henceforth be regulated into blessings.

Outwardly the medical profession is still tied and bound by the old vow of the Asklepiadæ, "Never will I give a deadly drug, not even if I am asked for one, nor give any advice tending in this direction." But anyone conversant with the inner thoughts of intelligent contemporaries is aware that this attitude is deplored by numbers who are disgusted with the amount of suffering which the race has already had to endure. At the bottom of his heart the modern man is grateful beyond measure that he lives in an age of anæsthetics and ready lethal resources, and is in nowise contented to be deprived of their assistance at the moment of anguish. Maeterlinck, the latest writer to dwell on the nature of death, assigns its real terror to the dreadful circle which the doctors compass for us, the circle of "prolongation of the agony increasing the horror of death, and the horror of death demanding the prolongation of

the agony."¹ But now that society has reached a stage when our life frequently depends for its very being on the volitional policy of others, it seems as if we cannot be very far from making its continuance dependent on a sanely regulated judgment. The medical profession will then be required to assist in the ordering of our viaticum as judiciously as it has assisted for generations in all matters relating to our arrival.

Recalcitrancy of this order cannot be attributed to casual rebellions of the flesh. It is due rather to a dim sense that the only categorical imperative is the biological imperative, and that the bull-roarer is an exploded device. The latter consequence is peculiarly fateful because it touches most nearly the attitude of women to their traditional position in society. The primitive bull-roarer owed its social authority principally to one artful precaution of those who whirled it. Sometimes the common men, but always all the women and children, were kept in a state of delusion as to the mysterious sound which they believed to be the voice of a god. They tamely acquiesced in the observances prescribed by their social superiors because they imagined that the officiating ministers were supported by an audible deity. It is a far cry from the social stage, when a slip of wood and a long string could do this thing, to the stage in which we are born to-day. Yet a perfectly efficient bull-roarer of some sort has been operative during the whole long interval. For most people it still drones and threatens. But for the first time in the history of the race an appreciable fraction of mankind has found the bull-roarer out. The effect thus wrought on the men is great enough, as we can easily believe, but the changes that are crowding into the minds of women after their enforced ignorance and intimidation must be past male understanding.

¹ *Our Eternity* (Eng. trans.), p. 12. "All our knowledge merely helps us to die a more painful death than the animals that know nothing. A day will come when science will turn upon its error and no longer hesitate to shorten our woes. A day will come when it will dare and act with certainty; when life, grown wiser, will depart silently at its hour, knowing that it has reached its term" (p. 15).

Never before has human life suffered such a radical change in values. The sex nearest the source of life is being initiated into the facts of life, and nothing but the facts.

But it is not only the sort of vital matter which always has worn a problematic aspect that the new criticism of life interprets afresh. The workaday rules of the Decalogue are not exempt from like treatment. After we have repeated that we must not steal, murder, commit adultery, or covet, we are in nowise advanced until we have determined what is stealing, what is adultery, and how we are to define murder and covetousness. These questions spring from rules sufficiently plain and definite when society was innocent of reflection on its own history. But when the rules are scrutinised in their latest surroundings by the light of our knowledge of the past, the questions raised prove to be complicated, and the answers they elicit prove to be sharply divergent according to the viewpoint adopted. Men governed by positive codes from the past decide in one way, and accept as part of the nature of things the difficulties and enormities which inevitably occur. Men guided by the light of historical investigation into humanity, its rules and institutions, decide in quite different ways, and strive to avoid as far as possible the horrors and cruelties which attend misfits between old rules and new situations.

From the anthropological standpoint, therefore, our present industrial turmoil, with its wages, capital, and land difficulties, is due to inept interpretations of the law, "Thou shalt not steal." Precisians hold fast to the principle that a bargain is a bargain; that legal exchange is no robbery. But nothing has been demonstrated more certainly by the course of events than that a rigorous application of the eighth commandment leads eventually to theft of the most atrocious nature, the sort of theft which consigns whole classes to slavery or degradation. Owners of land, owners of capital, owners of labour, may in all good faith exclude technical stealing from their mutual operations, and yet arrive at a social order characterised by the simple distinction between those who steal and those who are

robbed. Nor in this statement is any account taken of the businesses of the advanced industrial state which deliberately employ the laws against theft in order to rob persistently and with fair fame: nor is account taken of the gambling conducted under legal forms to the certain dispossession of those who produce the plunder. And the confusion thus created is perpetuated and increased by the struggles of those, caught in the vice of inviolable contract, who nevertheless cannot prosper in their private dealings with their fellow-men unless they observe narrowly the Mosaic prohibition against stealing.

On the other hand, those imbued with the true spirit of give and take, which has enabled mankind to worry through a thousand ordeals, hold fast to nothing but a point of view. They seem to possess a method or secret of mediating between conflicting ideals and interests. But their method is no mystery. It is the plain consequence of being emancipated from the delusions that property is an end in itself, that money and finance are other than recent devices of limited utility, that contract is an eternal obligation, that society is necessarily organised on a flagitious basis. Freedom of this kind is the gift of no dogma or principle. Like the Kingdom of God, it cometh not with observation, is not here or there, but is a state of the mind won from liberal acquaintance with the ephemeral follies, delusions, shifts, and strivings which, by splendid transitoriness, have developed men to the latest stage of variety, resource, and instability.

The difficulties surrounding the institution of property are peculiarly intricate and obscure. Those attending the seventh commandment are comparatively simple but intrinsically more momentous, because they deal with both a quality of life and the quality of the race. Few of us have not been affected intensely by what was held permissible in the relations between the sexes at our individual stage of moral culture. Wiseacres would have us suppose that in love we cannot expect any great enhancement of the value of life, but no richly emotional person believes them. Hence there is

always some beating against the bars set up by the society of the day.

The main framework of the bars to-day is formed by regard for the welfare of the children born and reared past adolescence. And in this solicitude for the quality of the race our generation has shown notable recognition of the anthropological point of view. Under the guidance of much questionable genetics it is sought to elucidate new principles of erotics which shall ensure the birth of a superior class of child, and an ultimate improvement in the constitution of mankind. The object is an admirable one. But the practicability of its attainment depends on a proper comprehension of what is behind the present representatives of the race, and of what would constitute an improvement in the future if we were able to attain it.

The question of the norm of human excellence under modern civilised conditions has not yet been faced. Such is the confusion of thought prevailing at the present moment that the perusal of reputable books leaves one under the impression that the sort of ability we should breed for is that which we might succeed in fixing in a hereditary caste of University Dons. Such a prospect ought to dismay the most sanguine reformer. Hitherto the fine quality of our University staffs has been obtained by selection from an immense mass of heterogeneous material from outside sources. The type that could be got by inbreeding from them would soon cease to be of value either to the Universities or to the great world—a fact which, perhaps, accounts for their limited fertility resulting in a redundancy of daughters.

Property and love happen to be the prominent matters under discussion at the present time, because never before has there been so much property to divide, and never before has there been so much love to enjoy unstaled by custom and unvisited by parental cares. But the fact in nowise impairs the importance of all that remains of human ideas and activity. In religion, morals, politics, and philosophy, all thinking will

henceforth have to endure examination in the light of human origins. Every term and notion will have to account for itself as it has come to grow up in our mentality; every institution and theory will have to yield its true import to a criticism that grants nothing to intuitive assumption or traditional reverence. And the reason why such an inquisition is urgent and imminent is because the highest aims of our industry and our marriages cannot be determined till we have revised all our standards and ideals from the anthropological point of view.

Under such a discipline we cannot doubt that a great part of what we hear and read at the present moment will be ruled off the record. Our professional philosophers, moralists, priests, and jurists will be deprived of much of their existing stock-in-trade. Professions, however, can always be trusted to put up ample defence for their authority, and no advantage is to be gained by trying their case prematurely. It is the layman, before whom the issues will have to be argued finally, to whom attention should first be paid. It is the inquirer, exempt from professional equipment and bias, to whom warnings must now be addressed and suggestions should be adumbrated.

At present our inquiring layman is chiefly distinguished from professional teachers by the naïveté with which he yields to the dictates of the personality which a singular concatenation of events has produced in his own self. Reflection should tell him that he is the last unit issuing from a prodigiously long series of parental combinations, and that his self is only an infinitesimal in an immeasurable sequence of diversity. Though he be a stranger to the thorny paths of dialectics, his acquaintance with the derivative character of his organism ought to make him pause before he accepts offhand the specious verdicts of his particular consciousness. Yet he is prone to ignore the disabilities of his position, and to assume the objective validity of all sorts of principles that commend themselves to his emotions and his will. He is apt to argue

as if truth, goodness, justice, love, beauty, happiness, loftiness, and similar concepts were things in themselves. He constructs ideals, and imagines developments, which shall satisfy the cravings thus created. He impatiently scorns the humble aims of the meliorist. He demands plenary powers for his ennobling thoughts, and hopes thereby to arrive at a new heaven and a new earth, whereas in truth his concepts are but the roughest possible approximations to sundry classified experiences of the race, destitute of validity apart from that fluctuating experience, which can only lead to absurdities if they are invested with authority beyond the scope of their special relative values.

The eidola of the schools work much the same harm in a narrower sphere, and sometimes do most damage when the leading phantom of the school is that it has no eidola. But internecine controversy provides a safeguard against serious mischief in this quarter, and incidentally yields an excellent discipline epitomised by the history of philosophy. Indeed, it is to philosophical criticism that we have to look for effective exposure of the pretensions of commonsense ethical and metaphysical notions, before there is much chance of anthropology being able to gain a hearing for its humble, unpretentious versions of human faculty. Otherwise we should never be free from captivating dogmas about the good, the beautiful, and the true. Otherwise we should never obtain freedom to trace the genesis of such notions, and to elucidate thereby hints towards raising our present perceptions and conduct to a higher power. Otherwise we should never be secure from irruptions of emotional obscurantism which the past history of the race lavishly laid up in our organisations during the tedious twilight of the struggle with famine and extinction, a struggle waged by every sort of rude and fanciful means that groping, purblind intelligence could fumble after.

If a Boethius had to seek consolation in these days, he would hardly invite a visit from divine philosophy. For his central thought, the Platonic paradox,—“that only *is* which

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maintains its place and keeps its nature,"¹—he would have to importune Anthropology. Thus he would come to contemplate existence as a variegated stream, maintaining nothing in its place for long, keeping the nature of nothing permanently, good turning to bad and bad to good, diverse qualities flowing at the same time side by side, all equally portions of the stream, all to be judged relatively to the moment, leniently, charitably, in the light of the best result at the latest date. And out of the bewildering flux of time there would appear the one surviving spiritual principle that through all the changes had maintained its place and kept its nature, the life of man's conflict through the ages, the soul that has sustained him in the past and consoles him in the present, the spirit which Goethe hymned when he made the Angels carry Faust to heaven chanting :

"Wer immer strebend sich bemüht,
Den können wir erlösen."²

The days, which we are now living with such zest and confidence, may yet bring to society effects far transcending our obvious and splendid advances in *matériel* and organisation. The work is inconspicuous and unpretending, the methods employed are quiet and insinuating. But the result may well amount to a new freedom, a new charity, a new outlook.

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¹ "Est enim quod ordinem retinet, servatque naturam. Quod vero ab hac deficit, esse etiam quod in sui natura situm est, derelinquit." *De Consolatione Philosophiæ*, iv. 2 ; James's trans., p. 135.

²

"Whoe'er aspires unweariedly
Is not beyond redeeming."

BAYARD TAYLOR'S rendering.

THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHRIST.

PROFESSOR BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD,

Princeton University.

WHAT may very properly be called the Chalcedonian "settlement" has remained until to-day the authoritative statement of the elements of the doctrine of the Person of Christ. It has well deserved to do so. For this "settlement" does justice at once to the data of Scripture, to the implicates of an Incarnation, to the needs of Redemption, to the demands of the religious emotions, and to the logic of a tenable doctrine of our Lord's Person. But this "settlement" is a mere statement of the essential facts, and therefore does nothing to mitigate the difficulty of the conception which it embodies. The difficulty of conceiving two distinct natures united in a single person remains; and this difficulty has produced in every age a tendency more or less widespread to fall away from the doctrine, or to explain it away, or decisively to reject it. Weak during the Middle Ages, this tendency acquired force in the great intellectual upheaval which accompanied the Reformation; and then gave birth, amid many other interesting phenomena, to the radical reaction against the doctrine of the Two Natures which we know as Socinianism. The shallow naturalism of the Enlightenment came in the next age to the reinforcement of the movement thus inaugurated, and under the impulses thus set at work a widespread revolt has sprung up in the modern church against the doctrine of the Two Natures.

Germany is to-day the *præceptor mundi*. And how things

stand in the academical circles of Germany Professor Friedrich Loofs informs us in his recent Oberlin lectures. "The whole German Protestant theology of the present time," he tells us, has, "to a certain extent," turned away from the conception of the Two Natures. "In the preceding generation," it seems, "there was still a learned theologian in Germany who thought it correct and possible to reproduce the old orthodox formulas in our time without the slightest modification, viz.: Friedrich Adolph Philippi, of Rostock (1882)." "At present," however, Loofs proceeds, "I do not know of a single professor of evangelical theology in Germany of whom this might be said. All learned Protestant theologians in Germany, even if they do not do so with the same emphasis, really admit unanimously that the orthodox Christology does not do sufficient justice to the truly human life of Jesus, and that the orthodox doctrine of the two natures in Christ cannot be retained in the traditional form. All our systematic theologians, so far at least as they see more in Jesus than the first subject of Christian faith, are seeking new paths in their Christology." No doubt matters have not yet gone so far in lands of English speech; but the drift here, too, is obviously in the same direction, and even among us an immense confusion has come to reign with regard to this fundamental doctrine of the Christian religion.

The alternative of two natures is, of course, one nature: and this one nature must be conceived, naturally, either as Divine or as human. The tendency to conceive of Christ as wholly Divine—so far as it has asserted itself at all—has been rather a religious than a theological tendency, if we may avail ourselves here of this overworked and misleading terminology. It has existed rather as a state of heart, and as a devotional attitude, than as a reasoned doctrine. Nothing has been more characteristic of Christians from the beginning than that they have been "worshippers of Christ." To the writers of the New Testament, the recognition of Jesus as Lord was the mark of a Christian; and all their religious emotions turned to

Him. It has been made the reproach of the Evangelists that they—following their sources—were all worshippers of Jesus. and it is precisely on that ground that modern naturalistic criticism warns us that we are not to trust their representations as to His supernatural life on earth. To the heathen observers of the early Christians, their most distinguishing characteristic, which differentiated them from all others, was that they sang praises to Christ as God. A shrewd modern controversialist has even found it possible to contend that the only God the Christians have is Christ. "Christianity," says he, "is pre-eminently the worship of Christ. Far away in the background of existence there may be a power, answering to Indian Brahma or Greek Kronos and conceived as God the Father. But the working, ever-living, ever-active Deity is Christ. He is the creator and preserver of the world, the ruler, redeemer, and judge of men. He and no other is worshipped as God, hymned, prayed to, invoked. To Him have been transferred the attributes of Jehovah. He and no other is the Christian God." If there is some exaggeration here, it is not to be found on the positive side; and G. K. Chesterton is not overstating the matter when he speaks of Christ incidentally as "the chief deity of a civilisation."

This worship of Christ has had, of course, theological results of great importance, some of them even portentous—if, for example, we can with many historians look upon adoration of saints, and especially of the Virgin Mary, as, in part at least, an attempt of the human spirit to supply, outside of the Christ thought of as purely Divine, the human element in the mediatorially conceived Divine relation. But only now and again has it worked back and sought a theological basis for itself by the formal divinising of the whole Christ. We think here naturally of the Apollinarians, and the Monophysites; but more particularly of confessional Lutheranism, which by its theory of the *communicatio idiomatum* managed to preserve indeed to theology a human nature for Christ, but

at the same time to present a purely Divine Christ to our religious emotions. But we shall have to go back to the Gnostic Docetism of the first Christian centuries for any influential effort speculatively to construe Christ as a wholly Divine Being. If men have here and there forgotten the human Christ in their reverence for the Divine Christ, they have shown no great inclination to explain Christ to thought in terms of the purely Divine.

Revolt from the doctrine of the Two Natures means, therefore, nothing more or less than the explanation of Christ in terms of mere humanity. When we are told by Loofs that the whole of learned Germany has rejected the doctrine of the Two Natures, that is equivalent accordingly to being told that the whole of learned Germany has rejected the doctrine of the Deity of Christ, and construes Him to its thought as a purely human being. It may continue to reverence Him; men here and there may even continue to worship Him. As many of the older Unitarians found it possible still to offer worship to Christ, and incorporated in their official hymn-books hymns of praise to Him as God—such as Bonar's "How shall Death's Triumph end?" in which Christ is celebrated as "The First and Last, who was and is," or Ray Palmer's "My Faith looks up to Thee," in which he is addressed as "Saviour Divine"—so many of our new German Humanitarians still worship Christ. Karl Thieme, for example, who righteously rebukes his fellows for continuing to use such phraseology as "the Godhead," "the Deity," "the Divinity" of Christ, when they know very well that Jesus is not God but only man, yet strenuously argues that He is worthy of our worship, because of what he calls His "representative unity with God." When asked how his worship of Jesus differs in principle from the gross hagiolatry of the Church of Rome, Thieme naïvely and most significantly replies, Why, in this most important respect, that he worships only *one* such holy one, the Romanists many! The adoring attitude preserved by men of this class towards Jesus—whom they nevertheless declare to be mere man—has called

out not unnaturally in wide circles a deep disgust. They are not unjustly reproached with idolatry, are contemptuously dubbed "Jesusites"—worshippers of the man Jesus; and occasion has even been taken from their corrupt Jesus-cult to inaugurate a movement in revolt from Christianity as a whole, wrongfully identified with them, in the interests of a pure and non-idolatrous service of God. Men like Wilhelm von Schnehen and Arthur Drews are thus able to come forward with the plea that in their philosophical cult alone can be found true worship, and do not hesitate to declare that the greatest obstacle to pure religion in the world to-day is precisely this idolatrous adoration of Jesus, interpreted as merely a human being. We can only record it to their honour, therefore, when the majority of those who have given up the Deity of our Lord refuse to worship Him, and, while according to Him their admiration and respect, reserve their religious veneration for God alone.

The present great extension of purely humanitarian conceptions of the person of Christ has, of course, not been attained without a gradual development, in the progress of which there has been enunciated a variety of compromising views seeking to mediate between the doctrine of the Two Natures and the growing Humanitarianism. The most interesting of these is that wonderful construction which has been known under the name of Kenotism, from its vain attempt to intrench itself in the declaration of Paul (Phil. ii. 8) that Jesus, being by nature in the form of God, emptied Himself—as our Revised Version unfortunately mistranslates the Greek verb from which the term, Kenosis, is derived—and so became man. The idea is that the Son of God, in becoming man, abandoned His deity, extinguished it, so to speak, by immersing it in the stream of human life. This curious view bears somewhat the same relation to the tendency to think of Christ in terms of pure humanity that the Lutheran Christology bears to the opposite tendency to think of Him in terms of pure deity. As that was an attempt to secure a purely Divine Christ while

not theoretically denying His human nature, so this was an attempt to secure a purely human Christ without theoretically denying His Divine nature. In effect it gives us a Christ of one nature and that nature purely human, though it theoretically explains this human nature as really just shrunken deity. Therefore Albrecht Ritschl called it *verschämter Socinianismus*—Socinianism indeed, but a Socinianism differing from the bold Socinianism to which we are accustomed by shyly hanging back and trying to hide itself behind sheltering skirts.

Kenotism differs from Socinianism fundamentally, however, in that Socinianism took away from us only our Divine Christ, while Kenotism takes away also our very God. For what kind of God is this that is God and not God alternately as He chooses, and lays off and on at will those specific qualities which make God the kind of being we call "God," as a king might put off and on his crown, or as a leopard might wish to change his spots but cannot, or an Ethiopian his skin? Of course, this is all—as Albrecht Ritschl again aptly described it, and as Loofs repeats from his lips—"pure mythology"; and the only wonder is that it enjoyed considerable vogue for a while, and, indeed, has not yet wholly passed out of sight on the outskirts of theological civilisation. Loofs seems to raise his eyebrows a little as he remarks that, as it has gradually died out in Germany, it has seemed to find supporters in England: "in Sweden, too," he adds, with meticulous conscientiousness, "it was confidently defended as late as 1908 by Oskar Bensow." The English writers to whom he thus refers are men of brilliant parts—such as D. W. Forrest, W. L. Walker, P. T. Forsyth, and latest of all H. R. Mackintosh. But even writers of brilliant parts will not be able to fan the dead embers of this burned-out speculation into life again. The humanitarian theorists are in search of a true man in Jesus, not a shrivelled God; and no Christian heart will be satisfied with a Christ in whom (we quote Ritschl again) there was no Godhead at all while He was on earth, and

in whom (we may add) there may be no manhood at all now that He has gone to heaven. It really ought to be clear by now that there cannot be a half-way house erected between the doctrines that Christ is both God and man and that Christ is merely man. Between these two positions there is an irreducible "either or," and many may feel inclined to adopt Biedermann's caustic criticism of the Kenotic theories, that only one who has himself suffered a kenosis of his understanding can possibly accord them welcome.

On the sinking of the Kenotic sun beneath the horizon, there has been left, however, a certain afterglow hanging behind it. A disposition is discoverable in certain quarters to speak in Kenotic language while recoiling from the Kenotic name; to claim as a Christian heritage the essential features of the Kenotic Christology while declining to lay behind them the precise Kenotic explanation. An isolated early instance of this procedure was supplied by Thomas Adamson, who draws a portrait of Jesus in his *Studies of the Mind in Christ* (1898) which seems to require the assumption of kenosis to justify it, but who vigorously repudiates the attribution of that assumption to him. Much more notable instances are found in such writers as Johannes Kunze of Vienna (now of Greifswald) and Erich Schäder of Kiel, whose formula for the incarnation is that in Jesus Christ the Godhead is "presented in the form of a human life." According to Kunze the Godhead appears in Jesus always as humanly mediated: the two, Godhead and manhood, can never be contemplated apart; all that is human is Divine, and all that is Divine is human. The omnipotence which belongs to His deity appearing in Christ only as humanly mediated, for example, is conditioned on His *prayer*; Jesus could accomplish all things by the power of prevalent prayer! So also with all the Divine attributes; the result being that we have in Jesus phenomenally nothing but a man, but a man who, we are told, is nevertheless to be thought of as the Eternal God.

Similarly, according to Schäder, God in becoming flesh

has not at all ceased to be what He was; He has only become it "in another way." In the place of the doctrine of the Two Natures, Schäder places the idea of what he calls, "the Being of God in Jesus"—*das Sein Gottes in Jesus*—a phrase which becomes something like a watchword with him. "We have here," he says, "a man before us to whom there is lacking not the least thing that is human, a man who is man in everything, be it what it may"; and yet who is just God become flesh, "having ceased to be nothing which He eternally is," but "having only become it in *another* manner." By what a narrow line this doctrine of "God in human form" is separated from express Kenotism may be observed from the difficulties in which Schäder finds himself when he comes to speak of the act by which the mighty transformation, which he postulates in the Son of God, takes place. Here his language is not only distinctly Kenotic, but extremely Kenotic, assimilating him in his subordinationism and transmutationism to what Loofs does not scruple to speak of as the "reckless" teaching of Gess. "Now, God our Father," he writes, "lets it, lets this Son proceed from Himself as man, and *thus* enter into history. This is an almighty act of His love, of His reconciling will": "what is in question here is an almighty transformation of the mode of being of the Logos by God." When we are thus told that, "by God's almighty act, God's eternal Son becomes a weak, developing child," we are not so much reassured as puzzled that we are told in the same breath that thus "He does not cease to be what He was, He only becomes the same thing in another way"; nor are we much helped by having it explained to us that even in His pre-existent state the Son of God, because He was Son, was dependent on God, subordinate to Him, and wrought only God's will—so that even in His pre-existent state He used prayer to God, preserved humility in the Divine presence, and lived in obedience to God. It is only borne strongly in upon us that it is an exceedingly difficult task at one and the same time to evaporate and to preserve the true Deity of Christ.

The fundamental formulas with which Kunze and Schäder operate—that the incarnation consists in “the Being of God in Christ,” that “God is in Christ in human form”—reappear in perhaps even more purity in the writings of the late R. C. Moberley. “Christ,” he says, “is, then, not so much God *and* man, as God in, and through, and as man.” “God, as man, is always, in all things, God *as man*”; “if it is all Divine, it is all human too.” So also W. P. Du Bose wishes us not to forget that “God is most God at the moment when He is most love,” and not to fail to recognise God “in the highest act of His highest attribute,” confusing external pomp with internal nobility—all of which has the appearance at least of being only a way of laying claim to the inheritance of the Kenotists, while avoiding the scandal of the name. Reviewing Du Bose, Professor Sanday falls in with the notions he here expresses, and pronounces it likely that the moderns in their insistence on the single personality of our Lord, which is both Divine and human—and, apparently, Divine only because it is perfectly human,—have made an improvement on the old Two Nature doctrine of the Creeds. We may perceive from this how completely the movement is but a phase of the zealous propaganda for a one-natured Christ, and but propounds a new method of submerging God in man. This method is to proclaim the paradox that God is most God when He ceases to be God—when He becomes man. For this condescension marks the manifestation at its height of the highest of all the activities of God—Love.

But we may perceive here, too, what may also legitimately interest us, a stage in the drifting of Sanday’s christological views towards the apparently humanitarian position at which they seem ultimately to arrive. In earlier writings Sanday had taught with clarity the essentials of the Trinitarian Christology, and had pronounced himself unfavourable to the Kenotic speculations. In this review of Du Bose he falls in, however, with Kenotic modes of expression; and soon afterwards he is found confessing himself in some sense a Kenotist—while,

nevertheless, in the act of propounding what seems really to be a merely humanitarian Christology. For Sanday's final suggestion is to the effect that we should think of Christ as the man into whose subconscious being—which is to be conceived as open at the bottom and through that opening in contact with the ocean of Deity which lies beyond—the waves of this ocean of Deity wash with more frequency, fullness, and force than in the case of other men, and so with more frequency, fullness, and force make themselves felt in the upper stratum of His being, His conscious self, also than in the case of other men. At the basis of this suggestion there lies a mystical doctrine of human nature, which makes the subliminal being of every man the dwelling-place of God. If we only go down deep enough into man's being, we shall find God; and if the tides of the Infinite only wash in high enough, they will emerge into consciousness. Man differs from man, no doubt, in the richness and fullness with which the Divine that underlies his being surges up in him and enters his consciousness; and Jesus differs from other men in being in this incomparably above other men. There is Deity in Him as well as humanity; but not Deity alongside of humanity, but Deity underlying and sustaining His humanity—as Deity underlies and sustains all humanity. The mistake of the orthodox Christology has been to draw the line which divides the Deity and the humanity vertically: let us draw it rather horizontally, "between the upper human medium, which is the proper and natural field of all active expression, and those lower depths which are no less the proper and natural home of whatever is Divine." Thus we shall have a Christ whose life, though, "so far as it was visible, it was a strictly human life," yet "was, in its deepest roots, directly continuous with the life of God Himself." That the same may be said in his measure of every man Sanday expressly affirms, and he as expressly identifies this Divine element which is to be found at the roots of the being of both Christ and all other men with what the Scriptures call "the in-

dwelling of the Holy Spirit." Christ thus becomes just the man in whom the Holy Spirit dwells in greater abundance than in other men. He is not God and man; He is not even God in man; He is man with God dwelling in Him—as, though less completely, God dwells in all men. We have reached here a Christology which substitutes for the Incarnation a notion which librates between the two conceptions of the general Divine immanence and the special indwelling of the Holy Spirit. According as the one or the other of these conceptions is given precedence will it find its affinities, therefore, with one or another widely spread form of the humanitarian theorising now so popular. For there are many about us who, declaring Jesus to be no more than man, wish to explain the Divine that is allowed also to be found in Him on the basis of the Divine immanence; and there are equally many among us who wish to explain it on the basis of the Divine indwelling or inspiration.

Those who occupy the former of these standpoints are prone to speak of Jesus as "a human organism filled with the Divine thought." This conception may be presented in a very crass form, or it may be clothed in very beautiful language and made the vehicle of very fervent expressions of reverence for Christ. "I see," explains James Drummond, "in the beauty of a rose a Divine thought, which is no other than God Himself coming unto manifestation through the rose, so far as the limitations of a rose will permit; but I do not believe that the rose is God, possessed of omniscience, omnipotence, and so forth. . . . So, there are those who have, through the medium of the New Testament and the traditional life of the purest Christendom, looked into the face of Jesus, and seen there an ideal, a glory which they have felt to be the glory of God, a thought of Divine Sonship which has changed their whole conception of human nature, and the whole aim of their life. . . ." Such a conception, we are told by its advocates, is far superior to the "masked God" of current orthodoxy; it "exalts Christ above all men, and

gives Him a place at the right hand of God." He was, no doubt, only a man—a human organism—but He was a man whose "attitude of will was such that God could act upon Him as upon no other in the history of humanity." "From the dawn of consciousness the human Christ assumed such an ethical uprightness before God that God could pour Himself out on Christ in altogether exceptional activities." In Him "for the first and only time the Almighty was granted His opportunity with a human soul," and, "as the Master kept Himself in unique ethical surrender to God, God acted upon Him in such a manner as to make the metaphysical relationship also unique. The ethical uniqueness implies and renders inevitable its corresponding metaphysical uniqueness of relation to God." For, we are told, "it is possible for God so to fill a responsive heart with His own spirit that every word of that soul becomes a word of God, that every deed becomes a deed of God, that every feeling reveals the loving heart of God willing to suffer with His children. In short, the life becomes such a life as God Himself would live were it possible for Him to be reduced to human circumstances. God could not suggest any improvement. He would find this soul such an open channel that He could at last pour Himself out to the utmost drop. There would be such complete mutual sympathy that the sorrows of God would become the sorrows of this soul, and the sorrows of this soul the sorrows of God. If in a moment of distress at the onslaught of sin the soul should cry out, 'Why hast Thou forsaken me?' the distress would be as real to God as to the soul, for every sorrow of either God or this soul would cut both ways. The soul would become God's masterpiece. God would throw Himself into its development with such flood that the metaphysical relationship would be beyond anything known to humanity, and beyond anything attainable by humanity. As the supreme work of the Father, and as the supreme response to the ethical cravings of the Father, such a creation could be called in the highest sense the Son of God."

Perhaps we may say that the exaltation of the man Jesus could go little further than this. And we can scarcely fail to observe that we have before us here a movement of thought running on precisely opposite lines from that of the Kenotic theories. In them we were bidden to observe how God could become man; in this we are asked in effect whether it may not be possible to believe that in Jesus Christ man became God. We are naturally reminded at this point that consentaneously with the rise of the Kenotic theories in the middle of the last century there was born also a contradictory theory—that of Isaac A. Dorner—which, with a much more profound meaning, proposed to our thought a solution of the problems of the Incarnation which formally reminds us of that just described. Dorner, beginning with the human Jesus, asked us to watch Him become gradually God by a progressive communication to Him of the Divine Being, so that, though at the start He was but man, in the end He should become in the truest and most ontological sense the God-man. The difficulties of such a conception are, of course, insuperable; it would compel us to think of the Godhead as capable of abscission and division, so that it could be imparted piecemeal to a human subject, or of manhood as capable by successive creative acts of being itself transmuted into Godhead. But it was inevitable that this theory, too, should leave some echoes of itself in the confused discord of modern thought.

We hear these echoes in the high christological construction of Martin Kähler. We hear them also in the lower theories of Reinhold Seeberg. According to Seeberg, Jesus Christ is just a man whom the willing God has created as His organ and through whom the personal will of God has so worked that He has become fully one with this personal will of God. "The will of God," he says, "chose the man Jesus for His organ, and formed Him into the clear and distinct expression of His Being." He emphasises the personal character of the Divine will in Jesus, but he allows no second hypostasis in the Godhead as its Trinitarian background. In his view we

can admit the eternal existence of only one thinking and willing Divine personality, though in that one personality there co-existed a threefold tendency of will. That particular tendency of the Divine will-energy which aims at the realisation of a church, manifests itself in the man Jesus, and so fully takes possession of Him that in Him it becomes for the first time personal and makes Him really the Son of God. Before God thus created Jesus into His organ there was no second ego standing over against the Father; there pre-existed in the eternal God only the eternal tendency of will to create a church. "What is peculiarly Divine in Christ" is therefore only "the peculiar will-content which we can distinguish from other will-contents, the tendency of the Divine will to the historical realisation of salvation." Seeberg thinks that thus he does justice to the Godhead of Christ. He looks upon Him as the Redemptive Will of God forming as organ for itself a human subject and coming to complete personality in it. "Jesus," he says, "in the peculiar contents of His soul is God." "Herrschaft," authority, therefore belongs to Him; but also "Demut," humility; but especially "Herrschaft," for is He not the personal Son of God, the only personal Son of God that ever was or ever will be? "That ever will be," we say: for the question arises, what has become of this personal Son of God now that His life on earth is over and He has ascended where He was before? As before the "Incarnation" the particular Divine will of salvation was not a Divine personality over against the Father, but acquired personality only as it flowed into the human person, Jesus Christ, and formed Him to its organ—has it, now that this man Jesus has passed away from earth, lost again its personality and sunk again into merely the tendency of the Divine will making for salvation? It is Karl Thieme who asks this question. For ourselves, we may be content with observing that in Seeberg's construction it is not God, but only the Divine will of salvation, that becomes incarnate in Jesus Christ; and that Jesus Christ is

therefore not God, but only, as we say in our loose everyday language, "the very incarnation" of the Divine will of salvation. We see in Him, not God, but only the will of God to save men—and this seems only another way of saying that Christ is not Himself God, but only the love of God is manifested in and through Him. What we get from Seeberg, then, is obviously not a doctrine of the incarnation, but only another form of the prevalent doctrine of Divine indwelling or inspiration, and it is because of this that Seeberg's theory seems to Friedrich Loofs one of the most valuable of those recently promulgated.

In an interesting passage Loofs selects out of the results of recent speculation the three conclusions which he considers the most valuable, and thus reveals to us his own christological conceptions. These are: "First, that the historical person of Christ is looked upon as a human personality; secondly, that this personality, through an indwelling of God or His Spirit, which was unique both before and after, up to the ending of all time, became the Son of God who reveals the Father, and became also the beginner of a new mankind; and, thirdly, that in the future state of perfection a similar indwelling of God has to be realised, though in a copied and therefore secondary form, in all people whom Christ has redeemed." The central point in this statement is that Christ is a man in whom God dwells. "The conviction," remarks Loofs in his explanation of his views, "that God dwelt so perfectly in Jesus through His Spirit as had never been the case before, and never will be till the end of all time, does justice to what we teach historically about Jesus, and may, at the same time, be regarded as satisfactorily expressing the unique position of Jesus, which is a certainty to faith." He is willing to admit, indeed, that he does not quite know what the dwelling of the Spirit of God in Jesus means; and, indeed, he is free to confess that he does not understand even what is meant by the "Spirit of God." And he agrees that the formula of the indwelling of the Spirit of God in Jesus is capable of being taken in so low a sense as

to destroy all claim of uniqueness for Jesus. He does not feel so well satisfied with it, therefore, as Hans Hinrich Wendt, for example, expresses himself as being. But he knows nothing better to say, and is willing to leave it at that, with the further acknowledgment that he feels himself face to face here with something of a mystery. Loofs is a Ritschlian of the extreme right wing, and in his sense of a mystery in the person of Christ, leaving him not quite satisfied with the definition of His person as a man in whom God uniquely dwells, we perceive the height of christological conception to which we may attain on Ritschlian presupposition.

What Ritschl himself thought of Christ it is rather difficult to determine; and his followers are not perfectly agreed in their detailed interpretation of it. He himself warns us not to suppose him to be unaware of mysteries because he does not speak of them: it is precisely of the mysteries, he says, that he wishes to preserve silence. Meanwhile he is silent of all that is transcendental in Christ, His pre-existence, His metaphysical Godhead, His exaltation—if these things indeed belong to Christ. If Jesus had any transcendent Being other than His phenomenal Being as man, Ritschl says nothing about it. He seems, indeed, to leave no place for it. He speaks, no doubt, of the "Godhead" of Christ; but by this he means neither to allow that Christ existed as God before He was man, nor to attribute a Divine nature to the historical Christ, nor to suggest that He has now been exalted to Divine glory. He means merely to express his sense that Christ has the value of God for us—that is to say, that we are conscious that we owe salvation to Him. The "Deity" thus predicated to Him, it is explained, is purely "ethical" and not "metaphysical," and, moreover, is transferable to His people so that His Church, viewed as the sphere of His influence, is as Divine as He is. It is the "calling" of Christ to be the founder of the Kingdom of God; and in fulfilling this "calling" He fulfils the eternal purpose of God for the world and mankind. And it is only because His personal will is thus one with the will of God that the predicate

of Godhead belongs to Him. "Christ is God" with Ritschl—thus S. Faut sums up the matter—"so far as He is on the one side the executor, on the other the object of the Divine will." It all comes, we see, at the best, to the conception that Jesus is the unique Revealer of God and Mediator of Redemption; and it is in these ideas that the higher class of Ritschlian thinkers live and move and have their being. To them Jesus is indeed purely human—"mere man" if you will, though the adjective "mere" is objected to as belittling. On the other hand, however, he stands in a unique relation to God "as the embodiment of God's life in humanity, and the guarantor of its presence and power; in whom God verifies Himself to us as Father and Redeemer." There is indeed no metaphysical Sonship with the Father in question; Sonship is an ethico-religious idea when applied to Jesus. When we call Him Son, we do not mean to declare Him God in a metaphysical sense; we but indicate "His superior mission for humanity as representing and communicating the Father's life." By His "centrality for the whole human race, as the one perfect mediator of the Divine life," He is so identified with God that those who have seen Him may be said to have seen the Father also. Through Him and Him only indeed has the Father ever been seen; in Him alone is "manifested the Father's ideal of humanity and the Father's purpose of grace toward the sinful." Through Him alone have men or can men come to the knowledge of the Father and to true and full communion with Him. "He is the one supreme Revealer," and "not only utters the thought of God"—who thus speaks through Him—but "incarnates the life of God, which through Him communicates itself to mankind as a redeeming and renewing power."

It is thus, we say, that the highest class of Ritschlian thinkers conceive of Jesus. We must emphasise, however, the words "the highest class." For this sketch of their thought of Jesus goes fairly to the limit of what can be said of Christ's dignity on Ritschlian ground. It not only, of course, gives

expression to views which would be deemed impossible by a Schultz, a Harnack, a Wendt, but it transcends also what a Kaftan, a Kattenbusch, a Loofs, a Bornemann might be willing to say. For the whole Ritschlian school Christ is not so much Himself God as the means by which God is made known to us, and the instrument through which we are brought to God—and it is therefore only that they are willing, in a modified sense, to call Him Divine. "The term Divinity, applied to Jesus, expresses at bottom" in Ritschl's usage, says a careful expositor of his thought, "nothing more than the absolute confidence of the believer in the redemptive power of the Saviour." "The Godhead of Christ, therefore," says Gottschick, "expresses the value which the historical reality of this personal life possesses, as the power that produces the new humanity of regenerate and reconciled children of God." It is common, indeed, for Ritschlians, like Herrmann, to repudiate altogether experience of the power of the exalted Christ, and to suspend everything on the impression made by "the historical Christ,"—and often, like Otto Ritschl, they mediate this through the Church to such an extent that Jesus appears merely as the starting-point of a movement propagated through the years from man to man; and He may therefore, without fatal loss, be lost sight of altogether. The Ritschlian conception of Christ must take its place as merely another of the numerous forms which the Humanitarianism of our anti-supernaturalistic age manifests.

For the characterising feature of recent theories of the person of Christ is that they are all humanitarian. The Kenotic theory, which tried to find a middle ground between the God-man and the merely-man Jesus having passed out of sight, the field is held by pure Humanitarianism. The situation is very clearly revealed in the classification of the possible Christological "schematisations" which Otto Kirn gives us in his *Elements of Evangelical Dogmatics*. There are only four varieties of Christology, he tells us, which we need bear in mind as we pass our eye down the labours in this field of all the

Christian centuries. These are, in his nomenclature, the Trinitarian, the Kenotic, the Messianic, and the Prophetic Christologies. The former two—the Trinitarian and the Kenotic—allow for a God-man; the first in fact, the second in theory. They are theories of the past. Only the Messianic and the Prophetic are living theories of to-day; and both of these give us merely a man Jesus. They differ only in one respect. Whereas in the Messianic Christology no less than in the Prophetic, Jesus in His self-consciousness as well as in His essential nature belongs to humanity and to humanity only, He is yet held in the Messianic Christology to be God's absolute organ for carrying out His counsel of salvation, and to be endowed for His work by a communication of the Holy Spirit beyond measure, fitting Him for unity with God and constituting Him the head of the community of God. The Prophetic Christology, on the other hand, looks upon Him as merely a religious genius, who in reaction upon His environment has become the unrivalled model of piety and as such the supreme guide to humanity in the knowledge of God and in the religious life. We may conceive of Jesus as the God-endowed man, or as the God-discovering man. In the former case we may see in Him God reaching down to man, to do him good: in the latter man reaching up to God, seeking good. Between these two conceptions we may take our choice: beyond them self-styled "modern thought" will not let us go.

Whether this reduction of Jesus to the dimensions of a mere man marks the triumph of modern christological speculation, or its collapse, is another question. The reduction of Jesus to the dimensions of a mere man was a phase of thought concerning His person which required to be fully exploited. And in that sense a service has been done to Christian thinking by the richness and variety of modern humanitarian constructions. Surely by now every possible expedient has been tried. The result is not encouraging. To him who would fain think of Him as merely a man, Jesus Christ looms up in history as ever more and more a mystery; a greater mystery

than the God-man who is discarded in His favour. Say that the union of God and man in one person is intrinsically an incomprehensible mystery. It is nevertheless a mystery which, if it cannot be itself explained, yet explains. Without it, everything else is an incomprehensible mystery: the whole developing history of the kingdom of God, the gospel-record, the great figure of Paul and his great christological conceptions, the rise and growth and marvellous power of nascent Christianity, the history of Christianity in the world, the history of the world itself for two thousand years—your regenerated life and mine, our changed hearts and lives, our assurance of salvation, our deathless hope of eternal life. And yet we are invited to believe Him to have been a mere man, on no other ground than that it is easier to believe him to have been a mere man than a God-man! For that, after all, is what the whole ground of the assertion that Jesus was a mere man ultimately reduces to. It is intrinsically easier to believe in the existence of a mere man than in the existence of a God-man. But is it possible to believe that all that has issued from Jesus Christ could issue from a mere man? Apart from every other consideration, does there not lie in the effects wrought by Him an absolute bar to all humanitarian theories of His Person? The humanitarian interpretation of the Person of Christ is confronted by enormous historical and vital consequences, impossible of denial, which apparently spring from a fact which it pronounces inconceivable; though, apart from this fact, these consequences appear themselves to be impossible of explanation.

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THE SUFFERING OF GOD.

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PROFESSIONAL theologians know of many, and those not unimportant, controversies stirred up over the question of the Divinity of Christ, but one alone, the Arian, has impressed itself on the imagination of the Church at large as being of vital and eternal significance.

It was the view of Arius that the Son was God indeed, but that His Divinity was essentially different in kind from the Divinity of the Father. Backed up as it was by an influential section of the episcopate, and still more by the support of a succession of emperors, his view, or some slightly modified form of it, would probably have become the official doctrine of the Church but for the heroic resistance of Athanasius, the only one of the Fathers whom even Gibbon condescends to admire.

Doubtless the philosophical categories in which Athanasius and his opponents alike expressed the point at issue between them are unilluminating and even misleading to modern thought. To ask whether the Son was *ὁμοούσιος* or *ὁμοιούσιος*, *i.e.* of the same or merely of similar *substance* to the Father, only obscures the issue at stake to an age which does not think of God in terms of substance at all.

Modern thought conceives of God rather under categories, like mind or life or will. Transmute the Athanasian formulæ into these categories, and it is plain at once that it really is a vital question whether or not the Will-attitude, the ethical

aim, the value-judgments of Christ are identical with those of the God of whom He is the mirror. God is love, says St John; and it is a God whose οὐσία, whose essence, is love, that is manifested in the life of Christ. If the life manifested in Christ is in its essential quality intrinsically alien to the life of God, "then is our preaching vain."

But though the religious instinct of the Church at large has never wavered in its loyalty to the cause championed by Athanasius, the Arian position, and positions in spirit allied to it, have always had some support. The strength of the Arian position is its recognition of a real distinction between God considered as the Absolute, and Christ the manifestation of God on earth—a recognition essential, as the Cappadocian Fathers saw, to any sane philosophy of religion, besides being one clearly implied in the Gospel narrative. The Monophysite cry, Θεὸς σταυρώθεις ἡμῶν, "God crucified for us," has no small value as a purely religious symbol; but the implication that the Christ who hung on the Cross is indistinguishable from the Father in Heaven offends equally against philosophy, common sense, and Scriptural tradition. It was because of its apparent affinity to positions like the Patripassian and Sabellian, which preceded it, that the Athanasian position had to fight so long and so hard for victory.

The fact, however, that I wish to press home is this, that, owing partly to the inadequate and misleading implications of the οὐσία terminology which was forced upon Athanasius by the philosophy of his time, partly to other causes, the victory of his position was never really won, except of course in words. The formula he fought for so nobly was accepted into the Creeds, but in so far as the *imagination* of the Church is concerned it has really been the Arian who has triumphed. And for practical religion the imaginative presentation of its creed counts for far more than its actual philosophical assertions. A few words will make this clearer.

From Greek philosophy the Church inherited a conception of God as an Absolute remote from the world, of whom

nothing but negatives can be predicated, a being in particular inaccessible to change and suffering. A quite different conception she inherited from the Old Testament—a God of Righteousness and of Judgment, a God alive and active, a God alike of mercy and of wrath, very different from the cold, bare abstraction of Greek philosophy.

A third conception of God as pre-eminently the loving Father came from the New Testament. Something of each of these conceptions was combined in the Church's conception of the First Person of the Trinity. The proportions in which they were blended would naturally vary with the different temperaments of different individuals. But in one point there was general agreement. The Hebrew imagination pictured God as dwelling in regal splendour in a far-off luminous Heaven remote from suffering and pain; and though even in the Old Testament another note is struck at times—"in all their afflictions he was afflicted," Is. lxiii. 9—it is only very rarely. Still less could Greek thought tolerate the idea that the Absolute could suffer. Thus the doctrine of the impassibility of God becomes a postulate of theology. But capacity to feel, and if need be to suffer, is surely involved in the very conception of God as love.

Men still spoke of the love of God: they only really meant it when they thought of God the Son; clemency at most—a royal prerogative—was imagined of the Father. God the Father is conceived as Majesty, God the Son as Love.

The Christian *Creed* acknowledges but one God and one quality of Godhead—so far Athanasius won his cause; but the Christian *imagination* has been driven by this postulate of the impassibility of God to worship two. Side by side sit throned in Heaven God the Father, omnipotent, unchangeable, impassible, and on His right hand God the Son, "passus, crucifixus, mortuus, resurrectus."

What is this but Arianism, routed in the field of intellectual definition, triumphing in the more important sphere of the imaginative presentation of the object of the belief?

What Christianity most needs to-day is a resolute reassertion in terms of modern thought of the principle championed by St John and Athanasius. Of the principle, I say, but not of the language. λόγος to us is a dumb word; ὁμοούσιος even points us towards a static and purely intellectualistic conception contrary to the real spirit of the view of Athanasius. Darwin has taught us that everything that lives must develop, and development means such intrinsic modifications of the organism as shall adapt it to its ever-changing environment. If the adaptation is good, the vital principle will gain an added life; if clumsy, it will just maintain its life until it can put forth a better; but if it can put forth no new modification to meet the changing environment, it dies. The Christian religion is no exception to this universal principle, and in so far as belief cannot exist without some attempt to justify and express itself in intellectual categories, theology must and will revise and improve its terminology.

The modern world feels with an acuteness never felt before the problem of suffering and evil. So long as God is pictured to the imagination as living in regal splendour in a gorgeous heaven untouched by suffering and ill, there is no answer to the question, If God is, and God is good, why did He create a world of sin and pain? Either there is no God, or He is not a good God, we say. Boldly press home the principles of St John and Athanasius, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father," the Father is essentially as the Son, and all is changed. God Himself is seen to share the suffering He allows. More than that: by an eternal activity, of which the Death of Christ is both a symbol and also an essential part, He is everlastingly, at the cost of His own effort and His own pain, redeeming and perfecting the world He made.

Thus far I had written three years ago, with a view of clearing up my own mind on the subject, and had then laid the paper on one side. And of course I am aware that the

views I have expressed were even then no novelty, but merely a summary of a tendency which had for some time previously been making itself felt in theology. But I have been moved to print what I had written by reading a book by Mr C. E. Rolt, *The World's Redemption* (Longmans, 1913), in which the principles which I had myself been trying to work out clearly to my own mind are carried to their logical conclusion by means of a trenchant criticism and re-examination of the current conception of the meaning of the term Omnipotence as applied to the Divine. I am not prepared to go the whole way with Mr Rolt; in particular (although, or possibly indeed because, I make no pretence to be a metaphysician), I am not certain that his efforts to clear himself from the charge of postulating an ultimate dualism between God and matter are quite successful; but his main contention is so suggestive that, as the book, in spite of its brilliant style and profound thought, is practically unknown to theologians, I make no apology for presenting a summary of his position almost entirely in the author's own words.

In the growth of man's inward life the perception of the material world comes before his perception of the spiritual. His senses are the starting-point of all his spiritual consciousness. Hence it is almost impossible for words to deal directly with anything but the world of matter; thus the spiritual quality of men can but be suggested by appropriate metaphors. We speak of a man's character as deep, of his imagination as lofty, of his sympathies as wide, of his genius as splendid; and in every instance we are using a figure of speech borrowed from the world of matter and space.

Such language is but metaphor; therefore it is true, but therefore also it may be misleading, most of all so when we try to use it to express that inscrutable mystery of the Infinite which breaks loose from all fetters of man's finite thought and language. Thus we say that God is great, but the greatness of God differs from all earthly magnitude. It cannot be meted with a measuring rod or conceived in terms of material pro-

portion. We cannot say that it is so many—not even if we name an infinite number—of yards or miles or leagues in height or depth or vastness. He is infinitely great, yet He exists wholly and individually in this place and in that, and in any point or spot of the whole spatial world.

Hence follows the important principle that, whenever we apply to God any words drawn from the outward world of matter and of space, such words, while true and necessary as far as they go, will always become *wholly* false unless used in a purely spiritual sense.

Apply this principle to the interpretation of the fundamental theological concept of the Divine Omnipotence. Our first instinctive concept of omnipotence derives from two sources, the one from without us, the other from within. We see the avalanche and the volcano and the terrific cataclysms of Nature. We see the action of the winds and storms, of the cataracts and the ocean waves, as they pass along with resistless fury and drive before them all that would obstruct their course. We see above all things the working of one mighty law—that law of gravitation which nothing can resist.

Within us is the mysterious power of will. I will to move a stone from my path, my body obeys the impulse. The stone resists me, but I tear it from its place. I am using compulsion and brute force. If I succeed in uprooting it, then I am stronger than the stone; if it defies my efforts, then it is stronger than I.

Thus within us and without we see at work a principle of *force*. That thing we regard as the most powerful which can crush and coerce the rest. It is natural to approach the concept of Divine omnipotence from the point of view of this experience of the material world. Man is stronger than the ant, the avalanche is stronger than man, the mountain than the avalanche, until at last we come to One who is yet stronger than the Universe itself, who, just as a man by the act of his will moves the pebble from his path, so by the act

of an almighty will which nothing can resist bends all things to His purposes, and compels the whole material system to obey his irresistible commands.

But is not this virtually to conceive of the Divine omnipotence as a kind of infinite brute force—a conception which, on the face of it, does not appear particularly Christian, to say the least of it? Far nobler is the attribute of power as claimed by the sufferer in Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound*:

"To suffer woes which Hope thinks infinite;
To forgive wrongs darker than death or night;
To defy Power, which seems omnipotent;
To love, and bear; to hope till Hope creates
From its own wreck the thing it contemplates;
Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent:
This, like thy glory, Titan, is to be
Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free—
This is alone Life, Joy, Empire, and Victory."

The power to crush opposition is the false power "which seems omnipotent," and is the power of heathen Jove. But surely, is not the power here claimed by Prometheus a better analogue to that of the Christian's God?

But where the notion that God's omnipotence consists in an infinite "physical" force, with infinite power to do or to prevent, breaks down most conspicuously is in the face of the Problem of Evil. Evil is only ultimately and really evil because it is contrary to the will of God, and therefore, if in the "physical" sense God *could*, He also *would* prevent it.

The facts of this world form a Procrustean bed from which there is no escape. On to this bed our theological beliefs must all be placed, and they can ultimately survive the process only if they succeed in fitting themselves within it. Now, this is precisely what the conception of an omnipotence consisting in force cannot possibly do. If we put it upon the bed, we find that large portions of it are promptly lopped off; in fact, it loses its feet and cannot stand upright. Unable any longer to carry us, it requires to be carried by us instead: it needs the support of apologetics—a sure sign of decrepitude. And so

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we try to perform the pious duty and to give it what first aid we can. We say that there is in God a principle of self-limitation whereby, though He has unlimited coercive power, yet He is prevented from using it; or else that omnipotence is a vague term; or else that the whole thing is beyond the range of our feeble minds. Anything, in fact, rather than give up the notion finally, completely, and absolutely.

And yet this is what must be done. The conception of a Being who possesses infinite coercive power in addition to infinite moral goodness will not through any human ingenuity fit the uncompromising bed. But there is another conception which will fit into it exactly. It is that of a Being whose omnipotence consists in His moral goodness and in nothing else. If God's power is itself nothing else than love, then all becomes clear and intelligible.

It is the nature of God, by patient meekness, to suffer ill, and, suffering it, to lead it into the paths of goodness. Even as He suffered the crime of Judas the traitor, and through it wrought our great Deliverance, so does He ever act throughout all time.

The forces of evil need space and time in which to assert themselves; and God needs space and time in order that, by enduring their assertion, He may win His gradual triumph. Hence the whole process of the world, and hence the almost incredible slowness with which its purpose is fulfilled. In meekness, in gentleness, in long-suffering and patience God endures the contradiction of blind and raging forces; He guides them little by little, as they allow His guidance, into definite channels; and slowly He changes the very things which thwart His tranquil power into a means for helping on His great redemptive purpose.

Thus—I am still quoting Mr Rolt's own words—we are saved from the degradation implicit in the ordinary religious attitude which bids us thank God for facts which our hearts condemn. Thus we are not passive slaves with mind and conscience fettered, but possess instead a glorious and

terrible liberty of untrammelled thought and action. The true Christian spirit is no spirit of acquiescence in things as they are; rather it is one of passionate though patient revolt. And, while it enables us to see that all things work together for good to those who love God, yet it also compels us to acknowledge that the universe does not in all its details express His holy will. All things, in fact, to some extent run counter to His will, inasmuch as nothing is perfect.

Such, briefly, are the conclusions towards which the latest efforts to think out the full implications of the doctrine of the Incarnation seem to be leading us. Truth is many-sided, and as new aspects catch our sight older and more important ones may for the moment be obscured, and in the eddies of theological tendency it is impossible for contemporaries always to be sure that the current by which they themselves are being carried along is that of the main stream; but I would dare to commend the position I have outlined to the serious consideration of religious thinkers as at least an aspect of the Truth.

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MECHANISM, INTELLIGENCE, AND LIFE.

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THE so-called vitalistic hypothesis has itself in recent years shown fresh vitality. The great and rapid progress of physical science in the last century, and the new interpretation placed by Darwinism upon the word evolution, had led men to think that the processes of life and of the history of species might be wholly mechanical, and that only time and a knowledge of detail were needed to discover this. The successful do not readily admit that their progress can be barred; and those who see scientific success chiefly in substituting for problems of qualitative change problems of purely quantitative character desire to reduce to these the problems of life and even of understanding itself. What was achieved encouraged the more confident to declare everything achievable. But time, which was to bring us nearer to the goal of complete mechanical explanation, has revealed fresh difficulties in applying it even to matters where it had been supposed to have triumphed; and that confident morning has passed. Yet many men of science view with angry apprehension the revival of anti-mechanical conceptions; and in vitalism they think they see an enemy of progress, a theory inapplicable to the solution of any particular problems, like the theory of divine intervention, the "thus far and no farther" against which reason protests.

That scientific explanation ends where the factors on which vitalism insists come into play, I believe to be true. Whether

for all this these factors must be admitted is another question. It is far beyond me to determine this. The object of the present paper is rather to try and clear the issue by showing what exactly a mechanical explanation is, and in what a vitalistic theory must, so far as I can see, differ from a mechanical; it will, I think, appear that the real antithesis to mechanism is intelligence; and that vitalism assumes in living things activity such as nothing known to us except intelligence can show.

Every machine is an aggregate of parts, and these parts act variously one on another. Forces applied at certain points set parts moving; and their motions are communicated to other parts, or checked and modified by others, according to the divers ways in which the parts are conjoined or brought together. These various movements may result in some peculiar movement of one particular part, which we call the movement or the work of the machine, because the machine has been constructed as it has for the sake of this: *e.g.* in a watch, the movement of the hands; in a ship's engines, that of the screw; in a Nasmyth hammer, that of the descending block of steel. But there is no intelligence nor purpose in the actual movements of the machine; its parts would not have been thus put together, except by an intelligent being with a purpose—this I am at any rate not concerned to dispute; but when it exists, and the moving force is applied to it, I do not need to ascribe intelligence or purpose to the machine in order to explain why it performs its work. On the contrary, that is the only possible result of applying force to a particular member of a system of parts thus interlocked; and though the parts may be many, and their interactions complicated so that the movement of any one part is determined by many others, yet it is nothing more than the resultant of all the forces which are brought to bear on that part, and which would each severally produce or prevent some movement in it according to general mechanical principles.

This fact is important. In a mechanical explanation we

start from the principle of inertia. An isolated body at rest or in motion would continue thus moving or thus at rest indefinitely. If it is a member of a system of two bodies, they influence each other according to some law. Given this law, and the masses and velocities of the two bodies at a certain time, with the direction of their motion, it is a mere matter of calculation to determine how they will be moving—or what will be the condition of the system—at another time. We reach our conclusion by mathematical reasoning; nor do we take account of any design, or any result desired or judged to be good. Introduce a third member into the system. Each member is now interacting with the other two; its movements are determined by them together; but the movement of every one exemplifies as fully and necessarily the laws according to which it and every one other severally would behave when interacting, as if it were only interacting with that other. The calculation indeed may be more difficult, or altogether beyond the resources of our mathematics; but what we cannot calculate, each member of the system performs. This at least is the faith of mechanics. And it is the same however many members there are in the material system. The system, therefore, is a mere aggregate. Its behaviour is nothing but the mathematical resultant of the behaviour of its several parts. All transactions are at bottom transactions between one part and another part, and they all take place according to a law which is constant, though expressed in varying events. Hence, too, there is nothing really new. No unity, and nothing new: these are the characteristics of the purely mechanical.

I began with considering a machine like a watch or an engine, and I took as the members of a machine those large masses which we should distinguish from one another by the cohesion of their parts: roughly speaking, that is one part which so coheres as all to move together, like a piston-rod or a cog-wheel. I might have begun with the solar system, whose members are sun and planets and their satellites, which influ-

ence each other's movements manifestly without direct contact. But the behaviour of such masses is taken to be really the behaviour of the molecules composing them, and in the last resort of the atoms, or whatever those parts may be called, which are the least things ever requiring to be considered separately. There are doubtless difficulties about regarding even these as units; but since they have no parts that act independently, but each "moveth all together if it move at all," these difficulties are allowed to rest. These atoms, or what not, need not be treated as aggregates, because we need not distinguish their parts, if they have such: hence they are treated as units. They are not supposed ever to come into absolute contact with each other, but to influence each other's movements from a distance, attracting or repelling, as the masses which we count as members of the solar system influence each other's movements from a distance. And the amount of the influence exerted is a function, though by no means in every case the same function, of the distance.

Now there are, notoriously, difficulties in this view of things, to some of which I will briefly refer. In the first place, though there are parts which are treated as least parts and as units for the reason given above, it is difficult to understand their unity. We can, by a kind of picture-thinking, imagine them as each something which, if sufficiently magnified, would appear possessed of a definite figure: and this figure we can suppose preserved unaltered in every way throughout all time; the thing so figured suffers neither compression nor distortion nor disruption. But it occupies space, and therefore contains undivided parts, and if an aggregate of such things attracts or repels to the extent it does in virtue of the separate attractions or repulsions of its real or separate parts, each such thing should do so in virtue of the attractions or repulsions of its potential or undivided parts. Yet this argument will carry us *ad infinitum* in vain search of the real units, of whose influences the influence of an aggregate is the sum. And Leibniz was so much moved by this consideration that he declared it

impossible for extension to be the essence of body, as the Cartesians held, or for any real thing to be extended, and held that the reals must be monads, beings having rather a sort of spiritual unity.

Secondly, there is the problem of qualitative differences, and this takes two forms, as it involves or not the fact of sense-perception. The sensible qualities of things, whereby we distinguish one kind from another, are supposed to be nothing inherent in the things themselves. Sensible things look coloured, taste sweet, smell fragrant, feel rough or cold, are sonorous or dull-sounding to us in virtue of their constitution and the constitution of our organs of sense. But the ultimate parts composing both sensible things and our organs of sense (which are themselves sensible, though not always to us, nor always to others until they have ceased to function) have no such qualities: they are not perceived at all; they are held, however, to be extended, figured, solid, and to influence each other's movements variously, as already described. To perceive as we do is one of the manifestations of life in those aggregates which are called conscious. It is a result which cannot be mathematically deduced from any knowledge of the ways in which the ultimate real members of a material system are influencing each other's movements. Hence it remains unexplained. The same must be said of the fact of knowledge; and there are greater difficulties in treating knowledge as an unexplained result of such interactions than in so treating sense-perception: greater not because the production of the one is more inexplicable this way than the production of the other, for both are equally inexplicable, but because such an origin seems inconsistent with knowledge being knowledge. It may be urged that no theory explains sense-perception, nor knowledge either: but that the hypothesis of a soul does not help us, because we cannot see why a soul should behave as it is alleged to behave. But whatever degree of truth there may be in this retort, at least, if a mechanical theory will not explain everything, it is best to acknowledge the fact. And waiving the

inexplicability of sense-perception and of knowledge, we shall find it hard to understand what a mechanical theory is to make of those differences in things themselves called chemical which it supposes to exist. They show themselves, in the behaviour of atoms, by different degrees of affinity; but there must be something in an atom of oxygen which differentiates it from one of iron, and again from one of hydrogen, in virtue of which when iron is left in water the oxygen in the water leaves the hydrogen and combines with the iron. If the elements themselves were homogeneous, they must behave alike. Though we might calculate their movements therefore from some formula of their affinities, that will not express the nature of the difference between them. And it is hard to see how this difference can be stated quantitatively. Difference of specific gravity might be so stated, if it could be resolved into a difference in the closeness with which homogeneous units are aggregated; but the very homogeneity of units which is thus assumed as the basis of difference in specific gravity makes it all the more difficult to see what basis there can be for differences of chemical affinity: while if we regard difference of specific gravity as ultimate, and suppose that two absolutely solid bodies of equal volume can have different masses, it is equally difficult to conceive what it is in the body which is the ground for the differences in the force of gravitational attraction, or in the extent to which one causes another to move towards it, wherein differences of mass express themselves.

Thirdly, it may be asked how one body can determine movement in another. A mechanical science will give a formula enabling us to calculate to what extent it will do so, but that is all. Its doing so, and doing it always according to the formula, seems to involve (if we reflect) that these bodies have a nature of their own which cannot itself be expressed quantitatively. The need for supposing this we have already to some extent seen; and it seems still more necessary if one body is to combine in itself and express in one movement the effects of the action of many others; but we may add that the

interaction of bodies according to the same formula seems to imply a real unity pervading or connecting them all. And this unity cannot be explained by adding more units to the aggregate, of the sort which are already recognised as aggregated therein. But those who uphold a mechanical theory, so long as their formulæ are intelligible, and enable them to calculate the behaviour of aggregates from a knowledge of how these units would behave, any two of them together, will perhaps regard this last consideration as a sign of superfluous metaphysical apprehensiveness. It is, however, connected with a consideration which, in regard to organisms, is of the first importance.

Let us ask, then, having thus attempted to discover what we mean by a mechanical explanation, and wherein such explanation would be complete, what reasons there are for refusing to apply it to organisms, and in respect of what departure from such a theory a theory should be called vitalistic. Now, I suppose that speaking generally what we seem to find in organisms, as distinguished from machines, is a power of adaptive response to stimulus. Adaptive, however, is a relative word, and means adaptive to something. If we ask to what, we must say to the growth and preservation of the organism and the reproduction of its kind in other organisms by the processes of generation. If the organism *is* a machine, it is one which builds up and for a while renews its own parts, as other machines do not: and which produces other machines like itself, that begin their course, like it, as aggregates comparatively minute, and proceed like it to build up their own parts, and so forward in a perpetual succession.

Now, I will not enlarge upon the difficulty of supposing that a machine so complex as this, having all the apparatus needed for all the different reactions, without which such a result could not arise, could come together out of atoms that interact according to mathematical formulæ, by a process fundamentally the same as that whereby a system of particles may shake or settle down into a moving equilibrium. It will

be admitted that those who uphold a mechanical interpretation of life cannot show that such a machine is possible, but must rely on the inability of their opponents to show that it is not possible; and here perhaps they cannot properly avail themselves of Spinoza's observation that the powers of matter are very imperfectly known to us; for in principle they think we do know these powers, and it would rather be the possible complexity of a machine that is very imperfectly known to us. I will only say two things: first, that if organisms were such machines they would have no real unity, but would only be aggregates whose constantly shifting components preserved for a time a more or less constant grouping, like the constantly shifting particles which compose a dust-devil; secondly, that it is the view of many biologists, as it is the view also of those who are content with the *primâ facie* view of the facts, that an organism has a unity such as a dust-devil has not, and does respond to stimuli differently from a machine. What I want to discover is the nature and implications of this difference.

A machine, we saw, even if there is some unity other than what belongs to each of its ultimate parts, behaves in a way that can be calculated from the laws of the behaviour of its several parts *inter se*. These laws have nothing to do with the fact that the parts are brought together into any particular aggregate; they are the same for all aggregations of the parts, and therefore indifferent to any particular aggregation. Whatever response a particular aggregate or machine may make to stimulus, it will result from laws which have no special relation to that aggregate, which are equally exemplified in events that maintain it or disrupt it. It cannot therefore be said that any response is adaptive to the maintenance of an aggregate, except accidentally, *i.e.* that the aggregate is actually maintained as a result of it. There is nothing of the nature of purpose or design. And in particular the fact that if one response were made the aggregate would be maintained, and if another it would be disrupted, does not in any way influence the response. If an organism has a power of adap-

tive response, what does this imply in it to differentiate it from a machine?

It implies that the organism is not an aggregate of material parts: that there is an unity in it totally different from that of any of the members of such an aggregate: and that its behaviour cannot be calculated from the laws which express the behaviour of the material parts *inter se*. Let us call this unity, if anyone likes, a soul, or for the moment by a symbol dissociated from the implications of the word "soul": let us call it x . Now, the important thing to realise is that this x cannot be homogeneous with the parts of the material aggregate which we will now call *its* body, and cannot interact with them as they do with one another. For otherwise it would not be the sort of unity required. Our position was that an organism is not an aggregate of material parts, whose total behaviour is explicable from, and at bottom is, the behaviours of those parts *inter se*, expressible in formulæ from which it can be calculated. The reason for taking up this position was, that the organism responds adaptively to stimulus, *i.e.* that its responses are determined, at least to some extent, by the fact that they maintain it in being and help it to function in determinate ways, and not merely by those attractions and repulsions between its parts or between them and bodies outside it, which have their play indifferently in what maintains it in being and in what destroys it. Of what use, then, can it be to suppose the organism to contain an additional part x , interacting with the rest in the same mechanical way as they with one another? The difficulties in the mechanical view did not arise from the precise number of the parts in the machine, and will not be removed by adding one to the number. The problem will break out again. If the behaviour of such additional part is subject to mechanical laws, and calculable accordingly, like that of the other parts, we must look again beyond it for the unity we seek.

We saw that there was some reason to think that even a mechanical system could not be understood as a mere aggre-

gate, but that some kind of unity must be supposed that was not like any of the parts of the aggregate. But that unity, if there is such, differs from the unity of an organism in two important respects. Firstly, it will not be the unity of any one aggregate, whereas the unity of an organism is the unity of that organism and not another. The unity, if any, presupposed by a mechanical system will belong equally to all aggregates for the reason that, although the groupings of the ultimate parts of matter may bring some into closer conjunction than others for a time, yet their mutual behaviour illustrates the same laws, whether they are near or far, or at least whether it be these or those particles of a given sort, with which they are interacting. As there is nothing in their behaviour directed to the preservation of a particular grouping, there is nothing which can be regarded as the soul of that group, or in less questionable language, as an unity directing the reactions of that group more than of any other. The mechanical system is one and not many. Organisms, on the other hand (if they do display adaptive response or variation), have their separate individuality: though the relation of these individuals to each other is a further problem. This thought is, of course, conveyed by talking about *self*-preservation as the first law of nature: merely mechanical aggregates are not selves: only the whole preserves itself: partial aggregates dissipate into one another, and the whole and its laws are the same throughout. The second difference between the unity of a mechanical aggregate, if there be any, and of an organism is this, and it would have to be recognised even if the first were denied and particular groups were allowed their several unities: the unity of the mechanical aggregate is ineffective, and its changes are deducible from the principles of interaction between any two parts, without any account taken of anything else; this, indeed, is part of what is meant by calling it mechanical. But the unity of an organism determines the reactions of the organism in a way which could not be deduced from any knowledge of the principles in accordance with which

the parts would interact mutually without it. Nor can they be deduced from a knowledge of that and a knowledge of the way wherein the unity, our x , interacts with each part; for to suppose that would be to make of it another part like to the rest, in the way which we have seen to be inadmissible, because not satisfying the problem proposed. And this difference between an organism and a machine is very important, and it explains the reluctance of many to conceive of an organism as having any unity of this kind. For there would really be a limit to our powers of explanation at the point where the influence of the organism as an unity is invoked. We might, indeed, learn empirically how it behaves; but we should never be able to deal with it as with the material parts. It would not be measurable like them in respect of such and such physical properties, so that its changes and theirs could be connected by any equation. And, if it is not so measurable, its power to modify the reactions of its body cannot be limited in advance. Doubtless that power is limited, but we cannot ascertain its limits, as we ascertain the limit of the earth's power to deflect the moon by measuring its mass. There will remain something in the organism, so long as it lives, unexhausted by its activities hitherto; and its behaviour can never be wholly predictable.

There is a special interest in this consideration, because of its connection with two characters often claimed for man, and one at any rate for all organisms—viz. uniqueness and freedom. So long as we suppose an organism to be nothing more than an aggregate of unchangeable least parts, interacting according to laws, there need be nothing to distinguish one organism from another except the combination of these parts. Perhaps no two combinations are exactly alike; but their differences can be resolved into those of their elements, and so accounted for; and the elements themselves may, for all our mechanical theory has to say, be (as Clerk Maxwell thought them) like manufactured articles repeated according to pattern. But if there is in each organism an unity not resolvable into parts, it

can at least never be shown false that every such unity is different from every other, or unique. And this unity, as not resolvable into parts, so far as it determines the behaviour of the organism, will determine it unpredictably. It has often been considered that if action is predictable it cannot be free. Some have endeavoured to meet this objection, so far at least as it is connected with the divine fore-knowledge, by saying that God knows future contingents not by deduction from their causes, but as we know the objects of present observation. That expedient implies that if future events could be known beforehand by deduction from present events, they could not be free; and such a contention seems justified. Now, it is clear that that kind of prediction depends on our being able to determine precisely the nature of the elements, in a subject to which the predicted change is to occur, and the laws of their interaction. An unity not resolvable into elements interacting according to laws cannot be so treated; its powers can only be learned by its behaviour. From this we may be able to form some notion of its nature, and hence in turn to anticipate how it will behave on other occasions, but our knowledge of its nature, drawn from what we have observed of its behaviour, can never be so precise as to enable us to determine exactly the limits of its powers. There will always be what I may call unexhausted resources in it, so far as we can tell; and any behaviour in which these are manifested will spring from the nature of the subject that displays it, and will therefore be its own.

Hence there are two characteristics, which those who desire to maintain the freedom of man seek to vindicate for him, that will belong to the action of such a subject: (i) that his acts will be his own, not traceable to the nature of something else, such as the parts of which a machine is composed—such a being will be, in Aristotle's phrase, an *ἀρχὴ πρᾶξεων*, or originator of actions; (ii) that we shall never be in a position to say that a man cannot in the future act differently to his custom in the past. On the other hand, it does not follow from the

nature of such a subject as the unity which we have described, that we may say he could have acted otherwise than he did. This unity may produce from itself what it does produce necessarily: we cannot anyhow suppose its resources to be altogether undefined and limitless; we may suppose them to be quite definite, so that if it could be replaced in the past situation it would behave in the same way. I am inclined to think that such necessity in action is not incompatible with the freedom which morality requires. We do not the less regard God as a free agent because we conceive him incapable of doing wrong; for we think his actions to be really his, and not due to the influence on him of anything else. Similarly, if we really thought that a man's actions were his own, and not due, *e.g.*, to the fact that his ancestors had been drunken or dissolute, temperate or brave, we should regard him as a free agent. It is perhaps worth while to notice that we do not consider a man unfree when he thinks coherently, although if he is rational he is bound to think that way: we are more inclined to regard him as unfree in his thinking if from pain or some other non-rational influence he thinks incoherently. This is because an intelligence has just such an unity as no aggregate can have, and we ascribe the issue to the activity of this intelligence and nothing else.

There are no doubt many difficulties in reconciling the existence of such unities as I have tried to describe with other of the facts of organic life. The character of any one organism seems to be bound up very closely with those of others, its ancestors in the way of generation, whereas these unities are not explicable from anything else. Biologists talk of heredity freely, and do not all of them seem to realise the difficulty of the conception; some of those who do, and substitute for it that of an identical subject, the continuous germ plasm, might be puzzled to explain how this is identical throughout the evolution which it undergoes, when it neither remains composed of the same material particles nor preserves through the change of particles composing it the same structure

and power. They might also find it harder to maintain the identity of the germ plasm in collateral and highly differentiated organisms, than of the germ plasm in the members of a single linear ascendant series; yet if there is a real identity of the germ plasms through successive generations, so that that of an ape to-day is the same with that of its remote prevertebrate ancestor, and if this is the ancestor of an elephant of to-day as well, then, since the common ancestral germ plasm is identical with the germ plasms of ape and elephant, these must somehow be identical with each other. But I do not escape from the difficulties which beset the conception I am stating by pointing to equal or greater difficulties besetting the conceptions which find more favour with the mechanistic biologist; and I must freely admit that it is a grave problem for the vitalist to determine how the unity of an organism, being something not resolvable into pre-existing parts, like the body, should yet, as it would appear, be determined in its nature, at least in large measure, by its relations to parents and ancestors generally, as the body is. The problem is, after all, the old problem of the genesis of a soul. Yet, before it drives us into admitting that there is nothing but the body, and that this, because its genesis presents nothing new, does not raise the same difficulty, we should remember that there are other things besides these questionable souls which, whether generated and destroyed or not, seem at least now to be, and formerly not to have been: such things as works of art, or natural beauty, or moral action, or the knowledge possessed by individuals. For the emergence of any of these may be connected with complex relations among things that exist before and after their emergence, but we cannot really sustain the thesis that any of them is those things in new relations.

And this reflection brings us to consider more closely some of these instances. The non-mechanical behaviour of an organism for which vitalism contends would fall to the ground if there were no unity in it; and, as I said at the outset, I have been concerned rather to make clear

what is implied in denying the adequacy of the mechanical hypothesis as to the nature of living things than in determining whether it is inadequate. But at any rate we are aware of certain processes which are not mechanical, those of a rational intelligence. And we may realise this if we consider artistic creation or speculative thought.

To this end, let us look first at what is like a mechanical process in the mind. Association of ideas, in which one school of philosophers or psychologists has sought a key to unlock all the mysteries of mind, is in principle mechanical. So far as transitions of thought are determined according to principles of association, the reason why I now pass from thinking of *a* to thinking of *b* is that I thought of them together in the past. If I have thought of *a* in conjunction with several other objects, *b*, *c*, and *d*, I shall pass from thinking of *a* to thinking of one or other of these according to the comparative recency, frequency, or what not of the past conjunctions. The conditions are many and variable: but one way or another, what determines transitions of thought is not any real connections between one element and another in the nature of the things thought of, but relations quite irrelevant thereto between past acts of thought. It is indeed—the point is become, since Mr Bradley, a commonplace of criticism—hard to conceive how past are to exert influence upon present acts of thought, if the mind is but a stream or series of states or activities. I am concerned, however, only with the conditions of the influence: and it cannot be disputed that on associationist principles an act of thought is determined to arise in the mind as the result of its relations to a great number of other such particular acts, in the same way as a molecule of water, let us say, is brought to the top of a wave as the result of its relations of interaction to countless other molecules, and theirs to one another. The school may talk about ideas or perceptions or presentations, instead of acts of thought: and it may swallow the difficulties connected with the recurrence of a particular idea. But our main point is

that what I think now is due to past conjunctions of these so-called ideas, and these did not depend on any intelligible and necessary connection between the elements conjoined. "All fancies," says Hobbes, "are motions within us, relics of those made in the sense: and those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense continue also together after sense: insomuch as the former coming again to take place, and be predominant, the latter followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner as water upon a plane table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger." This is clearly something mechanical, though Hobbes would have been hard put to it to show how the simile is applicable where there is a "passionate thought to govern and direct those that follow to itself, as the end and scope of some desire, or other passion." And later writers have tried to drop the movements of matter, retaining only those of ideas. But their theories abolished all apprehension of necessary connections in things, in favour of connections between apprehensions that were really nothing but psychical states, or at most nothing but apprehensions of psychical states; and the crowning triumph of their analysis, the theory of the inseparable association of ideas, explains to us that when we judge that x must be or cannot be y , what really happens is that because of their very frequent conjunction in the past, or their never having been conjoined, the one idea cannot now arise without arousing or barring out the other—though how we could judge x not to be y when y cannot arise in the mind remains a mystery.

Now, something like this "association" does no doubt determine many transitions in the mind. But in an intelligent process I am not led to pass from thinking of x to thinking of y because of any conjunction in my previous thoughts of them; on the contrary, I discover by thinking what I had not known before, I trace the connections of the facts; and another man does it better than I, not because the past conjunctions of his so-called ideas were different, but because he is more intelligent. When, indeed, I try to describe the process, so as to show why

I think thus, I cannot do it ; for I must either borrow the mechanical scheme of explanation, which is here false and inapplicable, or just repeat what happens in intelligent thinking. But I confess that when I reflect on that, I find myself bound to acknowledge in it something wholly different from " association of ideas " : something wherein a halting and confused apprehension clears itself up ; wherein there is genuine development, so that I can say at the end that my knowledge is the fulfilment of my previous more or less ignorant groping and questing. And the nearest analogous experience seems to lie in artistic production. I speak diffidently, as being no artist ; but I suppose a man conceiving a play or story, or designing a building or a picture, begins by being vaguely aware of what he seeks : and as he broods, this or that more definite detail occurs to him, and is seen to belong to what he seeks, or not ; but herein he does not just pick out from a mass of everything suitable or unsuitable, which may be suggested according to links of association, what is seen when presented to fit in best ; but the consciousness of the general nature of what he seeks somehow controls the movements of thought wherein detail suggests itself—that is Hobbes' " passionate thought " or " end and scope " ; so that the thing sought might be said to reveal itself under the effort of his thinking, not by aggregation but as the bud reveals itself (or so we think until we try to describe life mechanically) in the flower. No mental advance is by aggregation ; aggregation is transference of something hither from elsewhere ; and the parts aggregated have no unity but their togetherness. When knowledge grows, when a design, as we say, takes shape, it is not by transference from another mind of what I now know or conceive, and did not know or conceive before. None is robbed by my gain ; another need not be less an artist because I am more. Nor is the new merely added to the old ; but the old is transformed into the new, so that nothing need be quite the same ; and what is known or conceived in a story or design, is all interconnected the more as the knowledge is more complete or the

art better—a thing not statable in mechanical terms, in which even the simplest judgment disappears as a mere co-presence of ideas, a simultaneous thinking of two things: though this clearly is not judgment, since whether I judge that life is mechanical or that it is not, I think of the same two things together, and when I think at once of Gog and Magog I do not judge one to be the other.

In the progressive understanding, then, of a subject of thought, or working out of a subject of art, we have change which is not explicable as a rearrangement of elements in accordance with the laws of their interaction, *i.e.* is not mechanical: in which something new emerges, and yet the new is so related to the old that it can be regarded as developing out of it. But these processes go on in a mind or—to speak more generally—in a soul: they are processes in a soul displaying it at its most intelligent; they are not the only processes in which a soul seems to change not by aggregation but by growth. And what I have said of them might be said of the soul or mind as a whole. This is the thing of which we may say with confidence that it develops or grows. The term growth was no doubt first applied to the body, to plant or animal, as a material thing: but it was applied to them in a sense in which on the mechanical hypothesis it is inapplicable. For everyone would admit that to speak of the growth of a flood or sand-bank or a crowd was metaphorical: that strictly they do not grow; and that admission means that aggregation is not growth. If, then, the history of the bodily organism is one of aggregation merely, though the aggregation may exhibit law (as does that of a sand-bank) yet it will be really of the same character with the processes which are called growth only metaphorically, and will itself not properly deserve the name. Of the mind, however, we cannot refuse to admit that what comes to be is what was imperfectly before. And as the “passionate thought” directs the mind in study, or the vague though passionate thought of the complete work of art directs it in designing, so it seems as if the nature of the mind helped

to direct the process by which it is developed. Hence the failure of psychology when it attempts to explain how we come to apprehend things in space by starting from feelings as data, and the laws of association or reproduction whereby these are revived and integrated: hence the mythological character of objectification and reification, or noetic synthesis, if these are anything more than new names for an achievement which is no more explicable by psychology than vital processes, on the vitalistic hypothesis, are explicable physiologically. The psychologist and the physiologist may indeed discover conditions without which the achievement would not occur; but they must admit a factor which escapes their treatment because it does not operate mechanically. Hence, too, the failure of an ethics which starts from man as a being with only animal impulses, and tries to end with moral man, yet thinks the change can be explained by the mere complication of what it started from. Even Aristotle, who had a much clearer perception of the problems connected with the conception of growth than most biologists or philosophers,¹ hardly seems to see in his ethics that mere repetition cannot explain how a man who begins by doing virtuous acts of any kind because he is told to do them, or for fear of punishment, should end by doing them virtuously because he sees that he ought to do them, or that they are good.² Habit, indeed, as has been urged by Professor J. A. Smith, may be said to be a differentia of living—at any rate of conscious—things. What is inorganic, anyhow, can acquire no habits. The ship that finds herself, the machine that runs better after a little use, do not really acquire habits. Use or wear and tear affect their parts, so that they yield better results than before; but these parts are after all aggregates; and there is no unity which becomes by repeated activity so differenced that its nature shows itself now in different activities from heretofore.

¹ v. *De Gen. et Corr.*

² I owe this remark, as well as the next, to Professor J. A. Smith's conversation.

We may feel dissatisfied with Aristotle's phrases when he says that the form is efficient in determining its own realisation in the individual, or recurs, as he so constantly does, to the antithesis of "act and power." But it is difficult to find any satisfactory phrase; for the thing to be indicated can be brought under no more familiar conception. Wherever we can speak of development there is the same thing to be noticed, even if the successive subjects in which it is displayed have not grown one out of another. Students of culture talk of the development of a style: comparative anthropologists set before us tools or weapons or ornaments of successive dates, arranged in series: and unless it is nonsense to speak of the development displayed in them, we must admit that there is something, not physical or sensible, a form, which is more fully revealed in the later, less fully in the earlier; but that they do not think it nonsense is implied by the fact that they will often date members of the series relatively to each other by the degree of this development. Nor could we otherwise mean anything by the word "progress." As has been often pointed out, the genealogy of a species need not, on Darwinian principles, display a progress; for to be later in the series is not to be higher or better, and may quite well involve the disappearance or diminution of what was more fully present in earlier members of it. How should men speak of degeneration or diskinding—"Entartung"—if they did not naturally distinguish between progress and succession? succession is as much involved in regress. It may be hard to be sure one has detected the true line of progress—to recognise in the germ what one can see in its completeness; and the biologist is not alone in being faced with the problem of divergent development, wherein it may be hard also to say which of the developed forms displays more fully or truly what was present in the nature of the earliest member of the series. But it is not really clear analysis or competent thinking to shut our eyes to differences, or force the lucidity of mechanical formulæ upon facts which are really not of that nature.

Nor in principle is the problem a different one as it concerns the growth or development of an individual, and as it concerns the evolution displayed in the history of a race. I do not mean that the latter, and again the evolution displayed in a series whose terms are not connected by natural generation, do not raise their own questions. But as far as the notion of development is concerned—the coming to be more fully of what was less fully realised before—the problem is the same; and it is the same so far as that in none of its forms can it be solved mechanically, or the process resolved into aggregation.

The biologist indeed may prefer to talk no more of progress or degeneration: to say that from the impartial standpoint of science no species, and indeed no individual, is higher than another, but only more capable of leaving offspring, or more useful or pleasing to men. He may deny that plants and animals grow, in any proper sense of the word, or—if he thinks the proper sense is the sense justified by his science—in any other sense than that in which a flood or a sand-bank grows. But he cannot deny that the mind grows in another sense than this, that rational thinking and design are processes in which the result is not explicable from the laws displayed in the interaction of parts, but that something which may be called the unity, or the whole nature, of the mind or the soul is at work in the very process by which it comes to fuller display. And if we must allow it there we cannot correlate this mental development with a cerebral change that moves on disparate lines; and we may be inclined to think, without wishing to check any of his inquiries, that life may after all have in it as much of intelligence as of machinery. At any rate he should look his own theories in the face, and see clearly what he affirms and what he denies, when he repudiates anything—call it vitalism or what you will—that goes beyond the simple assumptions of the physicist.

H. W. B. JOSEPH.

ONE AVENUE TO GOD : A TRANSCRIPT OF EXPERIENCE.

THE REV. A. D. MARTIN.

I.

"One avenue was shaded from thine eyes,
Through which I wandered to eternal truth."

KEATS' *Hyperion*.

I WANT to describe that avenue. Not for one moment do I suggest that I alone have traversed it. Rather, as these pages will show, part of the way I have been cheered by footprints of others. Yet is it my way, and not that of the majority of those religious persons with whom I associate.

To men of a certain school the accepted theoretic position of the Christian religion is apparently satisfactory. Christianity, they affirm, is an historical religion. Its foundations are in events and are to be tested by the ordinary tests of history. Its origins must be investigated by scholarship. And, "Once we have laid stress upon historical events as vital to our position, we cannot warn the critic off. Where history is, the critic has the right to come. . . . Such an inquiry has obvious risks. If it be free, and any other type of investigation is worthless, then it must have an open mind with reference to its possible results. The chance of unfavourable decision must inevitably be taken. Let us not delude ourselves with the idea that we can stop when we are half through." Quite so, and that may be very well for the accomplished scholar¹ whose words I have quoted, but, in

¹ Dr Arthur S. Peake in *Christianity : its Nature and its Truth*, pp. 140-1.

the meantime, *what is to happen to my soul?* What am I to make of the contradictions of scholars? Am I really to balance all the relevant passages of a Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible* and an *Encyclopædia Biblica* with the associated literature? Must I, indeed, travel with Professor Schweitzer all the way "from Reimarus to Wrede," perhaps at the end of the journey to be informed by Professor Peake that my guide was not a wise one? On the other hand, dare I ignore these people? An Oxford Professor of poetry once wrote:

"I have a life with Christ to live,
But, ere I live it, must I wait
Till learning can clear answer give
Of this and that book's date?"

To that question he answered, No. But he did not show any way to Christ, except the way of a frightened child. And the soul has its intellectual rights. One cannot, indeed, even to get saved, separate spiritual satisfaction from mental process. How are the men—and there are multitudes of them—who know of the existence of relentless critical controversy to answer the question which, for Christendom at least, means so much, "What is the truth about Jesus Christ?"

Readers of Martineau's *Types of Ethical Theory* will remember an interesting passage in his treatment of Greek philosophy, in which he brings into striking relation the dialectic and the myth of Plato's writings. "If from the complex tissue of Plato's thought we try to isolate the ethical elements for separate estimate, we must not hastily assume that they all legitimately belong to his theory of the world, but must carefully consider whether they are to be credited to his system or to his personality. . . . Had he been able to justify his irresistible convictions of right and wrong by rigorous dialectic, he would not have dispensed with that severer security, and left them to depend on the persuasive charms of his symbolic myths. But there was a limit at which his metaphysics stopped short of the exigencies of his poetic and spiritual nature, and, bringing his counted steps

to an end, compelled him to take wing and pass the barrier through the air and in the light of intuitive truth" (*Types*, i. 109). That presents the dualism which we often find ourselves employing in our perplexed search after Reality. A similar antithesis confronts us in the present situation of Christian thought. On the one hand, we have "the counted steps" of a philosophical preparation, succeeded by knowledge of historical criticism and at last a creed of some kind, or the semblance of one. On the other hand, is there not something within us which offers a more immediate method, the taking wing with Plato, whereby we may "pass the barrier through the air and in the light of intuitive truth"? The object of this paper, couched largely in the language of personal experience, is to show such a method as safe and effective for those to whom religious authority must be sought within the circle of the soul's contact with God.

II.

The first thing we must ask concerning the general portraiture of Jesus Christ in the Gospels, and the words attributed to Him, is not, "Did these things really so happen? Are these sayings authentic or not?" but, "Are these things and words true? Do I find spirit and life in them, so that I proceed to treat God as revealed by them?" Thus, when I look at the story of the Passion of Christ and see the manner of His death, its fidelity and obedience, mingled with such love and pity for Jerusalem, the vital question arises, "Do I believe that the Creator is as Jesus was in His sacrifice and love?" It does not affect that question, in the first place, that some men may dispute the correctness of the narrative as history. *Is God like that?*

"What think ye of Christ, friend? When all's done and said,
Like you this Christianity or not?
It may be false, but will you wish it true?
Has it your vote to be so if it can?"¹

¹ "Bishop Blougram's Apology."

Here is a question I can answer without regard to any controversy of critics or of theologians. My answer to it will be regulated by the extent of my confidence in the vitality of Goodness, while this, again, is ever the fruit of deep ultimate things in the soul. There is a challenge of the universe which goes right home to the centre of life in us, in the untutored as well as in the learned. What finally rules? What is the Goal of things? What the Law and the Authority? And the answer which a man gives to this challenge will depend upon the measure in which he himself is good or evil, not in positive accomplishment but in vital desire, while as he shapes his response he further shapes himself. The just man believes that justice finally prevails because he feels in himself its moving spirit and authoritative verdicts. And if there be a man in whose tortuous life cunning and selfishness are entirely dominant, that man, if he thinks of God at all, will be tempted to fancy that God is "altogether such an one as himself." Our working and actual creed is framed not according to dialectic skill, but according to the stir and quality of moral instinct resident in our spirit.

If such a judgment as this is possible to us, there will be a real value in looking at the Christ-portrait in the Gospels as a thing that exists, apart from all questions as to how it came to be drawn and presented to us. And looking thus, perhaps I shall come to say with a recent writer—though the point of view is not so recent as the verse:—

"If He lived or died, I do not know,
For who shall disprove the words of the dead,
And who may approve of the wisdom they said,
That lips of dust uttered so long ago?
And where He is buried, I may not know.

If He lived or died, I cannot say,
But loneliness knows the sound of His name;
That men could imagine such love is the same
To me as a living of yesterday,
And words which God speaks are the prayers men say."¹

¹ Coningsby Dawson, *The Worker, and Other Poems*, p. 82.

Now it is here that the note of experience begins to sound clearly. To speak of it at all is to lay bare very sacred moments of one's life. That I venture to do so is only because the careful examination of personal experience—no matter who the experient is—affords material for religious certitude more valuable than merely intellectualistic reasonings can ever be.

If, then, I may make my confession, this point was the beginning of the straightening of my path, and, when I reached it, a long, clear beam came down to me, making morning through the trees. No words can ever describe the relief it brought to my spirit. I was like Bunyan's Christian at the Cross. For to me there was only one answer possible to the question which I had determined was the vital one. None could ever conceive and formulate the Christ-idea of the Gospels, whether by way of record or through imagination by art, without it were given him "from above." And I recalled Goethe's famous saying concerning the Christian religion: "It is a height to which the human species were fitted and destined to attain, and from which, having once attained it, they can never retrograde."

Yet, when I saw these things, I was only at the beginning of my way. Happily, one thing was irresistibly borne home to me: whenever in their discussions about Divine things men become bitter, or censorious, or harsh, that condition is the sure sign they have missed God Himself. The flame of the Holy Spirit has no smoke. The man who touches Reality is filled with an awe that solemnises and liberalises all his being. So, from the intense stillness of the Divine glory, believed in through "Jesus," one came to realise how full and manifold is the grace given to men. Many avenues converge upon God. Glimpses of accompanying souls bring home the certainty of a universal experience in numberless forms. As John Woolman writes: "There is a principle which is pure placed in the human mind, which in different places and ages hath had different names; it is, however, pure, and proceeds from God. It is

deep and inward, confined to no forms of religion, nor excluded from any, when the heart stands in perfect serenity. In whomsoever this takes root and grows, they become brethren." Such a charity of thinking has enabled me to remain unmoved, when some of my religious friends have insisted upon the necessity of particular forms of doctrine for the Christian salvation. The Love in which our manhood is constituted recognises Love, and attests it as both the Way and the End.

III.

I feel if this is to be a faithful transcript of experience I must not hesitate to confess the next step, although, because to me the sacredness becomes more intimate, I would rather pass it by. In my professional work a tremendously difficult task was laid upon me—a task from which I shrank back in dread and helplessness. Driven to prayer, I approached God through the way I have described. I believed Him to be Christly, yet a sense of vastness and reality overwhelmed me. Words failed me. In my distress the most effectual formula of prayer I used was this: *Thou whom I cannot name*. I am not sure how far my previous pleading contributed, but the response to that cry appeared miraculous, and, indeed, I have no other opinion about it now in my later reflection. It led me, however, into a new phase of experience, into a fresh conflict. For, when the crisis of my difficulty was passed, the thought suggested itself that, having reached God in an immediate contact and through a prayer the reverse of theological, Jesus Christ was not essential to my spiritual life. I might use the Scriptures about Him for edification, but I could cheerfully put aside all questions concerning His Person as irrelevant to experience. From the moment this view commended itself to me, my hold upon the Unseen Presence was gone. Something had happened in my inner life, like the shaving of Samson's locks.

After the first sense of desolation, there came the suggestion that in this very bereavement of strength was a new

datum requiring thought, and that a further stretch of the Way was opened, in which the end might no longer be visible and yet be nearer than ever. What did my loss signify? This I pondered until I saw that the historical Jesus must be in some way identified with the great Unnamed Good, upon whom in extreme need I had cast myself, and, therefore, that He would be the reverse of unimportant to experience. I saw then that the "inspired-Galilean-peasant" category would never satisfy the case. So I was back at the old task, but with something gained in respect to Reality, and with a new sense of awe. At the same time the authority of priest or expert *for the inner necessities of my soul* was as distasteful as ever. Lowell's lines rang in my ears continually:

"If sometimes I must hear good men debate
Of other witness of Thyself than Thou,
As if there needed any help of ours
To nurse Thy flickering life, that else must cease,
Blown out, as 'twere a candle, by men's breath,
My soul shall not be taken in their snare,
To change her inward surety for their doubt
Muffled from sight in formal robes of proof:
While she can only feel herself through Thee,
I fear not Thy withdrawal."¹

I had accepted the "Jesus" of the Gospels as the symbol of God. I had ventured my soul upon God, relying that the Jesus symbol was at least a *portion* of the Truth. It seemed that the crippling of my strength had come in through an almost subconscious conclusion that in this case what was symbolically true was not historical fact as well. Therefore I went over some of the way again. If the symbol was true, God was Fatherly, whatever else He might be. Then might I not, I asked, in reattempting the problem of Jesus, work back from the Fatherhood of God to an historic fact of Incarnation, as necessitated by the character of God so described? Let me illustrate the point from literature. In more than one of his poems Horace pays a beautiful tribute to his father, "the best of fathers"; he relates how his father used to go

¹ "The Cathedral."

with him to his classes,¹ and sit with him while he was under tuition, advising him in all the company he kept, looking at the boy's life from the boy's side. So it came to me that the highest thing man can ever think of God, and therefore the truest thing, is that which sums up all revelation in the watch-word "Emmanuel." Surely it was Fatherly for God to come in some form fuller than that of an imperfect prophet-saint. Would He have been perfect Father if He had not crowned all past and partial revelations by such a gift of Himself as simple souls could accept? For perfect love must needs be a self-gift as complete as the recipient can welcome. Hence I saw that to deny the Incarnation is both to imperil the doctrine of the Fatherhood and to belittle the capacities of Man. I concluded that the Incarnation was Fatherhood's most nearly complete and expressive sympathy, the chosen and necessary mode—forgive the paradox—of the approach of Perfect Life to that which is fragmentary and faulty.

IV.

But, next, how should the Incarnation be reconciled with earthly life, that is, how should it be seen in its setting? Looking back over the history of our race, prior to the birth of Christ, I was reminded of the striking apothegm of a modern scholar, "The main religious history, not only of Semitic but also of Aryan races, converges to Christ, and radiates again from Him."² And surely no wise apprehension of the Incarnation will neglect to relate it to both past and future. All human life must ever have had some participation in the Divine life, reaching up to and overshadowed and nourished by that all-encompassing Presence in whom every man lives and moves and has his being. There is a Divine Immanence with a Divine Transcendence. But the doctrine of the Immanence of God is in no necessary conflict with faith

¹ "Ipse mihi custos incorruptissimus omnes circum doctores aderat." *Satira*, Liber I. vi. 81-2; cf. *ibid.* iv. 103-129.

² Dr Bennett in *Faith and Criticism*, p. 43.

in the Incarnation. Rather in the Incarnation do we see the very blossom and fruitage of God's Immanence. Of the joy of those Hebrew saints, such as Simeon and Anna, who were permitted to see the Lord's Christ, we may say in the language of a Messianic prophecy, "They joy before Thee according to the joy in harvest."¹ The Bethlehem manger was God's garner.

Thinking such things as these, I have reapproached the Gospels with a faith which requires them: not simply as symbols but as history—history, of course, in a fairly free sense of the term. Under the guidance of criticism I can make detailed readjustments in the course of the narratives with neither timidity nor haste. At the same time, I confess my experience makes me shy of the denying mood. I prefer to leave some things about Jesus—as the Virgin Birth, for instance—in suspense. I am satisfied that in Jesus Christ was revealed the thing which is Divinest in God, what we call Holiness, in the full New Testament sense of the word—the coincidence of an unfaltering will with a perfect ethic—perfect, that is, in correspondence with all the occasions in which the life is wrought out. That of many years of that life we know nothing does not trouble me. I do not think we need treat our Lord after the manner of a police ticket-of-leave. I can trust Him through those unrecorded years. Common sense, indeed, apart from any higher feeling, suggests that one should. For sin always leaves its scars. Accepted forgiveness compels confession of mercy received. And in the case of Jesus there is no trace of any operation of pardon. Indeed, the sublimest feature of the Jesus of the Gospels is His own ethical self-sufficiency (*αὐτάρκεια*) in the face of sharp distinctions between the debts men owe to one another and those they owe to God (St Matthew xviii. 21-35). From His first emergence on my view to the revelation of His last experience in mortal life, Jesus arrests me as progressively filled with the very Spirit and Holiness which God is, filled so that in Him God and Man may be said to coalesce.

¹ Isaiah ix. 3.

This is the way I have come—through the supreme idea of the Central Figure in the Gospels, apprehended independently of criticism to an *a priori* faith in the Incarnation: as God's historical act of sympathy and judgment. I do not now say :

“That men could imagine such love is the same
To me as a living of yesterday.”

I hold to the worth of imagination. But I see the force of an event. Whatever spiritual thing comes to expression, whether in our individual lives or in history, is more than it could be immaterialised. Things that can happen are more than things that cannot. And what has happened remains. I believe that the Life which was made flesh, enhanced by the very fact of expression, has been taken back into the spiritual atmosphere of the world, to breathe Itself through our moments of openness into human lives, thus helping us to be that which It was and is. Yet still I often pray, “Thou whom I cannot name,” because all names fall short of my strongest consciousness of Him, and I have learnt that immeasurable breadths and depths of life lie behind the Keeper of my soul. George MacDonald¹ expresses this for me, better than I can for myself:—

“Not in my fancy now I search to find thee;
Not in its loftiest forms would shape or bind thee.
I cry to One whom I can never know,
Filling me with an infinite overflow;
Not to a shape that dwells within my heart,
Clothed in perfections love and truth assigned thee,
But to the God thou knowest that thou art.”

¹ “Diary of an Old Soul,” p. 21.

A. D. MARTIN.

ORDER AND UNREST.

EDITH HUNTER.

THE relation of the State to its individual members is undergoing a gradual change. The demands of the State have enormously increased and are still increasing, and the attitude of the people towards this change raises questions of the utmost importance. The subject is far-reaching in its scope, and arguments are of necessity drawn from widely differing points of view. Broadly speaking, the purpose of this article resolves itself into an examination of the attitude of the people towards the State under these changed conditions.

I shall try to show that, viewing civic life as a whole, these three facts clearly emerge:—(1) That there is a growing tendency on the part of the State to demand more of the co-operation and individual attention of its citizens. (2) That on the part of the citizens there is equally discernible a great apathy and indifference towards reform generally. (3) That beside this apathy there is present at the same time an irrepressible spirit of unrest.

It will be admitted, I think, that the State is in the initial stages of a vast development of which the general public is as yet hardly aware—a development which will ultimately involve the intelligent, alert, restrained, and sympathetic co-operation of all adult citizens, if our civilisation is ever to reach a saner condition.

In order to support that statement I must direct attention to one or two spheres of administrative work which serve

to illustrate my point, namely, that the citizen is being more directly drawn to participate in national and municipal affairs.

Let us look first at that important department which deals with the elementary schools. The province of the State Schools at the present time involves not merely instruction and the feeding of necessitous children, but also medical treatment. Now, I suggest that this one small section of the community's teeming life reveals a vast area which is crying out for reorganisation.

An extremely difficult situation has arisen in regard to the relative functions and limitations of hospitals, school medical treatment, and medical service generally. Even the smallest practical experience discovers in this direction a background of confusion and overlapping, of misdirected energy and misdirected funds. The whole demands readjustment, but to all these urgent needs the indifference of the average ratepayer is appalling. There is doubtless a fine network of voluntary labour spread over this area, but, even among those actively engaged in these matters, there is apparent a curious scepticism, which seems to doubt whether the effort is worth while.

Let us look further at the second stage in the child's life—that period immediately succeeding the school-leaving age. The State has recently waked to the fact that the unqualified casual who turns up at the Distress Committee and the Workhouse is a man who, as a child, had at least passed through the Council Schools. As the outcome of this there is now a scheme which bids fair to be a fine one if the means and the energy are forthcoming to carry it through. It involves, broadly speaking, the linking up (it may be by a chain of voluntary workers) of the school authorities on the one hand and the industrial on the other. The need is to steer the child through the first stages of industrial life. What that involves in the way of making demands upon individual co-operation, I do not think I can adequately suggest in a few short sentences. To begin with, it touches

every home in the community whose children pass through the Council Schools. It involves not merely the joint work of State officials with possible voluntary assistance, but the sympathetic co-operation of the employing classes. It means the development of a civic conscience in the individual employer. To put it quite plainly, an employer should be willing to face the inconvenience of obtaining his workers through a public authority, if that method be for the public good. That such method is not for the public good is quite a legitimate objection, but it is surely justifiable to ask of those who take up this position that they should make some alternative suggestion.

Let us now turn from the sphere of education to one which involves a far wider public. It is scarcely possible to find a better example of the tendency of the State to increase its demands upon the individual citizen than the Insurance Act. The Act exemplifies this demand on the one hand and on the other has shown up, quite as clearly, an unreadiness and unwillingness on the part of the public, irrespective of class, to co-operate. Putting aside for the moment the merits or demerits of the Insurance Act, I believe it has been the means of bringing hundreds of individuals, who never dreamed that they had any connection with civic life at all, into direct contact with the State. It has made for the first time each employer, however insignificant socially, not merely individually responsible but civically responsible, responsibility entirely new to many people. It has for the first time linked the employment of a young servant or a charwoman to the great world of industry. The outcry concerning the trouble of stamps and cards, which came alike from employers and employees, served to show that both (the one not more than the other) were in many cases utterly unconscious of the links which bind the individual worker to the whole mass. We have become more or less accustomed to the public responsibilities of the large employer. We are constantly reminded of them by such Acts as the

Workmen's Compensation Act or the Employers' Liability Act and such like; but to have the matter forced upon the private individual, as the Insurance Act does force it, is, I believe, a new thing in everyday life.

Thus, if we confine ourselves merely to these three examples:—the State in its relation to the physical life of the child; the State in its relation to the industrial development of youth; the complex demands of the State through the Insurance Act—in these three we have examples of national demands made concrete. The machinery has been laid down, so to speak, to be worked, if we will, to be improved or perhaps merely to be scrapped and replaced, but at any rate to be worked. They come within the sphere of administration, and by administering, and by that only, shall we learn the way to improve and develop them.

What then has been the response of the public to these particular demands? To answer such a question is beyond measure difficult. Perhaps we are too much in the mist to really know, and only when to-day's happenings have become history shall we be able to notice the slow but steady advance. If we try to estimate the attitude of the average person, or the opinion of the majority, our reply to such a question would indeed be disheartening.

In the lowest walk of life we meet with ignorance and slave-like subjection. One step higher in the social scale we find indifference and mechanical submission. In what are called the middle classes one often finds superficial knowledge and rebellious pettishness side by side; and there remain, of course, the few, the leaven of the whole, who, irrespective of class, always set the pace and help the general movement forward.

Through ignorance or apathy, through disinclination or aversion, the greater portion of the democracy has no sympathetic connection with the social problems and the increasing demands of civic life. To go into the practical details of the schemes or problems I have mentioned would be to

immeasurably strengthen my argument. But I can speak here only in general terms.

The subject has a yet more serious aspect. I refer to the wide-spreading unrest which is to-day so apparent on every hand. I use that term in its widest meaning, as describing all the varied forms of dissatisfaction which have appeared in the ranks of labour during the last few years, and that larger unrest which pervades the whole of the woman's movement, and covers too the irritation and dissatisfaction brought about by recent legislation.

In the HIBBERT JOURNAL for October 1912, Professor Jacks had an article on this aspect of the subject. His theme, briefly, is this:—Legislation to-day is making great demands upon democracy, and these demands are likely to increase in the near future. He suggests that at certain points the strain upon democracy has already gone beyond breaking-point, and that this is shown by the general spirit of unrest and revolt which is in the air. His argument tends to show that legislation on the one hand, and on the other the development of the people and their education in democratic principles and practices, must progress simultaneously if democratic government is not to end in confusion and failure.

Broadly speaking, we should all agree with such a statement, but with Professor Jacks' classification of causes and from his manner of describing the remedy for the disease, ending, as it seems, on a somewhat pessimistic note, some of us may differ. There may be a small section whose restlessness is due to the cause he mentions, namely, the exacting nature of legislation in gripping too tightly on the minds and actions of people whose training has not fitted them to bear the necessary restrictions of a noble liberty. Such an attitude may possibly appear in either rich or poor; it may be that of the highly cultured or that of the entirely untrained mind. It is an individualism which lacks, in differing degrees, the modifying influence of the social instinct. In so far as unrest is

due to such a cause, it undoubtedly falls into line with those other deficiencies of which democracy stands convicted. But it is because unrest in its larger and more general bearing is not due to that limited cause that I join issue with the view expressed in that article. I differ from the writer's generalisations concerning the nature of the complex element of unrest. He says that democracy is overstrained, and as an immediate consequence of this we are witnessing outbreaks and eruptions on every hand, and he omits altogether to discriminate between the widely differing sections. Now, to keep exactly to this line of argument, namely, that legislation has gone too far—that some section of the public has been, as it were, over-legislated—we find one very striking example in the Insurance Act. But when we observe the nature of the various revolting sections in the community, do we find much in common between the doctors and the sweated women chain-makers, or between the duchesses who would not lick stamps and the taxi-cab drivers? Of course in a vague sense there is a ground of semblance, but the term “unrest” used to-day signifies not only the strike and the open militant revolt, but is a subtle and most potent force, whose very subtleties render generalisation misleading and dangerous. In the early stages of his argument Professor Jacks lays himself open to criticism because he does not (as I have said) sufficiently discriminate between the various resisting groups. He refers to the doctors' refusal (since overcome) to work the Insurance Act as an example of irritation under a too exacting law, and proves thereby the fallacy of the idea that democratic government necessarily engenders obedience in those governed; in other words, the fallacy that the people will of necessity obey laws of their own making. Probably there could be no better example of this point, but immediately following this the revolt of the women is mentioned and put into the same category. Now, I submit that in no way can the women's position be said to prove any such theory. The doctors, not as a class, but as men, and in the same degree as all other male

citizens, are directly represented in Parliament; women not being directly represented, their action cannot be cited as proving any result of democratic representation. The reasons for unrest differ so widely that they must be dealt with in almost every case on their particular merits.

It is easy to prove in the measured argument of an article such as the one I refer to that the spirit of revolt is reprehensible and unsocial. Such a view appeals to superficial common sense. Methods of violence offend our moral judgment and our sense of fitness. They appeal neither to the sensitive idealist nor to the practical opportunist. In short, no progressive life is possible in a state of anarchy. Doubtless this is true; there is an overwhelming weight of opinion on the side of law and order. There is, however, another side to the problem; there is an element in the spirit of unrest which counts, in intrinsic value, more a thousandfold than the one of which, by its noise, we are most easily made aware. What, after all, is really the meaning of a spirit of unrest? What is the meaning of that spirit which, silently or otherwise, slowly lifts a people onward? It is by no means to be confused with mere discontent, or impatient childish peevishness. Nor must we allow our intelligence to be dimmed by the steam which at the present moment is blinding our eyes. Because a few small pipes have burst we must not cease to recognise the value of the element whose controlled energy has such potent force. Expressed differently, it surely means nothing less than a realisation of evil—an awakened apprehension of a lack of justice. A spark ignited, it may be, in the soul of a prophet; and passing thence through the deep heart of humanity, it becomes a holy thing. None who has ever faced a great social or industrial problem, or rather faced the people who make the problem, but has realised that the first step along the road of emancipation is the effect of the presence of that same spirit of unrest.

Unrest may be dangerous, it is sure to be uncomfortable; it is none the less so intrinsically necessary that the writer who

enlarges upon the evils of unrest must not remain silent on the deeper meaning of the force which is behind that restlessness.

Indeed, one statement of Professor Jacks alone amply justifies my contention. He says: "Of all modern democratic governments, with scarcely one exception, it may be said that they were conceived in disobedience and born in rebellion." We cannot have life without heat, we cannot have heat without fire and friction!

Progress is confronted to-day, and perhaps always will be, with two evils. On the one hand there is a deadening weight of apathy, and on the other the outbreaks of unbalanced fanaticism. The greater of these two evils is undoubtedly the former.

Having thus acknowledged the value of a noble discontent, let us face frankly the danger and difficulty of the real but limited evil produced by laws which are ahead of the people.

I have tried to show that the demands of the State upon the individual citizen yearly grow stronger, that the gulf which stretches between our vast problems and the individuals who form the democracy is very great. It may be that legislation has already stepped beyond the bearing power of some sections of the community, or that it will do so in the near future. I would prefer to say that it is possible, but not probable. Responsibility carries with it its own education. If we look back on history we find that enfranchisement preceded the Education Acts—democracy was made responsible long before the individual citizens had reached the standard of responsibility.

Let us grant at once that democracy is, to all appearances, showing itself unready and even unwilling to bear its burden. Professor Jacks traces this attitude to our lack, as a nation, of discipline. Although we have fought and won battles we have never been drilled, we do not march in step, we do not act quickly and unhesitatingly at the word of command. He says: "The social discipline of the British is strongest on its

moral, religious, and historical side. Its weakness is the lack of 'drill.' "

Now, in regard to the need for what is termed social discipline, meaning by that phrase moral self-restraint, there can be no difference of opinion. But, while urging this view, the writer implies a policy which would run in a contrary direction to the cherished ideals of many. To use the terms discipline, drill, and self-restraint as if they were synonymous leads only to confusion of thinking, when we are dealing with a complex organism like democracy. Surely it is fatal to apply to a would-be free people the same terms as we apply to a standing army. The man who enters the army undertakes to surrender his conscience, while on duty, to his superior officer. It may be there is much to be said for this from the standpoint of army discipline; there is nothing to be said for it from the standpoint of civil and social development. It may be right for the soldier to act because he must, and not because he knows the reason why. The only attitude proper to the citizen is that of one who acts because he does know the reason why. A phrase of Mr Lloyd George's is quoted which, so far as it means anything and so far as it describes an actual fact, is very significant. Mr Lloyd George spoke of the nation as "mobilised" by the Insurance Act. Now any attempt to mobilise before taking the intermediate educative steps is dangerous. In so far as the Insurance Act is proving (and it is so doing) educative, it is to be welcomed; where it has merely marshalled people, merely drilled and mobilised without teaching its own reasons, its benefits are far more doubtful. To influence a people to act with the instinct of soldiers, to answer promptly to the word of command, to be ready and alert at a given signal, would foster a tendency which, in the opinion of many, is already a disquieting menace. I mean the growth of the party spirit; and it is in regard to this tendency that I question the wisdom of such a statement as the following: "The citizen, whether as subject or as legislator, needs . . . not merely instruction in

political science. He does need that, but he needs something else far more; something without which all the political science in the world will carry him but a little way. He must learn to obey."

The heart of the subject is touched by the phrase "self-restraint." Discipline and drill savour of the army and the school; self-restraint suggests a self-conscious individual in the related whole of the democracy. An ideal democracy is to be organised, but not marshalled; to be led, but not coerced. The quality of its common life is dependent absolutely upon the quality of each constituent unit.

To conceive that coercion or repression, marshalling or mobilising, or the use of any force other than moral, will mould democracy into a well-oiled machine, is to have lost all real faith in a democratic ideal. What is the ultimate goal of an ideal democracy, if it be not that each individual unit shall become a conscious unit in a concrete whole? How then is it possible to affect the whole except through the mind of the individual? But the standard of that mind is at present far too low to be raised by drill. If we risk such a course let us beware lest we manufacture puppets instead of intelligent agents.

The remedy, then, is education. Education not in its narrow but in its widest meaning; direct education and indirect which will come from altered conditions, shorter hours, better surroundings, from longer and better used leisure and a thousand other things. It is not drill we need, but self-restraint, and self-restraint will come most quickly from understanding. Ignorance is surely the most prolific cause of impatience. People move round in their own narrow circles and have not developed a civic conscience. They have not left behind the *laissez-faire* attitude of fifty years ago. They do not know the moral basis nor the practical necessity of a standard rate of wages. They have not yet waked up to the fact that in our modern complex life the individual touches at every point the whole organism. But neither coercion nor

drill will bring about the needed change. Nothing will make the individual forgo his private ends, endure discomfort, or exert his energy, but an alert consciousness of the vital connection which exists between the whole and each separate part.

If we look at the tendencies in democracy as a whole we see hopeful signs. We see the complex nature of unrest—how that if in some cases it be anti-social, in others it is the germ of life itself. We see springing up in the community the beginnings of a temperament which is susceptible not merely of revolting but of suffering, not merely of asserting but of forgoing its rights and even the necessities of life. We see a spirit abroad which breeds impatience for the vague benevolences of the past and welcomes the advent of concentrated scientific effort, which will only develop in an atmosphere of freedom, but will never remain quiescent under servile methods whether they emanate from Socialists or from a Liberal Government or from philosophic thinkers.

We need a change of mind. Are we awake to the fact that, whether with our consent or without, the trend of things has changed? The development of the individual may be (nay, is) the far-off but certain goal, but we do not now believe that the attainment of the one is at the expense of the many. "Make no more giants, God, but elevate the race at once!" But surely it may be that by elevating the race He may yet make greater giants. We need a change of mind that will restrain the impatience which defeats itself and loses sight of the general good in private grievance—a change that will banish apathy and all its fatal consequences.

EDITH HUNTER.

LONDON.

THE GREAT ALTERNATIVE.

THE REV. CHARLES F. DOLE.

A MULTITUDE of people certainly live as if they had no certainty of God. In a recent number of the *Harvard Theological Review* Professor Ladd of Yale College discusses the decadence of theism in America. He points to the fact that people, who still repeat prayers in church, believe in money and luxury as they certainly do not believe in God. A growing class believe in liberty and in getting their rights and openly profess to have given up religion. The enormous militarism of the world, especially in Germany, is a practical denial of God.

There is a vague doubt in people's minds whether something has not happened in the realm of science to undermine the foundations of religion. It is pathetic that many people, and ministers among them, look to men of science in hope of a little assurance that God may exist. They trust that William James or Professor Bergson may perhaps have given us a glimmer of light, as if they had no light themselves.

I wish now to present a great alternative, which many thoughtful persons, skimming over deeper waters than they know, never seem to put to themselves: *Either God is, or there is no God.* In other words, either the faith of the heroes and poets and lovers is real, in a sense compared with which the deliverance of our senses is only superficial; either God's reality is fundamental and ever present like the atmosphere; either our religion is at least as substantial and rational

as any teaching of science, and its experiences, rightly interpreted, as valid as anything that we know ; either our religion is free, and always has been free, from any possibility of interference on the side of physical discovery or research—or else all men's talk about faith and religion and God is empty words. God is, or there is no God. There is no middle ground between faith, as good as ever the martyrs thought they died for, and complete atheism. Let us not skrink from drawing sharp lines. I wish to show that, not actual and intelligent thinking, but rather hazy and slovenly thinking, and the slovenly living which hazy thinking induces and excuses, are alone responsible for the want or decadence of a happy religious faith.

Let me first try briefly to say what I mean, and also what I do not mean, when I use the word God. I do not mean a being, or figure, residing somewhere in space, whom we could see with our eyes, if we approached near enough ; I do not mean an abstract "First Cause," which might perhaps have set the universe in motion and then left it to run by itself ; I do not mean a bare "Absolute," as an impersonal fountain of being, but without any describable qualities or affections ; I do not mean any such form of pantheism as might comprehend all things into a jumble of parts, without unity or purpose or distinction of values ; I do not mean a God, standing outside of our world, so as to need to break through by special revelation or interposition, in order to make us aware of his existence. If God is not the fundamental reality of our lives, if He is not as near and essential as the encompassing air is to our bodies, if we can live at all without Him, if we need proof of His existence any more than we need proof of our own existence, such a God would hardly be worth speculating about.

I mean, then, the "Living God," the might, the mind, the beauty, the will, the goodness in and through all things and all persons, and at the heart of the world ; I mean that which constitutes unity ; I mean that which comprehends into

itself, and is the source of all precious values, being greater and not less for having attributes and affections; I mean not only that which, as Bergson says, is revealed in a wonderful urgency developing all forms of life; not only what "makes for righteousness," as Matthew Arnold used to say, but as certainly that which urges towards the growth of persons, makes life worth living, works towards human welfare, and in the highest and mightiest form of its manifestation, as good will, is seen daily, like a universal motion, as furthering and generating what we call "progress."

We might stand helpless to call this innermost reality by any name. But we do better to call it by lovely names, inasmuch as we surmise that all splendid thoughts come from its prompting. How else do they come? We call it Life and Light and Love; we call it the Eternal, and the Father of our spirits. We cannot define it, but only say what it means to us and how it impresses itself upon us.

As the bird rests and lives in the air, the fish in the sea, and the tiny cell in its place in the body, without being aware of the source of their life, so in a higher sense we live in the presence of God, whether aware or not of the fact. His pressure is upon us; His thoughts are pictured to us in all that exists; His care is over us; without this universal goodwill, we should not know justice or love.

May I briefly hint that the idea of God that I have tried to present is substantially that which in some form is beneath the most virile religions of the world, towards which their faith has tended, and into which the varying experiences of devout and genuine souls under all religions may be easily translated. It is also, I believe, in the line of the highest reaches of human thought. So far as philosophy has been positive and constructive, it has developed towards some such general statement of its faith. A careful study of the history of religions, and especially of the great religious literature, would make this plain.

My point now is that either God is, in the large and real

and religious sense in which we use the word, or there is no God worthy of the name. If we may compare great things with small, we have here the same kind of alternative that presents itself when a young child is born. The body is there, a certain appearance of life is also there, but what we want to know is whether the vital germ of human thought and affection is there. It either is or is not. If not, the child is an imbecile, and wonderful as the bodily life by itself continues to be, there is nothing human or spiritual to train or to love. So likewise with the greatest of all questions about the universe: Is it merely alive on the side of matter and force? or, is it also alive through and through in the spiritual terms of intelligence, beauty, will, purpose, and love? I do not see how anyone who opens his eyes to the facts—the human or spiritual facts as well as the material facts—can fail to answer this question in the affirmative. We do not indeed yet see as much love as we see power, but we see love as truly as we see power, and what love we see is vastly more wonderful and important. Moreover, we no more create the love than we create the power. Both are urged upon us and grown within us by the manifold impulse of the Great Life, of which we are the children.

It is good for us, however, to face our thoughts with searching inquisition. Let us try, if we can, to get away from faith or religion, to wipe out the idea of God, to think life downward into strictly negative terms, and imagine ourselves in an atheist world. Either God or not. Let us say *No God*.

The case presents itself somewhat as it would if a sailor on a great ship had a strange dream that the captain and all the officers had been swept away, that there were no charts or compasses or sextants on board, in fact that the ship was drifting like a raft without any course. I think the first feeling which came to the sailor might be a sense of relief from toil and responsibility, especially in view of the fact that the ship appeared still to be well provisioned. There would be nothing on shipboard to do except what people pleased. With the coming of night, with the first appearance of storm,

with the problem of the distribution of the ship's stores, the berths and the staterooms, with the question of what to do and whether to try to sail at all, I believe apprehensions and terrors would begin to overcome the sailor's mind.

In somewhat the same way we imagine ourselves out of God's world. I confess that, when I have tried this, supposing that there is no God, I have at times felt a momentary sense of relief, as if all stress of care and duty had been taken off and I were free to do or think as I might. But, thinking straight on to the verge, the sense of awful and hopeless orphanage sets in upon me. I had loved integrity, but there is and can be no real integrity, either in the universe or the soul of man, except the integrity that goes with the thought of God. I had loved truth and tried to follow it, but truth is either a spiritual reality, founded and compact in a spiritual universe, that is, a veritable universe, or else it is purely imaginary, or what happens to serve and please you at the time. Curiosity is indeed ours, as with all animals, but why should we reverence truth or make sacrifice for it in a world of "things" and illusions?

Kindliness indeed is left, as one of the various qualities that all animals share. But responsibility and obligation have gone out of our world, where now properly the strongest strive for survival. Duty has gone too with God who had established it. Duty now is only what seems agreeable or expedient. Why should anyone be strenuous for the selfish moralities in a world without spiritual significance, where no moral imperative is, and no standards exist, and ideals are merely a part of the dream? I may not say, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die," having been brought up in a faith that made cruelty and selfishness abhorrent; but what possible reason can I urge to the animal man, why he should not follow the promptings of his appetites and passions, and do as he likes in this godless world, where all things are running down sooner or later to death?

I have known love and had thought it eternal, allying man

with the Master of life. But I see now, in my strange dream, that love is no more than the bloom on a peach. It has also its time and it passes to decay.

I had talked of human progress and seen visions of a perfected humanity. I may still, for want of anything better to do, pursue the ancient gleam, with the sense at the bottom of my heart that the quest is useless. Why should I guess that it makes any difference how soon the cycle of destruction comes in and grinds the race of man beneath the ice fields? Progress? Whither and for what end, if the ship merely drifts purposeless on the unknown seas? Is man, merely conceived as the animal child of matter and force, worth loving or striving to save, or worth dying for?

The fact is, on the material or negative side, you cannot make anything rational out of this world, or explain anything. The force and the atoms, or the electrons, are a blind mystery. How should they come? How should they constitute laws of motion or form? How should they build up a universe, and create minds with no mind to guide? How should they work together and dissolve and make worlds and dissolve them again, in senseless processions of chaos? Much less can you account for man at his best, as thinking, obeying, loving, as stirred with the ideals of heroes and poets, fearless of death, possessed with a mystic chivalry, ready to respond at the call of his duty, affection, or Christ. The atheist world, which we imagine, has neither place, nor reason, nor incitement nor environment to create a real man, or to recognise him when he appears.

We have also got away from the world of beauty and order and music. What standard of beauty or art is there, except passing fashion? The work of Phidias is as good or as bad as the Polynesian war idols. The Beethoven and Bach music is as the beating of a tom-tom. Why not? What makes beauty or ugliness, good or evil, right or wrong? We are beyond all that. What is good, where nothing stands fast? or, what is evil, where the light of no constant Good

Will shines? Numbers, géometry, harmonies, unity, order, are not material terms; they are the framework of the world of the spiritual, which we have been dreaming away.

We have been trying to do a thing as impossible as it would be for the bird to think the atmosphere away. We can pump a little air out of a glass receiver, but only enough to make the fact of its existence the more obvious. There is the pressure just the same, against which we had to pump. It took labour to get the air out, being an effort against nature. So with the pressure of the spiritual life of the world, namely, the presence of God, present in matter, and in the laws under which matter acts and is acted upon, present in force, present in innumerable forms of intelligence and beauty, present in the eternal urgency of life, present in man's soul, as compelling duty, informing love, and infinite loyalty towards invisible ideals, present in glad and restful goodwill, leaping to the work of the world as a happy child to the voice of his father.

The fact is, you cannot translate life downward into the realm of the minus sign and not leave out pretty much all that gives life actuality, worth, and significance. Press with all your might and try to get away from God, and the further you push, the surer you are to come back again with a mighty rebound of faith.

People sometimes like to call themselves "materialists" or "free-thinkers," and to scoff at religious faith, while they still help themselves freely to all the noble words which religion has created. Is it that they must dress up atheism in borrowed plumage? I think it is rather that they pay unconscious tribute to the poetry, the éloquence, the inspiration that belong to God's world. They do not think straight, or they would see that no form of materialism or atheism could have ever produced one of those great words of the spirit. It is positively startling to have to confess what an impoverishment of language you have to make, unless God is! You cannot lose God, and have the great words to play with like toys.

I said that there is no middle ground. Either God is, with all the implications of that faith, or there is no God at all. But why cannot one take the middle ground of agnosticism? Suppose one says frankly: "We cannot know whether God is or not." But the great alternative still faces you. You can try as far as possible to be unaware of God. But He either is, or He is not. Moreover, you cannot order your life, consciously or unconsciously, without making some kind of tentative choice. You will either tend to one side or the other, or you will sway to and fro about the pivot of faith. You cannot help feeling the pressure and urgency, whatever you do about it. Thus Huxley, father of agnostics, felt this compulsion of truth and duty, and acted exactly as if this were a spiritual world. Practically he was not so agnostic as were most of the professing Christians in England!

In the sense in which we are considering religion, namely, the pressure of the life of a spiritual universe, nature will not permit a man altogether to live without breathing its air. As with the sailor in the darkest storm, the alternative faces him: "Either life or death." Seeing that it may be life, he is constrained to act as if he hoped to be saved. Let him be a good determinist, and his intelligence bids him go with all his might where he hopes the determining power leads. So men tend to follow the gleam of their hope for the universe. You cannot possibly act and think and live as if it made no difference whether God is or not. The vast complex of social relations draws you for ever under the play of subtle spiritual forces of sympathy and hope which no man can entirely resist.

Perhaps someone thinks that there may be middle ground outside of our great alternative in the idea of a dual constitution of the world; or, again, of a limited and evolving Earth-God with whose fate we are bound up, and whom we may indeed help to save from failure. But the dualism of good and evil powers, at the last resort, means either the victory of the good God or the bad one. In other words, it is another form of our alternative: Either God is, or there is

no God. Since, now, a universal and victorious power of evil is unthinkable, there can be no question, if a good God is at all, that evil has no ultimate chance, and never could have had any chance. Dualism, then, seems to be only a stepping-stone, like polytheism, towards a fuller conception of the real and valid God. It passes away before the thought of a universe. All science tends to make it impossible, and the highest philosophy thinks all things into the integrity of truth, in the absence of which there could be no philosophy.

The case is different with the idea of a partial and developing god or gods. This, too, may be a form that a climbing intelligence may grasp for a moment. But the partial god, or series of gods, is no god at all, but only a monster, as likely to crush man in his groping as to assist him. So far from being the ground and source of life, he seems himself to need ground and source, at least as much as man does. Where did he come from, and who shall guarantee his progress? Who can revere him, honour him, or follow his behests, who is himself liable to fall and perish, who does not even surely know his own mind! This type of a god seems to be only an added difficulty to account for, granting once that anyone has demonstrated that he exists. No! Our souls are made to "cry out for the living God," as if our lives fitted and answered to Him.

Someone may still ask: Can we not believe in what you call a spiritual universe without believing in God? This seems like asking whether we might not have a man by some kind of automatism, that is, a man without the soul of a man. That which makes him a man is not his body and the atoms, but the invisible unifying spirit, to use the best word we know. So we cannot conceive of a spiritual universe without any unifying life or spirit informing it. God is our name for the complete reality of the universe. It is not a machine. It is a life; in the largest sense of the word, it is what men have meant by a "person." At any rate, this is the form of our alternative. Either God is, as the life of the world, or there

is no God and no universe. We do not make this so by our thinking. It either is so or is not.

We have seen how impossible it is to get rid of any form of a universal life force. All that we can do is to ignore it, and to try not to use it, and to suffer for the lack of it, like a man who holds his breath. But there it is, pressing like the air to rush back and fill the man's lungs. So with the universal spiritual presence and urgency, which we have tried in vain to imagine ourselves as exhausting altogether from men's souls. The world and the nature of man absolutely refuse to behave as if God were not. Let us now boldly grant that God is, and see what happens.

Begin first, if you please, with a bare "perhaps," as they give famished men at first a mere sip of milk. *Perhaps God is.* But if God is, then all is that makes life worth living. As Emerson says, "Whatever is excellent, as God lives, is permanent."

Thus, love is what we had always found it to be—the chief of all values. Browning's poor little Pompilia, having won love, has changed her whole sorrowful life into gain. The Christ type of life, which we had tried in vain to put out of our world, is with us again, and draws all men to it for ever. In fact, it is every man's part now to stake all for love's sake and to win the same victory. If God is, the mother's tears and pains are never for naught. They go to purchase immeasurable good not for her children alone. If God is, then a great stream of loving life, mightiest of all forms of energy, is flowing through time. We men are of its essence and nature. Let us go with its motion; let us never fear wherever the good will may bear us. All this is so, if God is. Nay, better! Because *this is so*, we know that God is. Let who will try it and see. But if God is, you must try it. For this is the movement of life, and outside it there is no life. What else does it mean, that whenever for even an hour we go with this motion of love, and will with the universe Will, pure joy thrills us and makes us fearless of evil?

Again, because God is, truth is. It is one of God's names. If no living God were, no truth could stand fast. For truth is not abstract; it is essentially a quality of real being, a spiritual harmony at the heart of things. Why else must we spurn falsehood and cleave to the truth? But if God is, we cannot do otherwise, His truth being our nature and norm. As the born artist cannot bear to do ugly work, so we cannot bear to deal or speak falsely. Herein is the secret of "soul-liberty" or freedom of speech.

We see now, with the guiding fact of God, what conscience is and how precious it is. As we felt love in our hearts, and thus became aware of God, as we saw the vision of integrity or perfectness and thus saw God, so as we feel the prompting of conscience we are aware of the eternal reality, as a great life pressure. Grant that it begins feebly like the beating of an infant's heart, grant that it needs illumination, that love must move with it, that its growth obeys its proper laws like every other part of us; yet here it always is, as sure as God lives, like a mighty life-force pressing us to grow out of the darkness of bare physical existence into the realm of the light and so to become citizens of the universe.

I know nothing so disastrous for the health of the conscience as to try to explain it without God, as, for example, in economic or hedonistic terms. The facts will not answer to such explanation. The most characteristic motion of our conscience is when it threatens us with economic loss, when we are most alone in our obedience, when we are forced to go athwart social prejudices, or to withstand popular passion, and no one thanks or praises us, and yet we cannot do otherwise. I know no such invigoration and liberation of the action of conscience as when we wholly accept the testimony of the highest reason, declaring that in the motion of conscience God's will and our will are one heart-beat. All fear of man is taken away with this thought. Obedience becomes, as it ought to be, a delight. It is the supreme function of our spirits.

Test this in the most practical form. Here is an issue of

commercial integrity where, if a man goes with his conscience, he stands to lose his position or his fortune. On the other hand, he needs merely to conform with the custom of his associates in order to have favour and wealth. Suppose this man really believes that the mysterious whisper, bidding him risk all and be true, is the voice of the spirit of the universe. It is this, if God is. Can he do anything else but obey? This kind of fidelity in all times has actually set up new and permanent standards of honour, given the world moral advancement, and developed splendid character.

The thought of God illuminates the notion of human progress. Against progress as a merely physical or economical movement, arising out of a world of change and flux, you can raise the most tremendous pessimistic doubt. Material evolution by itself promises nothing but meaningless rise and fall. Why should anyone, comfortable and well fed, go to the cross for reform, for liberty, for democracy, on behalf of vast backward populations, in a world where no reason exists for either faith or enthusiasm?

That brotherhood, democracy, freedom, peace on earth, are valid without any religion is a baseless assumption. All these ideas have sprung out of a spiritual conception of the worth of human life. They imply faith that the things which unite men of all races and classes lie deeper than the forces that antagonise them, faith in the practical working force of ideals, faith that "it is more blessed to give than to receive," faith that you can "overcome evil with good," and dull, backward and selfish men by justice and goodwill—in short, faith in God, guaranteeing your vision of progress. Progress whither, if you drift on a raft in a meaningless world?

But suppose that the way of reform, of democracy, of progress, of whatever "socialism" is good for man, is the way of the universe-life, that we share in the majestic purpose, that everyone of us has his place in the beautiful order, and each life counts for good—what will not man do in this faith? What enthusiasm flames up in him to do the will of the

eternal! What can make us weary or afraid with this faith to hearten us? "If God be for us, who can be against us?"

The face of evil now changes. If God is, then no lasting evil can be. Grant that this is, and must continue to be, a matter of faith. But it is a reasonable faith, like the faith of the engineer or the aviator. Nothing is more notable than the procession of noble lives who have experimented with this faith in the presence of every kind of evil, as if "the everlasting arms were under them." They have wrought out the miracle of changing evil to good; they have annexed new territories to the realm of order. The fact is, evil only seems evil to creatures on a certain brutal plane; on that plane it is self-limiting. In the spiritual realm, where alone we are masters of fate, we are lifted above evil. Pain does no real harm to a man, once conceived as a child of God. Who would dare to be exempt from suffering! It is in the nature of the universe-life, as a deep law of spiritual cost, whereby all high values are brought to light.

Again, if God is, prayer or communion must be also. We do not mean the childish petition of greed or selfishness. Why should the sons of God will or wish anything that is not also the good will—that is, whatever is best? Movements of action and reaction are always taking place. Thoughts, insight, power, affection, will, surge ever and anon through our spirits and urge us to answer back with trust and gladness. It is not so much for us to make petition, as it is to wait and listen, to give free course to these motions of life, and to do what they bid. These things are true, if God is.

Again, we face the wonderful thought and hope of the immortal life. If God is, this hope simply cannot be kept back. It behaves like a life function, whenever we realise God. If God is (Himself the very ground and source of all science), nothing has ever been or can be discovered by science to hurt this hope. It does not come to us as a matter of demonstration, like a chain of argument, no stronger than its

weakest link, but rather as a network of reasonable considerations, rising out of the highest experiences of man as thinker and lover; it is at times so persuasive and overwhelming that we say, "It must be so." The facts out of which it arises are simply inexplicable, except in the thought of a spiritual universe.

I am reminded that we are shut in by vast mysteries. But if God is, we look out into the mysteries of being as into a mystery of light, and no longer of darkness. We would not have it otherwise, seeing there is that in us which rests content with no finite value.

My plea is for a frank, thorough, and radical treatment of our religion both in thought and conduct. We are either citizens of a spiritual universe, or we are not. Our religion is wholly true, if it is anything at all. In a word, the world is either actually adjusted to urge and to aid us in co-operating with one another in a divine type of life, or there is no such thing as spiritual adjustment or lasting civilisation. As there is no middle ground between the supreme fact of God and the alternative of hopeless atheism, so there can be no forceful, happy, complete life for a man midway between faith and unbelief.

Vast problems confront the world, problems of the toiling millions, problems of the oppressed or barbarous, or backward peoples, problems of vice and crime, and of new, orderly, serviceable government, the everlasting problems of the human soul with its sorrows, its wearying ambitions, its personal defeats, its tragedies, its solemn march towards the grave, its aspirations and hopes. If God is not, no solution exists for these problems, or any rational answer to the ceaseless human questions; let us make no pretence of faith or hope. If God is, we have reason, answers, solutions, incitement to action, ground of enthusiasm, vital union here and now with the soul of the world.

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DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"EUGENICS AND POLITICS."

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1914, p. 241.)

I.

No topic could be of greater moment than that which Dr Schiller discusses. So far as European countries, and particularly England, are concerned, I have neither the knowledge essential, nor the wish, to controvert or to criticise his generalisations or the inferences drawn therefrom. It is possible, however, that he takes a too pessimistic view of the eugenic problem in the United States. I quote two passages from his article:

"It is stated that the State of New York already spends one-seventh, and sometimes so much as one-fifth, of its revenues on the support of its defectives, and there is no reason why it should not have to spend the whole of it in this unedifying way if the social policy which has led to this result is persisted in, or why the community should not come to consist wholly of idiots, lunatics, and epileptics.

"The same phenomenon (lower birth-rate of the better parents, socially considered) is observable all over the civilised world; it is not quite so bad in Germany as yet, but worse in France and in America."

Upon the first-quoted passage the necessary comment is merely mathematical. It may not be generally understood abroad that under our federal system the expenditures of the State of New York are unimportant, as compared with those of the cities and counties within it, or with its share of national expenditures. The care of defectives was taken over by the State for humane reasons, for greater uniformity and skill in treatment than local authorities were giving them; but the total annual expenditures of the State are a small affair compared with those of New York City alone.* In New York City, it may be of interest to add, the somewhat kindred

public expenditure upon poor relief, which is still left to the localities, is a small matter as compared with similar charges upon thrifty taxpayers in Berlin or London—less than one-tenth as much as is spent upon schools, for example.

Financially, the burden of the unfit upon the fit in New York State, and presumably elsewhere in the United States, is not alarming. Un-eugenic births may be a much more serious matter as affecting the future; but it is doubtful if in this respect America is really worse off than England and Germany. The birth-rate of what is inaccurately termed the "native American stock" is surprisingly low in the North-eastern portion of the country. Elsewhere it is better sustained. But, quite aside from that, is it fair to assume that the elements in our population that do maintain a high birth-rate are inferior? In New York City, the landing-place of most immigrants, the excess of births over deaths in 1913 was presumably more than 60,000, against possibly 50,000 in London, 20,000 in Berlin and its suburbs, and 1200 in Paris—the 1912 birth-rates being in these cities 26.22, 24.67, 20.26, and 16.81. The high birth-rates in this city are attributed mainly to the immigrants from Europe. In no sense are these generally inferior in capacity for development. The immigration authorities report venereal disease as rare among immigrants, who come quite generally from small towns. Their physical condition in other ways averages good. In mental capacity which of them is inferior? The German? The British, who are still a very large element? The Italian? The Jew? The Greek? The Scandinavian? The Slav? Only the negro, of whom a comparatively small number come in from the West Indies. The colour problem we have; and it is a frightful one. It would be hard to name an inferior white race represented largely among our immigrants.

For some years I have had to do with the award of a number of collegiate scholarships among deserving youth graduating from public (free) high schools in this city. Nearly thirty candidates each year from among the finest pupils of more than a dozen great high schools are personally examined. Their physique has rather improved in the past ten years. Their wonderful mental alertness is confined to no race; the British stock shows scantily in the number—in part for lack of the qualifying poverty; but other races are well represented. College professors tell the same story of eager students of the immigrant races. The census shows that the children of immigrants are illiterate in a smaller percentage than the children of native whites—mainly because of more concentrated distribution. Their racial energy is indubitable. Capacity for absorption differs in degree, but exists in all.

These racial elements that reproduce themselves so plentifully upon the new soil are in great part the same that Dr Schiller would call "the lower classes." In this country their increase scarcely suggests a lowering of the national mental or physical energy, though it may mean a modification of the assumed national type. Is it not possible that the rapid

multiplication of precisely the same element upon the continent of Europe is a less serious menace than is assumed?

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II.

It is a pity to spoil a good argument by partisan and unconsidered statements. Yet this is what Dr Schiller has done in his article on "Eugenics and Politics." The good argument is the paramount necessity of a sound family life as the basis of a sound society; the unconsidered statements are numerous: *inter alia*, the rash inference that the "biological process has probably come to an end" (p. 247); the false inference that intelligence varies as skull-capacity (p. 247); the highly dubitable statement that the present shortage of military officers is at bottom a biological problem (p. 250); the uncritical acceptance of the quite inadequate theory that the middle classes of the "Roman empire" were crushed out by taxation (p. 250); the false inference that the stocks of ability were "conserved" in the "lower" classes when they had no educational and industrial ladders to the "higher" classes (p. 251); the sweeping generalisation that "State control is never a success" (p. 253); the logically vicious theory that "the happiness and *perpetuation*¹ of the individual are secondary" (p. 253).

Dr Schiller's wider contention seems to be an attack on "the whole trend of social legislation." "Social reform costs money, and the money is raised by taxation, which bears very hardly on the middle classes, who cannot curtail luxuries like the rich, and will not lower their standard of comfort. They meet the extra expense, therefore, by further postponing the age of marriage and further reducing their output of children. One of the chief effects, therefore, of our present methods of improving social conditions is to deteriorate the race. And this in a twofold manner: they eliminate the middle class, and they promote the survival of the unfit and defective."

Karl Marx also had a theory, for which indeed he gave some grounds, that the middle class was being eliminated. Fortunately, facts have proved that Marx was wrong, and to-day there is absolutely no ground for the idea that the middle class is disappearing; on the contrary, there are some grounds for believing that it is becoming a relatively larger portion of the whole community—though of course any discussion of this particular point would involve a careful delimitation of the vague term "middle class." Let us waive that point, however, and consider the ground of Dr Schiller's inference. It is the old one (often emphasised by certain newspapers) that the State taxes this class out of measure. This may or may not be true, the argument remains fallacious. Let me give Dr Schiller some figures which show clearly that the birth-rate varies inversely as the standard of comfort—from which he may perhaps draw the inference that the more the

¹ *Italics mine.*

State diminishes by taxation the income of the members of any class, the greater will be the birth-rate within that class! It is an inference I would hesitate personally to draw, but there is at least some logic on its side.

No. of Births per Annum per 1000 Women of 15-50 Years.¹

Character of District.	Paris (1886-95).	Berlin (1886-95).	Vienna. (1891-94).
Very poor	140.4	221.7	200
Poor	128.9	206	164
Comfortable	111.2	195.4	155
Very comfortable	98.7	177.7	153
Rich	93.9	146.4	107
Very rich	69.1	122	71

It is to be noted that a lower death-rate almost invariably accompanies a lower birth-rate, and that therefore these figures do not show us the relative growth of the respective classes. It is also to be noted that the classes are continuous, and that the fall in the birth-rate is also continuous as one ascends the social scale—it does not stop at the middle classes, but applies still more to the very rich, whom, as Dr Schiller admits, taxation does not vitally affect. We must therefore look for a deeper explanation than any Dr Schiller offers us. It seems possible that the reason is something more than the incidence of taxation. The French Commission on Depopulation has confirmed in this regard the words of Zola; “Si la France se dépeuple, c’est qu’elle le veut. Il faut donc simplement qu’elle ne veuille plus. Mais quelle besogne! Tout un monde à refaire.”

This brings me to a further point. Dr Schiller hits out nobly at individualism and socialism, Hellenism and modernism alike. He attacks, not unjustly, “abstractions like ‘the State’ and ‘the individual.’” But it is a pity to hit so indiscriminately as to hit oneself in the process. In this very article we have the following passage:—“The individual is helpless against social conventions: and, in effect, society already prescribes whom he shall (or shall not) marry, when and under what conditions and penalties in every class, and leaves him only limited and largely illusory freedom of choice.” What, then, is this society which prevents “the individual” from eugenic marriage? If the individuals who compose society will to follow eugenic principles, what shall prevent them? Si l’Angleterre se dépeuple, c’est qu’elle le veut. But it is yet very far from being depopulated, and the problems, difficult and profound enough, which our social world presents, are problems, as I have heard a wise Government official recently say, “not for hysterics, but for science.”

R. M. MACIVER.

ABERDEEN.

¹ The figures are taken from Bertillon, “Abaissement de la Natalité en France” (*Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, August 1910).

III.

THERE is not much hope in Dr Schiller's analysis of our social condition. It is true he believes the family, which has its roots in a remote past, will not be easily displaced, but he thinks it will be a poor type of family that remains.

No doubt it would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the family as a religious, social, and economic unit; religious instinct and belief, natural affection and responsibility, and proper pride all conspire together to make it so. It does not follow that evil influences cannot weaken the bond, nor that extension of State power need be used to weaken it. The State may do some useful scavenging and get rid of poisonous ingredients in the environment of poor families.

Real family life is rendered very difficult when there is no reasonably assured prospect before its members, when the mother is away at work all day, when the home is physically wretched, and when the income is insufficient for proper maintenance. There is little or no hope in such conditions, and without hope you cannot have self-respect or progress.

Buy your labour as cheaply as possible when it is abundant and unorganised; make immense profits and acquire boundless wealth, as England has done; let the weakest go to the wall, on the principle that business is business,—and you will find that no distribution of relief will make up for your original injustice and neglect. Listen, if you will, to the prudent, who tell you that all will be well if you will give relief only under stringent conditions, and who believe that the whole problem finds its solution in the magic word “deterrence,”—still you will not reach the edge of the question. All of us, except a few extremists, are continually praising the family with a big F, and most of us are engaged in manufacturing these very families that Dr Schiller deplures and fears.

But it will be objected that these families are not what they are by reason of any pressure of avoidable circumstance, but because they are biologically unfit and incapable of amelioration.

That, however, is just the point we know very little about. Out of the very poorest families you certainly do get school children who are well above elementary school average in all respects. Granting that you cannot go wrong in trying to eliminate the definitely feeble-minded, there are still thousands of families, which are at present a burden on the community, of whom you cannot say with confidence that the children are incapable of developing under favourable conditions into useful members of society.

We are uncertain in our minds as to what object we are really aiming at; belief in the survival of the fittest individuals exercises its silent pressure on our minds, yet we refuse to eliminate or allow hunger to eliminate the unsuccessful; thus we neither whole-heartedly abandon ourselves to an animal struggle for individual or family existence, nor definitely address ourselves to the task of looking to the well-being of the community

as a whole and before everything. For our pursuit of individual interests too exclusively helps to create the strata who are a burden on society, while our religious beliefs prevent our leaving hunger to eliminate them.

Is not the solution of the whole question mainly a moral one for all from top to bottom?

Physically sound stocks are not the only requirement for satisfactory marriages, and, even if they were, you have in general no means of knowing what stocks are physically sound.

Dr Schiller fears the elimination of the middle classes by taxation. The following estimate of numbers assessed to income tax and of average incomes does not seem to favour this creed:—

Years.	Gross Assessment to Income-Tax (£).	Average Income (£).	Numbers of Income-Tax Payers.
1895-96	678,000,000	698	970,000
1910-11	1,050,000,000	937	1,120,000

Thus income-tax payers increased rather more rapidly than population.

The following figures from *The Times* seem to imply an inferiority in our productive powers, but where is the responsibility for this inferiority to be placed? It will be noticed that the American workman has the advantage of 22 h.p. of machinery per man against the British average of 9½ h.p.

Country.	Number of Persons Employed.	Total Output in £.	Machinery per Head (h.p.).	Year.
U.K.	6,478,794	676,433,000	9½	1907
U.S.	7,678,578	1,753,236,000	22	1909

The figures are not at all strictly comparable, because prices were higher in 1909 than in 1907. And yet Dr Schiller tells us that New York State pays away ⅙th or ¼th of its revenues in poor relief, and does not show or affirm that a large proportion of that ⅙th are congenital idiots, lunatics, or feeble-minded persons.

I am not quite clear as to Dr Schiller's opinion on the unfavourable biological effect of war; he tells us that *too much* war is bad, as it depletes the most vigorous stocks; but it is the *relative* depletion of vigorous and defective stocks that he thinks crucial; therefore it would seem to follow that in his opinion *all* war must be bad. War, however, is almost necessarily a school of unselfishness; the individual exists for the army and not for himself; out of it, therefore, spring gallant deeds and great achievements

which are national memories and certainly can enrich the whole life of a nation. The biological view seems to take no count of such spiritual possessions.

The good or bad effect of war seems to depend largely upon the kind of motives which animate armies, and these in turn depend both on the commanders and the men. Even Cromwell could make nothing good of decayed serving-men and tapsters, unless they had with them a good proportion of better men, and were well officered.

Dr Schiller seems indirectly to admit that there is something not biologically accounted for. He does, indeed, claim that the present shortage of officers is largely a biological phenomenon. "The families *with military traditions*,¹ in which the sons hereditarily went into the army and provided the best officers, are no longer large enough to provide an adequate supply of men."

Observe! the middle classes are larger and richer than ever; presumably they are biologically satisfactory, being well adapted to their environment, in which they have prospered exceedingly. Owing, however, to the predominance in them of the commercial element, the sons do not go into the army; they have different ideals and aims. Can this be called unfitness in the biological sense? Has biology anything to do with ideals?

Dr Schiller doubts "whether the law does well to attribute an equal sanctity and value to all families, and to put the worst on a par with the best, to regard sterile unions as no less precious and indissoluble than fertile, and to bestow the right to found a family indiscriminately."

Here is indeed an overwhelming flood of propositions, a veritable programme! Is it true that the law attributes an equal sanctity to all families? It seizes on the family that applies to it for help and breaks it up into its constituent atoms in a workhouse; it permits other families to remain intact. Does Dr Schiller hold a man should divorce his wife if she has no children, and that marriage should only be permitted to persons approved by a public official? This would indeed be "the meaningless triumph of an abstraction like the State," which he deprecates so much.

Eugenic considerations would naturally prevail if there were no snobs, no worshippers of wealth, and no classes so hopelessly sunk in poverty and wretchedness and insecurity that they cannot look beyond the morrow. Whoever heard of a family that did not critically examine the intended husband or wife of any one of its members, and generally conclude that he or she was not quite good enough!—only "good" has to be variously interpreted.

E. H. BETHELL.

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¹ Italics mine.

"A BROAD CHURCH DISRUPTION."

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1914, p. 332.)

IN his article on the above subject the Rev. Hubert Handley seeks to explain and justify his position as a Broad Church clergyman. May I, as a Liberal layman (once a churchman) who has followed the advancing tide of Liberal thought with keen interest for the last half century, be allowed to make a few criticisms on Mr Handley's paper?

I will first refer to the writer's attitude with regard to the Creeds. He maintains that the "I believe" need not be taken in an individual, personal sense. He says "the 'I believe' is representative." He says Professor Sanday repeats the Creed "not as an individual, but as a member of the Church"; that Canon J. M. Wilson says we may repeat the Creed "as the essence of our Christian belief as a body, rather than as the scientific expression of our individual present opinions."

Now I venture to ask, in the first place, what ground is there for the extraordinary assertion that the plain and simple words "I believe" do not mean "*I* believe," but "somebody else believes"? If the Church did not mean the Creeds to be an assertion binding on the individual, why, in the name of common sense and common speech, was the word "I" used? Had the Church really meant what it is asserted she meant, is it not reasonable to suppose she would have stated the substance of the Creed and ended (as the Athanasian Creed ends) with "This is a Catholic Faith"? But to show that the Church meant to bind the "individual," we have, in the second clause of the last-named Creed, "Which Faith except *every one* do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly."

Again, as clearly showing the Church's meaning, we have only to refer to the Baptismal Services and the "Order for the Visitation of the Sick," where the question is asked, "Dost *thou* believe in God the Father Almighty," etc.; then follow all the sentences of the Apostles' Creed, and the answer is, "All this I stedfastly believe." And yet we have reverend Deans, Canons, and Vicars of the Church telling us that "I believe" and "All this I stedfastly believe" only mean "the Church believes"!

And more than this. The clear implication from the frank confessions of their own beliefs and the drift of the argument of these Liberal churchmen is, that although the individual repeating the Creed or answering the question at a baptism actually himself *disbelieves* the statements, he is still justified in saying he believes them. This is truly an extraordinary position! What a pass we have come to! Here are leaders of the Church—an institution one of whose main objects is the propagation of truth—here are our "spiritual pastors and masters" actually asserting that it is justifiable to assert your belief in statements which you do not believe!

Of course we know what the answer is. It is said that all these creeds, formularies, and articles were framed more than three hundred years ago; that we have moved on since then; that the words have changed their

meaning ; that the old words are to be used now, not in a popular, but in a technical sense ; that the people in the pews do not take them literally.

But, first, it may be asked of those who make such assertions, What authority have you for putting this meaning into the old words? I maintain there is no authority but their own. The Church has not sanctioned such a course. Again, it is a mistake to think that the people in the pews understand all this sophistry—that they say “I believe” when they have ceased to believe.

What an extraordinary ethical confusion such teaching as this would lead to! Take an illustration from science. The memory of Galileo is generally thought to be stained by his assent, before the Inquisition, to the declaration that the new teaching of astronomy, to the effect that the earth revolved on its axis and the sun was stationary, was false, he being convinced that the new doctrine was true. Now, according to the reasoning of the Liberal clergy, Galileo was justified in what he said, for his “I believe” (in the old doctrine) need not have referred to his individual belief, but to that of the scientific world in general!

Let me refer to one other point in Mr Handley’s article. The advancing tide of religious thought has largely modified the views of churchmen as regards many leading doctrines; for example, Inspiration, Revelation, Immortality, the Divinity of Christ, Eternal Punishment, etc., the words embodying these having been sufficiently elastic to permit, quite legitimately, of the expanded thought. But two crucial dogmas remained, two fundamental pillars, which it was thought were absolutely unshakable. These were the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection of Jesus.

Now, one would have thought that, whatever vagueness or elasticity such words as Inspiration or Immortality might possess, no two meanings could possibly attach to the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection of Jesus. But no; as regards the first, Mr Handley says it may mean “a non-miraculous but sacrosanct birth.” The Resurrection may perhaps not be regarded as quite such a hard, clear, concrete fact, but all doubt as to the Church’s meaning is removed by the words of the fourth Article, which affirms, “Christ did truly rise again from the dead, and took again his body, with flesh, bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of man’s nature.” And yet Mr Handley tells us the words in the Creed, “the resurrection of the body,” may mean “post-mortem idealism”!

Mr Nevinson lately informed us that he once asked the late Canon Barnett what he would say to someone who inquired whether he believed the Resurrection of Christ was a physical fact. He at once answered, “I should say No. But at the same time I should show how much more marvellous and vital His spiritual Resurrection has been.”

The Liberal clergymen seem incapable of viewing their position from the Liberal layman’s point of view. They fail to see the wisdom of obeying their Master’s injunction to put new wine into new bottles. Strange it is that they cannot see the injury they are causing both to religion and to their Church by these methods. Laymen who think and are in earnest are

fast deserting the Church, and, what is perhaps more serious, young men who think and are honest find it impossible to enroll themselves as her ministers.

Test the matter further from this consideration. If it is justifiable to put the construction on the Prayer Book language which is contended for, there is nothing to prevent Unitarians obtaining episcopal ordination. In fact—and I make the statement advisedly—those churchmen who hold the views justified by Mr Handley are virtually Unitarians.

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HAMPSTEAD.

"THE SCOTTISH CHURCH QUESTION."

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1914, p. 306.)

It is obvious that Sheriff Orr has made a blunder from which legal training and experience should have saved him. He treats as decided, and decided in his own favour, questions which are still *sub judice*, if they have even got that length. He tells us that the Church of Scotland has made proposals "which constitute an entirely new departure," that she is prepared to frame and adopt "a new constitution" which amongst other things will vindicate the action of the men who in 1843 stood for spiritual freedom, and so forth, to the general effect that the Church has already turned its back upon its traditions to an extent which has fairly ripened it for union with, and apparently assimilation to, the United Free Church. Now, no doubt, in those private conferences which are taking place in Edinburgh, where old opponents are learning to understand each other, hasty things may have been said which have misled the Sheriff. But the truth is that, so far, the Church of Scotland has recorded no opinion whatever on the points which Sheriff Orr indicates, nor has it been invited to do so in the usual constitutional way. It has appointed a Committee to confer with a similar Committee of the U.F. Church on "the ecclesiastical situation" and "the obstacles to union," and for some years now the Committees have been prosecuting their remit. But neither Church has registered a judgment on the question. Each is still awaiting its Committee's report. What the judgment on either side will be when it is given, no wise man will try to predict. It is understood that endearments are being exchanged in Edinburgh. But the Church of Scotland sits in her parishes amongst the glens and the straths and the isles of the sea, where memories are living and long, and high-flown sentiments appear as doughty facts, and the love of a principle is not considered to be narrowness of mind, and the question of union is weighed in an atmosphere which is not that of Edinburgh. No one can do more than surmise what her thoughts are or what her decision will be. There are many in her own communion

who have not observed that change of opinion which is so plain to Sheriff Orr. No doubt spectators see most of the game. It is curious that the Sheriff, who has so acutely detected a revolution in the convictions of another Church, has not observed any similar phenomenon in the convictions of his own.

The Sheriff founds largely upon a certain document known as the Memorandum. With consent of the General Assembly the Memorandum was sent by the Church of Scotland Committee to the Committee of the United Free Church, in order to allow negotiations to proceed until they should reach a stage at which the opinion of both Churches might usefully be ascertained. No doubt it has the effect of provisionally opening questions long held to be closed. But it decides nothing. It has not been submitted to, far less approved by, either Church. It has certainly provoked dissent in both of them. It is entirely tentative. To nothing whatever in it does the Church of Scotland stand committed.

It would be futile to discuss further the Sheriff's views of the present state of the Church question in Scotland. They are his own. It is not known how far they are generally shared. They are obviously, however, the views of a pleader, not of a judge who waits for evidence; they are largely founded on hearsay, and they are the views of one who possesses no right whatever to speak for the Church of Scotland, whatever right he may have to speak for his own. It would have been unnecessary even to enter this caveat against him had it not been that the *Hibbert Journal* is read by many who have not the opportunity of discovering for themselves that an article written in such a strain of confidence is in reality premature.

JAS. B. GRANT.

GLASGOW.

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

THE publication of Mr F. H. Bradley's *Essays on Truth and Reality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914) is by far the most noteworthy event that has happened of late in the philosophical world; and although a review of the work appears in this issue, I may be permitted to say a word about it here. It is a great book, a permanent addition to philosophical literature. Whatever difference of opinion may prevail in regard to the conclusions it is written to support, there can be none in regard to the power and suggestiveness of its argument, and the penetrating keenness of its criticism. The metaphysical position of the author is still that which he developed years ago in *Appearance and Reality*. Only there is a difference of emphasis in some not unimportant respects, and Mr Bradley seems now more inclined than he once was to admit the claims of the religious consciousness as entitled to recognition in a metaphysical interpretation of experience. One is struck by the change of emphasis at the very beginning of the present volume. "Every aspect of life," so the opening sentence runs, "may in the end be subordinated to the Good, if, that is, we understand the Good in a very wide sense." It is true that there is no one aspect of life which possesses unqualified goodness, no one aspect in which the perfect good is found. But every aspect of life, so far as it is good, is justified in itself, and has its own sphere of relative supremacy. Just because everything in life is imperfect, and seeks beyond itself an absolute fulfilment of itself, everything in life is subordinate to the Good. And the Good is defined as satisfaction; so far as anything satisfies, there is no possible appeal beyond it. No doubt, by "the Good" is here meant much more than was included under that term in *Appearance and Reality*. But, nevertheless, the change of attitude is unmistakable. "The Good," it was contended in the earlier book, "is not the perfect, but is merely a one-sided aspect of perfection. It tends to pass beyond itself, and, if it were completed, it would forthwith cease properly to be good." Significant, again, is the way in which Mr Bradley insists, in the new book, that philosophy demands, and in the end rests on, what may fairly be termed faith. The aim of philosophy, it is insisted, is ultimate truth, or, in other words, intellectual satisfaction. In and for

philosophy, truth in the end is true because we have a certain kind of want and because we act in a certain manner, not because it is simply seen or follows logically from what is seen. Furthermore, philosophy is obliged to act on an unverified principle; and in so far it must continue to rest upon faith. There are some wholesome protests against the mistake of making philosophy into a religion. "It must be an unhappy world where a man can say that, if he had no philosophy, he would be left destitute of practical belief." On the other hand, from its very nature, as a rational interpretation of reality, philosophy must be conversant with the highest things, and it must recognise those things in their proper character. Religion, in Mr Bradley's view, consists in the identification of our wills with the Will that is completely good. And he lays it down, as a matter of principle, that "whatever ideas really are required in practice by the highest religion are true." Two religious beliefs are discussed in some detail—the beliefs, namely, in a personal God and in human immortality. With regard to the former, Mr Bradley's main contention is that if personality is to be ascribed to God, it must be formulated in such a way as to agree with the truth of the indwelling of the divine spirit in the finite soul. This latter is, he insists, a religious truth far more essential than God's "personality." At the same time, he unreservedly rejects the mode of escape adopted, for example, by Feuerbach, who held not merely that God is self-conscious only in us, but that his self-consciousness is in the end ours alone. For religion is throughout a two-sided affair, and to place the consciousness of unity and discord all on one side is to remove the essence of religion. If the belief in the separate individuality of God be required for religion, Mr Bradley would accept it as justified and true, "but only," he adds, "if it is supplemented by other beliefs which really contradict it." He will not subscribe to the doctrine that there is no truth except the truth which is self-consistent and ultimate, and urges that a blind devotion to consistency involves either in the end worse inconsistency, or else the mutilation of religion. With respect to immortality, a similar line of thought is pursued. What appeals to himself, Mr Bradley tells us, is "the demand of personal affection, the wish that, where a few creatures love one another, nothing before or after death should be changed." If religion really endorses that demand, then he thinks the belief is, so far, right and true, although exactly what its truth comes to in the end we cannot know. Of one thing at least we may be assured: goodness, beauty, and truth are all there is which in the end is real, and their reality, appearing amid chance and change, is beyond these and is eternal. Our life has value only because and so far as it realises the things that do not die. Mr Bradley's treatment of these high themes is dignified and impressive, and cannot fail to leave its mark on the mind of every thoughtful reader.

The article by Mr Harold H. Joachim in *Mind* (January 1914), entitled "Some Preliminary Considerations on Self-Identity," will serve to illustrate and reinforce the central argument of Mr Bradley's book. Mr Joachim tries to show that our belief in our own individuality and self-

sameness through life is itself a faith in a something we know not what, and that our spiritual individuality is certainly not an incommunicable and impenetrable privacy. He examines first of all the unity and persistence we attribute to the bodily organism. It soon appears that if we conceive of the body as a sum of atoms, we are forced to recognise a system of actions and reactions, and that the supposed impenetrable unity of the body as a solid thing in space is a pure fiction. So again, if we conceive our living body as a chemical and biological individual, it becomes evident that it is a shifting population of diverse cells, all descended from the same ancestor. So that "if I am asked whether my body, as a living whole, is 'the same' as that of the boy who went in my name to Elstree School in 1879, the answer would seem to be 'Yes—in a sense analogous to that in which the English nation is the same now as it was in the days of Queen Elizabeth.'" The unity and persistence of the living body are, indeed, relative and derivative, and the living body is an individuation of the universal life. Proceeding, then, to the unity and continuity of the self, Mr Joachim makes it clear that such unity and continuity cannot be found in any immediate oneness of self-feeling. For no individual whole of self-feeling can ever comprehend within itself my yesterday, my to-day, and my to-morrow. Great stretches of my past, not to mention my future, and many features even of my present, are clearly not "for me" as explicit constituents of my immediate sense of myself. Our spiritual selves are, he maintains, individuations of the universal spirit—that or nothing. To forget oneself in the reverence and in the creation of beautiful things, is to become an artist; to bury oneself in the pursuit of truth, is to become a thinker; to lose oneself in the love of God, is to become a saint. And these phrases help us to see in a new light the real meaning of the spiritual individuality of man. In this connection, I should like to mention an extremely acute and able little volume, *Vom Selbstbewusstsein*, by Broder Christiansen (Berlin: Feddersen, 1912). The author seeks by a careful piece of psychological analysis to establish the thesis that we have no immediate awareness whatsoever of states of our own consciousness, that there is no intuitive apprehension of the processes of the inner life. Self-consciousness, as indeed all knowledge of what is psychical, is, he contends, the result of reflective construction, and is in no way a fact of direct or perceptive experience. In *Logos* (iv. 3, 1913) there is an interesting article by Siegfried Marck on "Die Lehre vom erkennenden Subjekt in der Marburger Schule," in which the writings of Cohen and Natorp are chiefly referred to. The author points out that as Hegel rejected the Kantian notion of a "perceptive understanding," so Natorp dismisses Bergson's view of intuition, as the knowledge which would swim with the stream of life itself, on account of its suspicious approach to mysticism. Natorp would *replace the assumed immediate experience of mental processes by a reconstructive psychology, in which the attempt would be made to trace the way in which the distinction between subject and object comes to be made, and the stages of development through which it passes.

Mr Bertrand Russell's paper on "The Philosophy of Bergson," originally read before "The Heretics," together with a reply by Dr H. Wildon Carr, and Mr Russell's rejoinder, has been republished in pamphlet form (Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes, 1914). Mr Russell, after a rapid survey of the leading principles of Bergson's philosophy, which culminates, he thinks, in "the great climax in which life is compared to a cavalry charge," concentrates his criticism upon the two fundamental doctrines of space and time. Bound up with Bergson's view of space is his contention that for the representation of number we are compelled to have recourse to an extended image. Mr Russell maintains that there are here three entirely different things which are confused by Bergson, namely: (a) number, the general concept applicable to the various particular numbers; (b) the various particular numbers; (c) the various collections to which the various particular numbers are applicable. So soon as it is perceived that a particular collection has been confused with the number of its terms, and this again with number in general, the theory that number or particular numbers can be pictured in space is seen to be untenable. And with that there is disproved also the more general theory that all abstract ideas and all logic are derived from space, on which theory the condemnation of the intellect is based. Bergson's theory of duration and time rests throughout, Mr Russell urges, on the confusion between the present occurrence of a recollection and the past occurrence which is remembered. Whilst believing himself to have given an account of the difference between the present and the past, what Bergson really gives is an account of the difference between perception and recollection, both *present* facts. And this is an instance of the more general confusion between an act of knowing and that which is known. In memory, the act of knowing is in the present, whereas what is known is in the past; by confusing them the distinction between past and present is blurred. Dr Carr argues it is only with regard to what Bergson calls intuitive knowledge that the charge of confusing subject and object can have any semblance of meaning, and there the identity of subject and object is the very essence of Bergson's doctrine. To which Mr Russell replies, that because such identification is of the essence of the doctrine, it does not follow that no confusion has been made. The only valid defence would be to show that remembering is in fact identical with what is remembered. Miss Karin Costelloe, writing in the *Monist* (January 1914) on Mr Russell's paper, contends that the charge of failing to distinguish the past from the *idea* of the past does not really apply to what Bergson means by memory. The only past that Bergson is here concerned with is the past of our own consciousness. What he claims is that this forms one process, continuous with our present consciousness, and *creating* it. Our present idea of the past does not, therefore, come into the question at all. In an article on "The Ethical Pessimism of Bergson" (*Inter. J. Eth.*, January 1914), Mr J. W. Scott asks the question whether there is any reason for the impression of pessimism which arises in the mind after reading Bergson's account of the comic. And he finds the answer in the

reflection that to rule out the mechanical, the rigid, from the life which society wants is to withdraw the good from the reach of common men and to make it the aristocratic privilege of a few. And not only that: it is to lose sight of what, definitely, the good can be, even for the few. Because the good life, then, implies no longer the remaining firm to a fixed law, and the moral imperative is in the end deprived of its absolute and positive character. The good life is transmuted into a game of skill.

A series of articles "On the Nature of Acquaintance" is commenced in the *Monist* (January 1914) by Mr Bertrand Russell, and the first is devoted to a "Preliminary Description of Experience," in which the author attempts not a logical analysis of experience but to determine its extent, its boundaries, its prolongation in time, and the reasons for regarding it as not all-embracing. It is maintained that, whilst some facts are experienced, namely, those which are known to us by the immediate insight of sense, most of the facts which we consider to be within our knowledge are not experienced. Again, the present images of past things may be experienced, and in the immediate memory of something which has just happened the thing itself seems to remain in experience, in spite of the circumstance that it is known to be no longer present. Our total experience is proved to be not all-embracing certainly in the case of mathematical entities. For example, the number of functions of a real variable is infinitely greater than the number of moments of time. If, therefore, we spent all eternity in thinking of a new function every instant, or of any finite number of new functions every instant, there would still be an infinite number of functions which we should not have thought of, and therefore an infinite number of facts about them which we should never experience. No such cogent argument can be produced with regard to existing particulars. But although the existence of other people and of unperceived physical things cannot be conclusively proved, yet no logical reason can be urged against it; the fact that in the logical world there certainly are entities which we do not experience affords a parallel; and the common-sense assumption of the existence of such particulars has been found to be thoroughly successful as a working hypothesis, and there is no argument of any sort or kind against it.

Several volumes dealing with the history of philosophy call for mention. Mr Edwyn Bevan's four lectures on *Stoics and Sceptics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913) give an interesting and suggestive sketch of these ancient schools of thought. The author lays stress upon the fact that the Stoic philosophy was determined all through by a practical need. Regarded from the point of view of pure speculation, it was on a lower level than the Platonic and Aristotelian systems. The Stoics went to their task *with the wish* to discover that the power governing the universe was rational, and were thus led into a dogmatism which was certainly a philosophic fall. Yet Stoicism provided a scale of values, and nerved men to brave action and endurance in a world where brute force and cruelty had dreadful scope. An extremely interesting account is given of the Sceptics, which

makes one hope that some day Mr Bevan may be induced to write more fully on Carneades, whom Adamson once described as "by far the acutest mind in antiquity, a regular Hume." Professor S. Belmond has published the first volume of a work entitled *Études sur la philosophie de Duns Scot* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1913), in which he deals with the doctrine of Duns Scotus concerning the existence and knowableness of God. The book ought to be of great help to students of mediæval philosophy. There is an excellent and readable translation by Mr R. G. Collingwood of Benedetto Croce's book on *The Philosophy of Vico* (London: Latimer, 1913). Croce finds in Vico neither more nor less than the nineteenth century in germ, and writes with genuine veneration for the *Alt Vater* of his nation's philosophy. The little volume by Mr A. D. Lindsay, on *The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, in "The People's Books" (London: Jack, 1913), is an exceedingly clear and lucid presentation of the leading principles of the critical philosophy, marked by much originality and independence of judgment in the interpretation of Kant's meaning. Mr Lindsay admits that the Kantian theory of perception is inconsistent and wanting in coherence, the reason of which he considers to be that Kant is not concerned with the nature of perception, but with the relation of what is immediately perceived to what is not, but may be, immediately perceived. Sometimes Kant speaks of perception reaching objects directly, and refutes the view that we perceive only what is in our mind. At other times he argues that we do not perceive things, but affections produced in us by things. Hence, when he talks of our knowing only phenomena, he sometimes seems to mean that we know objects, things in themselves, only in part, so far as they appear to us, and the distinction between phenomenon and thing in itself would then be a distinction between the same thing imperfectly and perfectly understood. On the other hand, he sometimes seems to mean that we are aware of appearances, as entities separate from the objects which produce them in our minds. I think, however, it is a mistake to represent Kant as meaning, in this latter sense, that appearances are produced by *objects*. Surely, as thus understood, the phenomena *are* themselves the objects; the whole drift of the Deduction of the Categories becomes unintelligible unless this be recognised. Professor C. Lloyd Morgan's Herbert Spencer Lecture on *Spencer's Philosophy of Science* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913) is a very interesting and able criticism of certain aspects of Spencer's philosophy. Professor Lloyd Morgan contends that cognition is a mode of relatedness which science must endeavour to treat on precisely the same lines as it deals with any other natural kind of relatedness. The essential point to bear in mind is, he thinks, that the cognitive relation always involves relatedness of *many terms*, and that its discussion involves the analysis of what, in the higher phases of its existence, is probably the most complex natural occurrence in this complex world.

G. DAWES HICKS.

THEOLOGY.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.LITT.

THE sixth volume of the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, which has just been issued with admirable punctuality, bears the name of Dr L. H. Gray as a new assistant-editor. Dr Gray, in addition to his editorial work, contributes several articles to the volume; most are upon Iranian topics, but the first is on Fiction (primitive, Oriental, and Græco-Roman)—a subject which at first sight looks astray in such a work. Fiction is mentioned also, however, in the bibliography to the article on Gambling, where, among novels which illustrate the effect of gambling on character, *The Old Curiosity Shop* might have been mentioned. These articles, however, belong to the department of ethics rather than of religion. The leading articles which belong to the subject of our present survey may be grouped as follows.

In the first place, Greek religion¹ is discussed by Dr L. R. Farnell in a lucid and well-proportioned article, a model of what an encyclopædia article of this kind should be; it does not diverge into details covered by special articles, and yet presents the long, intricate story of the development of Greek religion in such a way that the successive stages stand out as distinctly as the evidence of the literature and the art permits. Dr Farnell closes by stating that "anthropomorphism was the strongest bias of the Hellene's religious imagination; and with this we associate his passion for idolatry and hero-worship." The latter trait emerges in the article on Heroes and Hero-Gods, which ranks with that on Health and Gods of Healing as among the most important in the volume. The writers really break fresh ground more than once. The accident of the alphabet also brings some remarkable material on Indian religions into this volume, notably Mr Crooke's survey of "Hinduism." In discussing the prospects of Hinduism at the present day, which is an even more difficult task than surveying impartially its past, he points out that it possesses three sources of strength in grappling with the powerful opposition of religions like Islam and Christianity; one is the caste-system; another is "the universal recognition of the power of *dharma*—a term which connotes much, but may be roughly explained as personified social law"; the third is the influence of women. The impact of Christianity is discussed by Mr Bernard Lucas in his new book on *Our Task in India* (Macmillan). He asks his Christian readers, "Shall we proselytise Hindus, or evangelise India?" By the former he means the aims and methods of those who seek "the acceptance by individual Hindus of our Western theological Christianity, and their definite accession to the various ecclesiastical organisations of very pronounced Western types which we

¹ An equally good piece of work is Mr J. G. Milne's account of "Græco-Egyptian Religion." Almost every article about Greek things in this volume reaches a very high standard, not excluding Troitsky's compressed and frank account of the Greek Orthodox Church.

have established in their midst." Against this he pleads for an Evangelism which will recognise frankly the contribution which the Hindu can make to Western Christianity, and the need of preventing the Indian churches from being regarded as foreign communities. The author's case is argued with candour and seriousness. One of its difficulties is to determine how much Western dogma has to be retained in an Evangelism which strives to be loyal to historic Christianity. An aspect of this is presented by Mr J. L. Johnston in *Some Alternatives to Jesus Christ* (Longmans)—a study of the various forms which the Incarnation-idea has assumed in Buddhism, Hinduism, and Babi-Behaism; the author attempts to show that Christianity, with its stress on the historical appearance of the Saviour, His human suffering, and His abiding presence in the Church or community, has qualifications, such as no other faith possesses, for meeting the needs of those who crave a religion of divine Incarnation. Mr Johnston's book belongs to the "Layman's Library." It is addressed not to specialists but to those Englishmen or Churchmen who meet in various ways the problem of comparative religion as a practical question. The author's aim is to reassure any who may feel that Christianity can only claim to be one of several great faiths which appeal to different racial temperaments. Without endeavouring to score points against the Eastern religions which he discusses, he argues persuasively. One or two of the statements in the chapter on the historical features of Christianity seem open to question, and it is hardly correct to say that "dogmatic formulation" is what "constitutes the inner history of the first Christian centuries" (p. 2). But the tone of the book is good, and its method fair. Mr T. J. Hardy's *The Religious Instinct* (Longmans) is a similar volume of orthodox apologetic, on a larger scale, with an appendix on "Some Regulations for the Guidance of Students of Comparative Religion." Mr Hardy writes effectively, and marshals with care his evidence for the thesis that Christianity can be demonstrated to satisfy the religious instincts of man as no other faith is able to do, these instincts being defined as (a) the consciousness of some object other than ourselves which we have the (b) desire to approach. In the *International Review of Missions* (1914, pp. 149 f.), Mr K. J. Saunders interprets Mr Tagore's wonderful prose translation of the *Gitanjali* from a similar standpoint; he attempts to show that the Deity of the *Gitanjali* is "no impersonal, imperturbable Absolute of Hindu philosophy, but that in fact, whether He be Christ or not, He is at least a Christ-like God, and that the experience of His suppliant and lover is one with the deep core of all Christian experience." Mr Saunders evidently shares the feeling of Mr Lucas about the need of allowing India to offer her own contribution to her interpretation of Christian theology. He concludes by hoping that "the songs of Rabindranath Tagore shall be on every tongue and that churches of Indian architecture and having their own liturgy and ritual shall resound with these exquisite words." Kabir, the weaver mystic of Northern Hinduism in the beginning of the sixteenth century, is described by Miss Underhill in almost equally appreciative

terms, in the *Contemporary Review* (February 1914, 193 f.). Kabir was born a Mahommedan, and went over to Hinduism. Abu'l Ala, the Syrian, whose career has been sketched by Mr Baerlein in a pleasant volume of the "Wisdom of the East" series, also forsook Islam for a semi-Buddhistic philosophy, but his views were nearer those of Ecclesiastes than those of the Christian ecclesia. Neither he nor Kabir has the significance of Tagore, for literature or for religion.

Naturally, the supreme article in this volume of the *Encyclopædia* is the composite one on "God," in fifteen sections. In the article on the Jewish conception of God there are some statements which we cannot but regard, as Miss Seward regarded Dr Johnson upon a historic occasion, "with mild but steady astonishment." For example, to say that it is not possible to speak of faith in connection with Judaism, "which is a religion of mere observance," or to assert that "rabbinism is fast dying out," while "no other system can save Judaism from dissolution," are statements which Jewish scholars will very properly resent, and which are out of place in a scientific work. The other sections of the article are quite adequate. In connection with Judaism, we may chronicle the appearance of a serviceable monograph by Dr S. Daiches on "Babylonian Oil Magic in the Talmud and later Jewish Literature," and a popular introduction to the "Cabala" (Open Court Publishing Company), by Dr B. Pick, which fills a gap in English study and enables the reader to appreciate the influence of this curious theosophical system on Judaism and Christianity alike. The *Encyclopædia* also contains articles on Halevi and Hillel, with a study of Jewish heresy by Dr Abrahams, who evidently hesitates to commit himself to Bacher's view that the term *min* denoted originally the Sadducee as viewed by the Pharisee. In the *Theologisch Tijdschrift* (1914, pp. 1-26), Professor Eardmans writes on "Farizeën en Sadduceën"; and in the *Jewish Quarterly Review* (January 1914, pp. 443 f.), Professor Friedlaender pleads for the recognition of a historic nucleus in the Talmudic account of the rupture between the Pharisees and the Hasmonean ruler, contending that the latter was not John Hyrcanus, as Josephus declares, but Alexander Jannæus. In a notice of Dr Abelson's recent book on Jewish mysticism, Dr Abrahams (*Journal of Theological Studies*, 1914, pp. 267 f.) agrees that the tendency which threw up the mediæval Cabala was not a sudden, foreign influence, but suggests that mysticism implied a metaphysic as truly as its rival, scholastic rationalism, did, and also that Dr Abelson has perhaps underrated the erotic element in the Zohar. This erotic element is not peculiar to Judaism, though it was to the allegorical interpretation of Canticles that it probably owed its start or impetus in Christianity. Canon M'Culloch notes one expression of it in the cult of the Sacred Heart within the Roman Church (*Encyclopædia*, pp. 557-558). The broader problem of mysticism in relation to Christianity is discussed by Miss Underhill in *The Interpreter* (January 1914, pp. 131-148), with special reference to the atonement; and in the *Journal of Theological Studies* (January 1914, pp. 244 f.), Mr J. L. Johnston offers some criticism on her treatment

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of mysticism and the New Testament in *The Mystic Way*, contending that Christ becomes, on this theory, little more than a path-finder or Prometheus, and that it is on Christology that the mystic reinterpretation tends to break down. This is one of the points urged by Mr Matthews, in "Mysticism and the Life of the Spirit" (*Church Quarterly Review*, 1914, 323 f.). Miss Underhill's main position is reflected, for the most part, in a pleasant volume of *Studies in Christian Mysticism* by Mr W. H. Dyson (Clarke, 1913), which insists that mysticism means the intense core of personal religion. Mr Dyson, however, seeks to qualify some of Miss Underhill's statements as Mr Johnston does.

The emergence of mystic phenomena¹ in connection with theosophy in early Christianity is one of the features of Gnosticism, which is discussed by Professor E. F. Scott in a luminous and striking article in the *Encyclopædia*. This admirably follows up Professor Peake's earlier study of Basilides. Professor Scott's estimate, like that of M. de Faye in his recent study, marks a real advance in our knowledge of the subject. One of his cardinal points is that the affinities of Gnosticism were with religion rather than with philosophy, and yet that the redemption which the Gnostics preached was a spiritual enlightenment which operated by means that were not primarily ethical; it was a deliverance from the material world and also from fatalism, whose method used occult rites and formulæ. In conflict with Gnosticism, the Church had to win by partially adopting some of the tendencies which it controverted. Professor Scott enumerates among these (a) the ascetic bias; (b) the sacramental theory of "a secret praxis, which was itself sufficient to insure all spiritual blessings"; (c) mysticism, the most important of all; and (d) an impulse to theological statement. Redemption in the New Testament, as he points out, "is fundamentally ethical, although the ethical meaning is obscured, even in the New Testament, by apocalyptic or speculative forms." In an article on "le péché et la gnose dans la théologie de Paulinisme" (*Revue de l'histoire des Religions*, 1913, pp. 273 f.), M. Jeanmaire endeavours to show that *gnosis* for Paul meant redemption in two ways: one form of it was "proprement intellectuelle," the knowledge gained by the Spirit in faith, which frees the believer from the fatalism which shut up the individual to sin; the other form was the direct vision which destroyed the flesh and changed the elect. The essay suffers from a failure to realise how *cognitio* did not really carry with it, for pagans, any specific thought of a relation to a personal deity.

Professor Troeltsch's succinct article in the *Encyclopædia* on Historiography restates some of his well-known ideas on the relation of history to religion. The narrower problem of the relation of the historical element to the Biblical narrative is discussed by Professor Peake in the course of

¹ In a thoughtful paper on "The Evolution and Survival of Primitive Thought," reprinted from *Essays and Studies presented to William Ridgway*, Mr S. A. Cook (pp. 30 ff.) aptly uses the re-emergence of mystical phenomena to illustrate his thesis. The comparative study of mysticism, he points out, suggests "a fundamental relationship between the most primitive of existing totemic cults and the most advanced of the historic religions." This is particularly true of magic and the Eucharist.

his singularly useful and sagacious book on *The Bible* (Hodder & Stoughton), which is a scholar's account of the value which the Bible in the light of modern criticism may be held to possess for the Church. Along with this English monograph we may class the penetrating essay by Kessler in the *Studien und Kritiken* (1914, pp. 247 f.) on "Die Bibel und die Begriffe: Geschichte, Mythos, Offenbarung." Professor Peake, in his seventeenth chapter, does not deal at large with the eschatology of the Gospels; but this is handled by Dr Latimer Jackson in his Hulsean lectures on *The Eschatology of Jesus* (Macmillan), a conscientious and readable attempt to introduce some methods of recent German criticism to his fellow-Anglicans, and to estimate, pretty much along the lines followed by Dr Winstanley, the permanent value of the eschatology of Jesus. In the closing chapter he pleads for reasonable liberty of criticism within the confessional bounds of the creeds. On the other hand, Bishop Chase, who has reprinted an essay on *The Gospels in the Light of Historical Criticism* (Macmillan), adds a new preface in which he hints that a bishop may be compelled to deal strictly with a student whose views of Jesus repudiate "the specific statements and the general tenour of the Apostles' Creed." The strained feelings between various parties and the authorities in the English Church reappear in two other books which lie before us. One of these, by Mr C. L. Marston, on *God's Co-operative Society* (Longmans), is the sort of cross-bench production which forces the reader to ask whether in these latter days so-called "Catholics" have jettisoned the command, *Thou shalt not speak evil of the rulers of thy people*. As Mr Marston assumes that "the Church has the right to contradict the Bible," this probably would not trouble him very much. His little book shows how bad temper leads to bad taste, and spoils whatever good case an ardent High Church social reformer may have against things and bishops in general. It is very different with Father Bull's *The Revival of the Religious Life* (Arnold). Father Bull, like Mr Marston and others, makes up for insisting on episcopal ordination as essential to the ministry by cheerfully scoffing at episcopal dignitaries. He derides the Church of England as a national entity, "the Erastian establishment with its Privy Council Law administered by the nominees of the Prime Minister." But his anger and sorrow are due to a passionate belief in the heroic mission of the Church, and this is what makes his pages attractive even to those who cannot share his enthusiasm for monks and the celibate life. By "religious" life he means "a corporate life under Rule," not a life of personal devotion. He sketches and criticises the history of monasticism, but his chief aim is to urge the need of Religious Orders in the Church of England, in order to cope with the problems of evangelisation and education at home and abroad.

I have taken the sixth volume of Dr Hastings' *Encyclopædia* as the framework of this survey, since it meets often the needs of people who, like the Irish writer, feel "bothered entirely by the want of preliminary information" about a topic, and contains work of fundamental importance for the study of comparative and positive religion in its various branches.

The value of the *Encyclopædia* becomes more and more evident as each volume appears. It is perhaps superfluous to offer any suggestions to the distinguished editor upon the scope and method of his great task, but I venture to offer one or two. One is, that while he cannot be expected to include everything, or to make this a biographical dictionary, we would have been glad to have had articles, *e.g.*—in this volume—on people like Gratry, Hilary of Poitiers, Francis of Assisi (but perhaps he is to come under the rubric of Religious Orders), and Francis de Sales; they are surely as relevant as Heine, Herodotus, and Hooliganism. Another is, that in future the bibliographies might be improved. Accurate and adequate bibliographies are of very high importance for study, and in this volume the bibliographies are not always up to date or full enough. Thus, *e.g.*, the articles on Free Thought omit any reference to Professor Bury's recent monograph; the articles on Heredity (which are excellent) ignore Professor Arthur Thomson's work; the article on the Apocryphal Gospels fails to notice the discovery of the large fragments of the Gospel of Bartholomew or the very important monograph of Schmidtke; Troeltsch's bibliography on "Historiography" is only a note of a few German works; and the article on the Hyksos omits any reference to the results of the recent excavations at Heliopolis. There are many such omissions. The articles on Comparative Religion and Folk-lore are usually blameless in this respect; it is generally the theological articles which are the defaulters. A third suggestion, which may be offered in no carping spirit, relates to specific statements, which ought to be verified or modified. Thus, in an article on the Christian idea of Forgiveness, which is not otherwise distinguished by sound exegesis, Dr Cobb asserts that "justification" is a term "which bulks largely in the New Testament, especially in Romans, Galatians, and Hebrews"! One of the characteristic features of Hebrews is that this term does not occur. Again, in the article on the Greek and Roman idea of Friendship, Mr Stock tells us that there is "no word on friendship" in Marcus Aurelius. There are at least ten, no fewer than five in the first book of his *Meditations*, including the famous remark that he had learned from Severus to "believe I am loved by my friends"—a lesson, by the way, which George Eliot found it so hard to learn ("I can't help losing belief that people love me—the unbelief is in my nature, and no sort of fork will drive it finally out"). Similarly, Dr Ottley would not have written (p. 779a) that hope "cannot be said to have a place in heathen ethics," if he had read Professor Butcher's essay on "The Melancholy of the Greeks"; and his article misses entirely that importance of eschatology for a critical valuation of the New Testament doctrine of hope, which Dr H. R. Mackintosh recognises in his opening study of Christian eschatology (*Expositor*, February, pp. 111 f.). Mr Stock's article on Hermes Trismegistus also fails to notice the discussions by Professor Granger (in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, vols. v. and viii.) and Dr Zielinski (in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, viii.—ix.).

JAMES MOFFATT.

A SOCIAL SURVEY.

SOCIAL THEORY.

Notes on Politics and History (Macmillan, 2s. 6d. net), a revision of the address which Lord Morley delivered as Chancellor of the Manchester University last year, is a political philosophy in little, combining the profound and mellow wisdom and serene calm of mature experience with a youthful faith and hope. The clarifying of thought on public questions will be greatly assisted by the issue of several new journals. The first number of *The Political Quarterly* (Oxford University Press) has a suggestive article by Mr A. D. Lindsay on "The State in Recent Political Theory." Doubtless, though a painful, it will be a salutary process for the protagonists of politics, science, and literature to have Mr Thomas Gibson Bowles and his collaborators ruthlessly probing their vitals in *The Candid Quarterly Review* (Garratt, 5s. net). Another venture which will interest many who were not born in the Principality is *The Welsh Outlook* (Cardiff: The Welsh Outlook Press, 3d. net), a monthly which will concern itself with national social progress. A word of praise must be reserved for the sociological supplement (31st January) to *The Athenæum*, characterised by the same candour and competence which have marked that journal during its seventy years of life.

In the field of pure economics a stimulating volume is *The Economics of Enterprise* (Macmillan, 10s. net), by H. J. Davenport, Professor at the University of Missouri. Writing as a conservative in economic theory, he sees "the need of a new economics," and the underlying spirit of the book is crystallised in the following paragraph: "It is for someone to construct an economic science adapted not only to the requirements of the facts, but to the needs of their amelioration. To this end economics must cease to be a system of apologetics, the creed of the reactionary, a defence of privilege, a social soothing syrup, a smug pronouncement of the righteousness of whatever is—with the still more disastrous corollary of the unrighteousness of whatever is not. The facts which are and the facts which are to be, are equally in need of economic categories to fit them. If the programme of social progress does not harmonise with the existing economic science, something is the matter with one or with both. It is in the conviction that the fault is with the economics that this book

has been written." A brief but extremely clear and readable explanation of the causes of economic welfare is *Wealth* (P. S. King, 3s. 6d. net), by Professor Edwin Cannan. A specific economic question is ably treated in *Die Lohntheorien, von Ad. Smith, Ricardo, J. S. Mill, und Marx* (München and Leipzig: Düncker and Humblot, 3 marks), by Dr Ferdinand Graf von Degenfeld-Schonburg. Another question, hotly debated in every industrial country, is discussed with full knowledge in *Löhne und Lebenskosten in Westeuropa (Frankreich, England, Spanien, Belgien)* (same publishers, 8 marks), by Dr Carl von Tyszka. An interesting scheme, which by and by will react on economic and social theory and experiment, is on foot to establish at Oxford a permanent memorial to one of the sanest and most far-seeing of social workers. *Barnett House*, if the scheme succeeds, will be (1) the home of social and economic studies at the University; (2) the headquarters of the Committee established in 1911 to link Oxford with the various University settlements and other organisations for social work in different parts of the country; (3) a centre for the work of the Oxford Tutorial Classes Committee. Mr Sidney Ball, St John's College, is chairman of the provisional committee which has the scheme in hand.

American Ideals, Character, and Life (Macmillan, 6s. 6d. net.), by H. W. Mabie, is a series of addresses delivered under the auspices of the Carnegie Peace Endowment to audiences in Japan, Korea, and Manchuria. The social aspirations of present-day Americans are those which are shared by the best men in all sects and parties in every Western country. The test of faith is no longer the acceptance of a formula, and religion is estimated in terms of social service. We hope it is true, as Professor Mabie says, that Americans to-day "have undertaken to reorganise their business so as to bring it into accord with the spirit of their institutions and with the Christian ethics they profess." Some notable American achievements are described in *Labor and Administration* (Macmillan, 7s. net), by Professor J. R. Commons, of the University of Wisconsin, whose motto is, "Utilitarianism, idealism, constructive research, class partnership, administrative efficiency." The book abounds in all manner of useful and practical suggestions, and describes mainly what has been done in that laboratory of social experiment, the State of Wisconsin. *The Governance of England*, by Sidney Low (Fisher Unwin, 3s. 6d. net), which has become a classic, has appeared in a revised edition with a new introduction. In *The King's Government: a Study of the Growth of the Central Administration* (Bell & Sons, 2s. net), Mr R. H. Gretton, in a bright and readable survey of recent administrative tendencies, shows that since the Reform Bill government means "an organisation for carrying on continuously all sorts of accommodations, conveniences, ameliorations of the daily life, the daily work and business of the public at large."

In England, with regard to problems of education as with regard to those of land, there is a considerable amount of agreement even among political opponents. *The Schools and Social Reform* (The Report of the Unionist Social Reform Committee on Education), by S. J. G. Hoare, M.P.

(Murray: 6d. net), advocates a national settlement and denounces the waste of bad health, of misdirected teaching, and of child-labour, without overlooking the evil of bad marriages, bad houses, and insufficient pay. *A National System of Education* (Cambridge University Press, 2s. 6d. net), by J. H. Whitehouse, M.P., which in general represents the view of English Liberals interested in education, is a plea for the raising of the school-leaving age, for the abolition of half-time, and for control of the education and wage-earning hours of adolescents.

The general position of women is discussed from opposite points of view in (1) *The Vocation of Woman* (Macmillan, 4s. 6d. net), by Mrs Archibald Colquhoun, the ablest and most temperate statement in English of the anti-feminist position; and (2) *Conflicting Ideals: Two Sides of the Woman's Question* (Murby, 1s. 6d. net), by B. J. Hutchins, a careful analysis of the ideal of social life imbibed by a child and young girl brought up under Victorian conditions, as opposed to the ideal of economic independence followed by the modern professional woman. *The New Statesman* special supplement on Women in Industry (21st February 1914) is a most valuable statement of the facts with regard to women's wages, women's trade union organisations, and women's position under the recently established English Trade Boards.

A notable contribution to the knowledge that will be required to solve English land problems is *A Pilgrimage of British Farming, 1910-1912* (Murray, 5s.), by Mr A. D. Hall, a scientific expert of the highest authority, who thinks that the British agricultural industry is on the whole prosperous, and that revolutionary changes are not needed, though he is strongly in favour of co-operative marketing and purchase, and of improved methods of farming. Of no less importance is *An Agricultural Faggot* (P. S. King, 5s. net), by R. H. Rew, which is full of exact information about the national food supply, agricultural co-operation, the migration of labourers, and even on seldom-discussed themes like the social habits of the modern farmer. *The Colonisation of Rural Britain*, by Jesse Collings (Rural World Publishing Co., 10s. 6d. net), advocates occupying ownership by enabling tenants to become owners, and by establishing peasant proprietorship on co-operative lines. *The Rural Problem* (Constable, 2s. 6d. net), by H. D. Harben, expounds the Fabian policy of a minimum wage for labourers, afforestation, a State service of railways and motors, credit banks, co-operative raising and distribution of farm produce. *The Land Problem* (Collins: The Nation's Library, 1s. net), by "Home Counties," conveys a great deal of useful information, carefully and judiciously brought together, in the short space of two hundred and fifty clearly and brightly written pages. *Problems of Village Life* (Williams & Norgate, 1s. net.) is a vigorous though rather partisan plea for a minimum wage, the compulsory provision of cottages, and for a land policy which will ultimately lead to nationalisation.

An obvious trend of modern industry is discussed in *The Tendency towards Industrial Combination* (Constable, 6s. net), by G. R. Carter, who

maintains that the present-day tendency to centralisation and concentration is (1) the natural and almost normal development of a new form of business organisation to meet modern conditions of industry and commerce, and (2) a natural reaction against the unbridled operation of the competitive system and extreme individualism. It is curious to find that by combination Mr Carter merely means combination among employers, and that there is hardly any reference in his book to labour and trade unions, factors which surely cannot be ignored in any penetrating or comprehensive treatment of industrial tendencies. Two admirable little books are *Co-operation and Co-Partnership* (Collins, 1s. net), by L. L. Price, and *Co-Partnership and Profit-Sharing* (Williams & Norgate, 1s. net), by Aneurin Williams. *Unemployment* (Williams & Norgate, 1s. net), by Professor A. C. Pigou, analyses various causes of unemployment, but leaves untouched the most important of all, viz. that the modern competitive system of commerce and industry will not work without a reserve of labour.

SOCIAL EXPERIMENT.

The International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, convened by the British Government last autumn, has unanimously recommended that (1) an ice patrol service under the control of the United States should be established in the North Atlantic to observe the action of currents and to destroy dangerous derelicts; (2) all vessels travelling on international voyages and having more than fifty passengers on board shall be equipped with wireless telegraphy; (3) there must be accommodation in lifeboats or their equivalents for all persons on board. The International Association for Labour Legislation is endeavouring, for the moment unsuccessfully, to secure an international agreement to limit the hours of women and young persons to ten per day, and to prohibit altogether the night-work of boys. Sir George Askwith's Report on the working of the Conciliation Act during the year 1913 shows that both employers and employed show an increasing willingness to take advantage of the opportunities of bringing about industrial peace. *Insurance and the State*, by W. F. Gephart (Macmillan, 5s. 6d. net), is a reasonable statement of the pros and cons of the question of a State monopoly of insurance. Italy, the canton of Neuchâtel, and Wisconsin have a public monopoly of life insurance, and there are similar examples elsewhere. Sir John Collie, one of the greatest British authorities on legal and industrial medicine, speaking recently on the panel system in connection with the Insurance Act, declared that a State medical service was inevitable.

The need for exact information on the multifarious forms of modern municipal activity will be met, so far as England is concerned, by the recent decision of the London County Council to publish a statistical survey of British towns and a volume of comparative municipal statistics on the lines of those published by the municipal authorities of Paris, Berlin, and Vienna. Such surveys will help (1) to ascertain whether

economies can be effected by a yearly comparison of the cost of municipal services, and (2) to increase efficiency. Chapter XIII. of Professor Common's *Labor and Administration*, already mentioned, describes a successful experiment inaugurated by the Milwaukee City Council during the Socialist régime from 1910 to 1912. A Bureau of Economy was established to overhaul the work of all the executive departments, and to eliminate waste of time and money. The effect of various social experiments in England can now be to some extent tested by experience. During 1913 the 423 Board of Trade Labour Exchanges filled 921,853 vacancies out of 2,965,893 registrations. *The Seventh Report of the Central Unemployed Body for London* (P. S. King: 1s. net) records the fact that applications received were 50 per cent. under the average for eight years, and the percentage of cases assisted was higher than ever before. Nevertheless, in a year of unprecedented industrial prosperity 15,773 persons, nearly all with dependants, came for assistance. *The First Year's Working of the Liverpool Docks Scheme*, by R. Williams (Liverpool Economic and Statistical Society), shows that during a year of busy trade over 30 per cent. of the men received 15s. a week or less when working.

Even without the suffrage, women are winning their way to a position of equality with men. A woman judge has been appointed to the Juvenile Court at Chicago. In Berlin, notwithstanding the Imperial opinion that woman's chief concern is with *Kinder, Küche, and Kirche*, a financial journal edited and for the most part written by women has been started in January last, as the organ of the Berlin Frauenbank, all of whose directors and clients are women. More wonderful still, the Government of Turkey has decided to admit women to the university, and courses of lectures are being specially arranged for them on domestic science, hygiene, gynecology, and—the position of women!

Child Labour in the United Kingdom, by F. Keeling (King, 7s. 6d. net), is a lucid and exhaustive study, prepared for the International Association for Labour Legislation, of the development and administration of the law relating to children employed outside the Factory and Mines Acts. *Rearing an Imperial Race* (St Catherine Press, Norfolk Street, Strand, 7s. 6d. net) is a mine of useful information about social experiments both in England and abroad with regard to the physical well-being of poor children during the years they are at school. The Order of the Local Government Board, issued on 31st December last, which excludes children from workhouses, is an important step in the right direction, and one that was scandalously overdue. *Young Delinquents* (Methuen, 3s. 6d. net), by Mary G. Barnett, is an account of reformatory and industrial schools in Great Britain, with suggestions for the solution of the problems which they involve. "The Little Commonwealth," a self-governing colony for young delinquents of both sexes, established only a year ago in Dorsetshire, has already achieved great success. One girl, a skilful shoplifter who had been committed to it as incorrigible, has already served her second term as judge. It has been found also that the sensible, business-like relations between the boys and

girls has checked the growth of a morbid or corrupt sex-consciousness. France has instituted a system of Children's Courts, modelled largely on American ideas, which came into operation on 4th March. Paris, but not the provinces, is favoured with a special president, judges, and a public prosecutor chosen from magistrates who have specialised in children's cases.

Interest in the housing of the masses continues to increase. *The Garden City*, by C. B. Purdom (J. M. Dent, 10s. 6d. net), is a readable and splendidly illustrated account of the aims and activities of Letchworth. The original purpose was to improve individual housing, not to build an artistic town. The municipality of Paris will erect for occupation not later than June 1915 cheap and hygienic dwellings for 60,000 persons at present living under unsanitary conditions. Spain has also a scheme for workmen's dwellings. In a suburb of Seville three groups of three-storied houses are being constructed, each containing accommodation for thirty families, an artesian well sunk on the premises, and a cinematograph for educational purposes. So much has recently been heard of the pernicious effects of the last-named invention that it is well to remember for what useful purposes it has been, and still more in the future will be, employed. Cinematograph films have been used not only as illustrations of surgical operations and for other scientific demonstrations, but as aids to scientific investigation. A Danish savant is trying to record the aurora borealis in motion upon the celluloid film. The cinema has been used as a means of studying certain industrial processes (like the testing of Sheffield steel), of teaching lip-reading to the deaf, of giving instruction in motor-bus driving, of exposing fraudulent spiritualist mediums, and of identifying people wanted by the police. Lastly, the "Okó" machine, the whole outfit of which, including appliances for developing and printing, is as light and compact as a snapshot camera, not only takes cinema photographs, but projects them on the screen, so that everybody of moderate means and leisure can make and exhibit his own films, and teachers can secure pictures of any subject they desire and show them in the ordinary class-room. The educational potentialities of the cinematograph are to be investigated by an International Committee which has recently been formed in London.

A valuable account of the personalities of some reformers, not so well known as their high character and intelligence deserved, is to be found in *Working Men Co-operators* (Co-operative Union, Manchester, 10d.), by Benjamin Jones and A. Dyke Acland, which has been revised on behalf of the Central Education Committee of the Society by Miss J. P. Madams. Another quietly forceful personality, whose merits ought to be more generally appraised, has had justice done to him in *The Life of Edward A. Moseley in the Service of Humanity* (Macmillan, 8s. 6d. net), by Jas. Morgan. Moseley, who, as he said himself, devoted his "life to the man with the patched trousers," was chiefly responsible for the introduction of the Safety Appliances Act, employers' liability, and the limitation of the hours of labour in America.

R. P. FARLEY.

(British Institute of Social Service.)

REVIEWS

Essays on Truth and Reality.—By F. H. Bradley.—Oxford :
Clarendon Press, 1914.—Pp. xvi + 480.

MR BRADLEY tells us in a short preface that he had intended to rewrite these essays and present them as a formal treatise on the nature and criterion of knowledge, truth, and reality. Everyone will sympathise with the author in the reason, his delicate health, which has prevented the fulfilment of this design, but everyone also will rejoice in the possession of these most valuable essays not merely collected in a volume but arranged with the special purpose of developing a continuous argument. It will also be welcome news to Mr Bradley's readers that he hopes to republish those early works which have long been eagerly sought for in booksellers' catalogues. Whilst sharing the disappointment he feels that he is not able to undertake the task he has so longed to perform of rewriting the *Principles of Logic*, some of us think, with at least one famous historical instance in mind, that philosophers are apt to underestimate the value of their early work. One thing at least is certain, the increasing devotion to metaphysical inquiry, and the wide interest in philosophy that is so striking a feature of our generation, is in no small degree due to the influence of Mr Bradley's writings. When the historian of our modern intellectual development takes stock of the remarkable awakening of interest in philosophy, *Appearance and Reality* will seem to mark its beginning and, to no small extent, to have determined its direction.

The main purpose of the book before us may be described as a restatement of the doctrine of *Appearance and Reality* in the general light of the criticism it has received, and a reaffirmation of its claim to present a reasonable view of the universe. The Introduction is new, and was written for the formal treatise that Mr Bradley originally designed, and with the two chapters which follow it, entitled "Faith" and "On Floating Ideas and the Imaginary," it gives us a vigorous exposition of the metaphysical principle that reality is the whole as a perfect individual experience. The three following chapters, on "Truth and Practice," "Truth and Copying," and "The Ambiguity of Pragmatism," form, with an introductory note, a division by themselves, and present to us Mr

Bradley's attitude towards the Pragmatist controversy. This is followed by an important chapter on "Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience," to which is added an appendix on "Consciousness and Experience," published twenty years ago, but of present interest as a criticism of certain views put forward by Dr J. Ward. The three chapters that follow, on "Truth and Coherence," "Coherence and Contradiction," "Appearance, Error, and Contradiction," also form a division by themselves, and deal with some fundamental criticisms directed against Mr Bradley's doctrine, chiefly in the writings of Mr Bertrand Russell and Mr G. F. Stout. This is the most difficult part of the book, and will probably be quite unintelligible to the reader who does not look up the references. Whoever does will be well rewarded, particularly if his delight is in dialectic, for it is here that Mr Bradley displays his amazing logical skill. Let those who enjoy a subtle argument turn, for example, to the discussion of "Class" with Mr Russell on page 283, and also to the note on page 253. The chapters on "Some Aspects of Truth," "Memory and Inference," and "Memory and Judgment" are republished articles which deal especially with Mr Bradley's doctrine of the logical principle in judgment. The last three, entitled "What is the Real Julius Cæsar?" "God and the Absolute," and "My Real World," are, with the concluding remarks, entirely new. They gather together the whole argument and distinctly advance the author's philosophical position, showing it to rest on a broader and firmer basis than it has ever before appeared to occupy.

I propose to do no more than note the controversial portions, not because they are less—they may be more—important than the direct argument, and certainly not because I would advise any reader to omit them—is it not often in controversy that the true inwardness of a doctrine is revealed?—but for two sufficient reasons. First, that to be fair to a controversial statement you must let each side speak for itself—it is this that makes a symposium, in which the writers present their case, each with reference to the others, so valuable; when you cannot have this you are bound to look up references and compare contexts. And, secondly, because contradiction or negation is of small value in comparison with positive statement. We may notice, then, that there is a marked difference in Mr Bradley's attitude towards Pragmatism and towards those other critics whom we have named. Pragmatism proclaimed a new gospel, an emancipation from some kingdom of darkness which it called intellectualism, and Mr Bradley's insistent demand is for explanation, for more light, for less shouting and heralding of the new era and for more cool reasoning. It is sad that the great mind who called forth the enthusiasm for and was the intellectual force behind pragmatism, William James, was lost to us by death before he could devote himself to reply to the challenge here personally addressed to him.

It is very likely that but for *Appearance and Reality* there would have been no pragmatism, or, at least, that the form and direction the movement took would have been very different. If logical advance is

through contradiction, and contradiction is implicit in the very affirmation itself, then we may see in Pragmatism the antithesis to Mr Bradley's thesis, the doctrine of reality in *Appearance and Reality*, and this may be the reason why the counter assertion was so emphatic. But it is hard to explain the strange perversity by which a doctrine that so decidedly rejected the bold saying, "The real is the rational," that declared intellect to be but a partial aspect of reality, that affirmed a felt whole of experience before thought, and sought ultimate reality in the satisfaction of an individual felt whole beyond thought—the Absolute as a perfect experience—should have been named intellectualism, and that intellectualism and absolutism should have been employed as convertible terms. In the light of this present book it must seem more than ever surprising. For what is Mr Bradley's doctrine? It is that every partial aspect of life shows imperfection inherent in it. Everything is subordinate to the Good, and the Good is that which finally satisfies, that which gives contentment and suppresses unrest. This final satisfaction is not to be found in the Hedonist principle of pleasure, nor in practical activity, nor in beauty, nor in knowledge, nor in love. Each of these has goodness, yet in none is goodness supreme, in none is satisfaction absolute. And this contention leads to his characteristic doctrine: "Philosophy demands, and in the end it rests on, what may fairly be termed faith. It has, we may say, in a sense to presuppose its conclusion in order to prove it." This is the logical ground of the Absolute; let us see its application. What are the limits of the real world—of my real world? In ordinary experience I identify reality with my world of actual fact, by which I mean the world which is continuous with my body, the construction that I build in time and space round my present, that is, my end waking moment. That is real, and outside it floats the unsubstantial realm of the imaginary. But this is a false assumption, false in the meaning that it will not work. None of my ideas merely float; all in some way qualify reality. If it is otherwise, reality is reduced to a pure abstraction, a present point without duration. Past and future are excluded, for theirs is not the reality of actual existence, and with their exclusion follows also art and science, morality and religion. No one does exclude, and no one can exclude, his ideas from reality. The worlds of politics, commerce, trade and manufacture, not to speak of poetry and imaginative art, are for each of us real. But to what reality are these ideas attached? In the end, to the Universe, to the Absolute reality as an all-inclusive whole. In what mode does this reality exist? Mr Bradley replies that it exists in finite centres, and that outside these finite centres, which are the appearances of the Absolute, there is no reality. The Absolute is not something over and above and beyond our individual lives; it is these individual lives carried out to their complete fulfilment. The doctrine that reality only exists in finite centres is insisted on with particular earnestness in the present work—it is almost, one might say, its main contention; and on it ultimately rests the theory of truth. You cannot by any possible means separate the nature of truth

from the nature of reality, for truth is the ideal aspect of reality—it is reality as it exists in knowledge.

"The Universe is one Reality which appears in finite centres." This is the theme which is handled with extraordinary skill in the most striking chapter in the book, entitled "What is the Real Julius Cæsar?" The title is afforded by a quotation from Mr Russell which asserts, Mr Bradley tells us, the opposite of what appears evident to him. Mr Russell assumes, he says, that of any judgment he makes about Julius Cæsar, Julius Cæsar is not himself a constituent. Here, then, we have in its most direct form the problem of truth and reality, in the difference, if any, that there may be between the real and ideal Cæsar. And the problem, for Mr Bradley, resolves itself into the question, What is the relation of a finite centre of experience to other centres and to the whole? It would be obviously impossible to give even an account of the important argument in a brief notice of the whole book, but we cannot leave it without calling attention to the perfect frankness with which Mr Bradley here and elsewhere warns us that we are concerned with a problem that does not admit of solution. In the end it is not intelligible and therefore not explicable. But this does not and should not deter us. Mr Bradley feels as all philosophers must feel, that a universe which could be made perfectly intelligible to a finite understanding would be so poor a thing that it would not be worth understanding. "The complete experience which would supplement our ideas and make them perfect is in detail beyond our understanding." It is this frank recognition which gives the note of scepticism that so many people think they discern in Mr Bradley's philosophy.

Truth, then, for Mr Bradley, is the ideal aspect of reality. Truth and reality are inseparable aspects of one whole. Truth does not therefore stand over against reality; it differs from reality by falling short of it in the same way that the part falls short of the whole. Were truth finally satisfied by the addition to it of what it lacks, it would be reality. There are therefore degrees of truth as there are degrees of reality. "Reality for me is one individual experience. It is a higher unity above our immediate experience, and above all ideality and relations. It is above thought and will and æsthetic perception. But, though transcending these modes of experience, it includes them all fully. Such a whole is Reality, and, as against this whole, truth is merely ideal. It is indeed never a mere idea, for certainly there are no mere ideas. It is Reality appearing and expressing itself in that one-sided way which we call ideal. Hence, truth is identical with Reality in the sense that, in order to perfect itself, it would have to become Reality. On the other side, truth, while it is truth, differs from Reality, and, if it ceased to be different, would cease to be true" (p. 343).

In the two chapters on Memory we see the application of Mr Bradley's principle to a special problem. The problem of memory is to him the problem of ideal construction. Whatever be the fact of memory, whatever be its origin in the felt experience of the individual, in knowledge it involves ideal construction. No recollection merely floats or comes to the

mind as a detached idea. A remembered event is attached to present consciousness by a series of events which may not, and in most cases cannot, have formed part of our actual experience. These events are ideally constructed or, as we say, inferred. What is our guiding principle in this logical process of inference? This is Mr Bradley's problem of memory. In regard to it I would like to give a personal impression not as a criticism but for what it is worth. In reading the chapter on "Memory and Inference" there comes back to me the vivid recollection of the effect the argument produced on me when I read it on its first appearance fifteen years ago. It seemed to prove that all reality was ideal construction, and its effect was to deepen my scepticism. It strikes me differently now—not that the logical argument has less force, but that the whole point of interest of the problem has shifted. It is impossible now to regard the problem of memory as purely a logical one, and this is due to a distinct advance in knowledge, mainly the result of the remarkable success of the new method of studying abnormal psychology. Memories are for the new psychology no longer merely personal and individual recollections, but psychical realities as stubborn and as active as any physical realities. It would be easy to make too much of this, and I do not pretend that it invalidates Mr Bradley's argument. Some may say it has no bearing on it, but it is no longer possible to regard memory as a clear case in point of a reality that involves or depends upon ideal construction and nothing else.

One final question will be present to most readers as they study this book. What is Mr Bradley's attitude to the concept of change or becoming? Original change or becoming has not only been recently proclaimed anew as the ultimate principle in philosophy, but the principle is modifying profoundly the older scientific theories in biology and also in physics and mathematics. "The Universe contains change, but the Universe itself cannot change" (p. 411, note). This to Mr Bradley appears essential to his concept of the Absolute. This also is his reason for refusing to identify God with the Absolute. In making the Absolute the object of religion you thereby transform it. It has become forthwith something that is less than the Universe. A personal God is a God with external relations, and therefore something within the Universe; less than the Universe, and therefore imperfect. This is the antinomy in the religious consciousness—the object of worship is a God who must be and who cannot be perfect.

The book concludes with the alternative,—if you reject the Absolute as a vain idol, you must set up in its place some abstraction, change itself, if you will, and declare that this is the only reality of things and all else illusion; and then, where else but in the real universe does this illusion fall?

We may conclude our notice by quoting a passage which occurs early in the book, and with which all Mr Bradley's readers, whatever their differences, will agree: "Philosophy always will be hard, and what it

promises even in the end is no clear theory nor any complete understanding or vision. But its certain reward is a continual evidence and a heightened apprehension of the ineffable mystery of life, of life in all its complexity and all its unity and worth" (p. 106).

H. WILDON CARR.

LONDON.

All Men are Ghosts.—By L. P. JACKS.—London: Williams & Norgate, 1913.—Pp. 360.

BECAUSE of the hardness of men's hearts and the slowness of their understanding, the teachers of mankind are always tempted, sooner or later, to veil their meaning in parables, and to tell their audience a story instead of expounding a doctrine. They not infrequently succeed thereby in enlarging their popular appeal, without giving offence to the learned; for even pedants have found it a congenial pastime to interpret parables, and to debate the precise meaning and function of, say, a Platonic "myth." But there is always a danger that the world will swallow the story without assimilating the doctrine. I will not, therefore, attempt to review as literature Professor Jacks's stories (excellent as they are), nor add to the chorus of praise which they have elicited as such; I will discuss rather the very interesting doctrine of which I conceive them to be the vehicle. I do so with the greater gusto that I can conceive them also as illustrating doctrines I have been scientifically expounding for over twenty years (without ever eliciting a word of comment from those whom they concerned professionally), and as expressing an attitude towards life which follows logically from the profoundest philosophy and has been recommended by all the religions. And yet I greatly doubt whether by so doing I shall be doing Professor Jacks a service. The very fact that what seems so novel in his attitude is really of the hoariest antiquity shows that his ideas challenge stubborn prejudices which have always found them repugnant, and compensated for a nominal acceptance by practical neglect. When, therefore, Professor Jacks's real meaning is clearly grasped, I fear that the prophet will be stoned—as usual.

The two lessons Professor Jacks wishes us to take to heart and really live by are, (1) that "Illusion is an integral part of Reality" (p. 123), *i.e.* reality is *literally* "of such stuff as dreams are made of," and (2) that *therefore* there is *literal* truth in the belief in the supremacy of Spirit. Now, the first doctrine means, not so much that we are unreal as that "dreams" also are real, and that there are no real means of *theoretically* discriminating between their reality and that of ordinary reality, because the difference between them is *practical*, and a difference of value; the second, that the formula, "reality is ultimately spiritual," is not to remain the pale abstraction of a phrase, but to apply to the inmost life of every one of us. Both, plainly, are hard sayings for the commonplace. Con-

jointly, moreover, they generate the corollary that not only may there be a future life for every Spirit that has spirit enough to go on, but that already past, present, and future interpenetrate, and that "worlds without end lie enfolded one within another, like the petals of a rose" (p. 148), as we could see if only we had the courage to open our eyes and to look at the facts of our personal experience instead of at the convenient fictions by which they are standardised and classified.

Now, all these doctrines are of the most venerable antiquity. The first underlies the great Hindu doctrine of *Maya*. In the West it is first recorded by Plato in the *Theatetus* 158. He recognised its difficulty, and it has been recognised as a "difficulty" ever since, by an interminable succession of philosophers who have dreamt away their lives without ever finding any "valid proof" that *their* "realities" were not dreams. It dominates the life of every child, until he becomes able to distinguish practically between dream, fancy, and illusion and waking experience. The second has been orthodox Idealism since Plato. The corollary has been passionately emphasised, in one form or another, by every religion worthy of the name.

But has the world behaved as if it believed in any of the three? Not a bit of it. On the contrary, it has taken care to reduce them all to unreality and sterilised them so that they bear no fruits for life. For of course they are disturbing doctrines, and unsuited to the taste of philistines who wish for a quiet life and do not want to see abysses opening out before them at every step. Accordingly, it is an understood thing that when a philosopher speaks of "reality" it is of a tamed reality which has been rationally doped and purged of all reference to hallucination, dream, illusion, and madness, and that the Idealist's dictum about the "spirituality" of all reality is not to make the slightest difference to life or science, and to be perfectly compatible with the complete materiality of everybody. Similarly, the religions must not be allowed to mean that life is a perpetual miracle, and the miraculous must be weeded out of them; their utmost possibilities must be authoritatively explored by theologians, and properly catalogued and fixed in Creeds. Thus do philosophic and theological orthodoxies conspire in every age to pander to the timidity of the masses, to multiply the visions of the seers, and to eviscerate their own doctrines of their meaning.

Professor Jacks, however, is a protestant against this policy among theologians, as I have the honour to be among philosophers, and as the Psychological Researchers are among scientists. We have all discovered that the official formulas are empty and unsatisfying. We are consequently in for a battle royal, and can expect no quarter.

But will such minor prophets succeed where the major ones have failed? Will men be persuaded of the imminence of the kingdom of heaven by Professor Jacks, when Jesus and St Paul have failed? Will William James convince the Idealists that a "spirituality" which makes no difference has no meaning? Will the Society for Psychological Research render probable by

experiments the reality of a spirit world Plato could not establish by *a priori* argument? Their success does not look probable, and yet *gutta cavat lapidem*, and truth, as well as reality, grows "dropwise." There are, moreover, some hopeful symptoms. Science, after bullying religion out of all its romances about devils, saints, miracles, heavens, and hells, and reducing it to abject tameness, has of late itself grown very wild and romantic. It has become very critical of the convenient fictions it has hitherto venerated as unquestionable "principles," and seen that their methodological truth needs continual confirmation from experience. It has consequently had its eyes opened to the existence of less convenient alternatives in every direction, and is indulging itself in a gorgeous liberty of theorising which spares neither age nor repute. The result is that "nothing is true" (absolutely) any longer, and "everything is permitted," provided it works, while fixed ideas are everywhere uprooted and cast into the flux. And, worst of all, for those who have got into a groove and wish to stay in it, a growing number of philosophers applaud all this, and say that science is all the better for it! But, whatever happens, it is to be hoped that literature will be enriched further with some more of Professor Jack's parables.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

Pragmatism and Idealism.—By William Caldwell.—London:
A. & C. Black.—Pp. vii + 268.

PROFESSOR CALDWELL enjoys the distinction of having been the first to introduce Pragmatism to the notice of the British public by his paper in *Mind* for October 1900, and he has therefore a right to expect his account of its relation to Idealism to be well received, the more so that there is no other general survey of the controversy which mediates between the extremes, and there are so many moderate men who shrink from going the whole way with Pragmatism, while yet unwilling to shut their eyes and harden their hearts with the older idealists. These, therefore, will welcome Professor Caldwell's book, and all will find it readable and interesting and appreciate his solicitude to hold the balance even between the contending parties, even though it sometimes leads him into apparent contradictions. For example, although on p. 47 he (strangely) speaks of "the impossible breach that exists in Pragmatism between the 'theoretical' and the 'practical,'" this does not prevent him from (correctly) drawing from it the insight that there is "*no rigid separation between theory and practice*" (pp. 93-5).

There are also more serious defects in the plan of the book. It fails to map out clearly the extent of the territories and the issues which are in dispute. Its standpoint is so dominantly metaphysical that it almost completely ignores the psychological and logical motives in Pragmatism. James's great *Psychology*, of which all the doctrines of Pragmatism are only the application to special problems, is hardly mentioned. And it is

hard to believe that if Professor Caldwell had read either Mr D. L. Murray's excellent little *Pragmatism* (which is the only comprehensive survey of Pragmatism from the inside in English), or the logical works of Mr Alfred Sidgwick (whom his index confuses with his cousin Henry), or my own *Formal Logic*, which gives a *catalogue raisonné* of the faults Pragmatism finds in the traditional "logic," he would have allowed his remarks about a "neglect" of logic by Pragmatism to stand on pp. 130-1. He has also been deceived into thinking that the *Essays in Radical Empiricism* represent James's last work simply because they were the last to be republished, and into rejecting them too unreservedly as "a new Humism" (p. 11).

On the other hand, he must be credited with a perception that the great question Pragmatism has raised is "the simple fact of human action and of its significance for philosophy" (p. 93), "the rediscovery of the fact of action" (p. 98), which intellectualism had disregarded (and indeed made unintelligible). He also recognises in full the "humanism" of Pragmatism, and consequently acquits it of the charge of "subjectivism" and "solipsism" (pp. 159 *f.*, 212, but *cf.* p. 261 *n.*), and even condemns Absolutism on this score (pp. 212, 216). He conceives Pragmatism widely enough to include a chapter on Bergson, and to call him "the greatest of the Pragmatists" (which is true only if Pragmatism is essentially a metaphysic), although he seems to understand neither his *durée réelle* nor his doctrine of "images." He also accepts from Schinz the derivation of Pragmatism from "Americanism" (which, however, in a neighbourly Canadian spirit, he approves of), and holds that James could have found no more favourable soil than at Harvard (p. 180). This may be true *academically*, but it is not saying much. For, after all, James had to contend throughout life with the hostility of all his philosophic colleagues, and did not get into Harvard as a philosopher but as a physiologist. Nor has either Professor Schinz or Professor Caldwell attempted to show how the general Americanism of the *people* could get James the entry into the self-coöpting *coterie* of natural "intellectuals" who form the academic caste in every country. But for the accident that the greatest genius America has produced happened to become a professor, there would have been as little *academic* Pragmatism in America as anywhere else. The American temper would (like the British) simply have continued to be flouted in academic circles, to find (intellectualist) "philosophy" unpalatable and unintelligible, and to leave it severely alone. Which is, after all, the attitude of most minds towards the subject everywhere, and of most of the best minds in the Anglo-Saxon world. As a matter of fact, therefore, its supposed conformity with the national temper has been the greatest *obstacle*, not only to the spread, but even to the intelligent appreciation, of Pragmatism. It made Pragmatism such an object of dread and detestation everywhere to all who shared the professorial bias that they completely lost their heads over it. Nothing, *e.g.*, aroused more *furor Teutonicus* at the Heidelberg Congress of Philosophy in 1908 than the harmless historical statement that Pragmatism was a movement of thought which had originated in America.

About the practical problem Pragmatism finally puts to the professor, viz. whether philosophy should remain merely a means of enabling the superior person to feel superior or should attempt to influence the minds of men, Professor Caldwell does not seem to have quite made up his mind (cf. pp. 187, 190, 265). He sees that with the intellectualist conception of philosophy it can never be made palatable to the ordinary man, who does not really need overbeliefs that have no value for life. But he also realises that if philosophy is to survive even as a subject of academic instruction or amusement under these circumstances, it will require a good deal more "protection" than it is likely to get (except perhaps at Oxford).

Passing, lastly, to Professor Caldwell's treatment of Idealism, it is to be noted first that he conceives it both as affirming "the necessary implication" of subject and object (pp. 143, 160 n., 264), and also as "the great doctrine of the sovereignty of the spirit," without perceiving that the latter by no means follows from the former. For, unfortunately, the implication-theory leaves the subject just as dependent on the object as *vice versa*, and only proves their *correlation*. Secondly, Professor Caldwell, being a strong theist, devotes a chapter to a keen criticism of Professor Bosanquet's *Individuality and Value*, which he takes as the high-water mark of absolutistic intellectualism. In this chapter he traces the process by which the terms "individual," "self," "God," "freedom," "morality," etc., are emptied of their ordinary significance, in order that they may be absorbed in the abstract and formal standpoint of a "whole" to which nothing "finite" can possibly attain. If Professor Caldwell had been able to include in his notice Professor Bosanquet's second volume also, he might have been tempted to use even more scathing language about this strangely paradoxical method of "rationalising" the world. And he is probably right in thinking that the modern spirit is more and more turning away from this sort of thing, though it would be sanguine to expect that this will make much difference to academic teaching of philosophy. For it is, after all, only in America that it makes any practical difference to a professor whether his pupils understand and like his doctrine, and that he is thereby forced to bring his theories into something like accord with the requirements of life.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

Mechanism, Life, and Personality.—By J. S. Haldane, M.D., LL.D., F.R.S.
London: John Murray, 1913.—Pp. vi+139.

Continuity.—The British Association Presidential Address, 1913.—Sir Oliver Lodge, D.Sc., F.R.S.—London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1913.
Pp. 118.

Some Intimations of Immortality.—By Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Fry, G.C.B.
London: Williams & Norgate, 1913.—Pp. 35.

THE year 1912 witnessed a rather remarkable output of literature advocating the claims of the mechanistic theory of life. This revival was due to

the growing conviction amongst scientific workers of the worthlessness of vitalism coupled with the recent rapid growth and recognition of the new sciences of bio-chemistry and modern physiology. It is safe to say that the development of these sciences received great impetus from the adoption of the mechanistic theory as a working hypothesis. We have so much yet to learn concerning the mechanism of living things, and the progress already made is so startling, that many workers have succumbed to the temptation of regarding an organism as nothing more than a complex machine. This danger of losing sight of the whole by concentrating attention upon the details is one against which every scientific investigator must be on his guard. In assigning, then, much of the credit for the success of recent biological research to the mechanistic conception, it is necessary to keep in mind that all the experimentation concerned is solely directed towards investigation of the mechanism of living things. The bio-chemist starts fully armed with the resources of his physico-chemical laboratory, with instruments for detecting physical processes and apparatus for determining chemical changes. The working hypothesis decides both the means and the end, which is to unravel the mysteries of the mechanism, and that alone.

The amazing success which the biologist working on these lines has achieved does not, however, warrant him in attempting to construct a philosophy of life upon the results of investigations so strictly limited in their scope. Though he dissect an organism and analyse it down to its very atoms, and so gain complete knowledge of all the physico-chemical changes that occur in it, the organism as such will still remain unexplained, because it transcends a mere integration of its parts. Sir Oliver Lodge, in his address on "Continuity," very justly insists on this point. "If we dogmatise," he says, "in a negative direction and say that we can reduce everything to physics and chemistry, we gibbet ourselves as ludicrously narrow pedants and as falling far short of the richness and fulness of our human birthright."

In his lucid criticism of the mechanistic theory, Dr Haldane emphasises the hopelessness of this doctrine on scientific grounds, as a philosophy of life. "We now know," he says, "that the problem of the process of cell growth and cell nutrition is not one which we have at present any prospect of solving in a mechanistic direction." The résumé which he gives in this connection, of recent progress in physiological investigation, is of great interest. The result of all the marvellous progress in physiological knowledge is, he urges, to show "with ever-increasing clearness that physico-chemical explanations seem to physiologists of the present time far more remote than they appeared at the middle of last century."

During the course of this searching criticism of the mechanistic conception, the rival theory—vitalism, or animism—is also submitted to careful scrutiny, and the author decides that it also is unavailing. It is necessary, however, to be quite clear as to the precise meaning which Dr Haldane attaches to the term vitalism. He evidently does not mean the

which is always seeking to transcend itself. . . . Even in its most perfect works it is at the mercy of the materiality which it has had to assume." Here then is an idea which at least is worth consideration. Physical science, psychic research, theology, philosophy, and Mr Bernard Shaw all point to a limited, guiding, yet struggling power behind and immanent in all phenomena. The fact that it struggles means, of course, that it is experimenting to find the best way of accomplishing its purposes. And experimenting, as every true experimentalist knows, involves frequent failure. Failure, however, need not necessarily mean defeat; it often is an incentive to fresh thought, a stimulus to originality, if the aim and purpose of the experiment is definite and clear. In this sense evolution is a series of experiments by the immanent guiding power which is sometimes in its efforts "diverted from what it should do by what it does." The ultimate object is, surely, the production of a being capable of understanding and of expressing in thought and action the eternal purposes of the transcendent God Himself. Herein lies the germ of a new philosophy—a philosophy not only embracing the conclusions of science (including psychic research and theology), but illuminating the whole with the clear light of spiritual and religious experience.

O. W. GRIFFITH.

CRICKWOOD, LONDON

The Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century.—By Vernon F. Storr, M.A.—London: Longmans, 1913.

THE most marked quality of Canon Storr's learned and important work is its sense of proportion. He is extraordinarily successful in the construction of theological balance-sheets. In dealing with a subject-matter at once wide and varied he is neither superficial nor over-precise. Much is necessarily omitted: but the significant movements and persons are treated with a thoroughness which is more valuable than the multiplication of names. Again, the method of treatment strikes a just balance between the old way of attributing everything to a few outstanding personalities, and the new way of merging all individuals in general and almost unconscious movements of thought. So, too, in dealing with a subject which might easily become either dry or disputatious, Canon Storr is at once scientific and didactic; but he neither bullies nor bores. The book is thoroughly historical. But it is the work of a man who is interested in the past for the sake of the present; and therefore its importance is not merely, or even mainly, historical. Its verdict on the past suggests an interpretation of the present, and a faith as regards the future.

The period covered by the present volume is the first sixty years of the last century: a second volume is promised, carrying the history down to the end of the century. These sixty years were a time of extraordinary importance for the theological and religious history of England. The

eighteenth century had, on the whole, solved the problem of existence to its own satisfaction. It was a constructive age, and built quite a good glass house, considering its very limited resources. The nineteenth century was inundated with new experiences and ideas, which it never quite assimilated. Scattered thinkers tried to piece things together, but only succeeded in being misunderstood by their contemporaries and plagiarised by their successors. Modern Broad Churchmen are thought advanced if they repeat views which were held by Stanley and Jowett, and which they, in their turn, borrowed from Hampden and Arnold. The modern critic finds it dangerous to revive controversies which might almost have been regarded as settled in the days of Huxley, or even of Hume. And a comparative study (such as that of which Canon Storr avails himself) of the series of Bampton Lectures, or even of *Essays and Reviews*, *Lux Mundi*, and *Foundations*, whilst it shows a remarkable advance in many ways, illustrates also the slowness of the Church's mind to accommodate itself to new ideas. The fact is that our experiences have for a long time been outrunning our judgment. We have not been able to deny the experiences, but we have dimly resented the conclusions which hasty people asked us to draw from them. The Church is just now becoming conscious again of questions which were asked it fifty years ago. It remains to be seen whether the twentieth century can find an answer where the nineteenth failed. We have, at any rate, reached a point from which it is possible to form a fair estimate of the two main influences affecting theology in the last century: and the chief value of Canon Storr's book lies in the clearness with which he describes these influences, and the definiteness with which he judges them.

The first was the Critical movement. The seeds of this, as of other nineteenth-century movements, were sown in the eighteenth century. In the course of the Deistic controversy, writers little read to-day, such as Tindal, Middleton, and Woolston, anticipated many of the arguments of modern rationalists and critics. But the world was not ready for them: Paley and Butler (that John Bull in theology) held the field. The growth of the historical spirit, which Canon Storr rightly puts in the forefront of the new influences shaping the thought of the nineteenth century, altered everything. It changed the attitude of the present towards the past. "The historical method arose in reaction against the abstract and artificial manner of writing history prevalent in the eighteenth century. The rationalism of that age was content to move lightly over the surface of events, without caring to explore the deeper causes of change and movement. The writing of history became a matter of the use of abstract formulæ, or shallow generalisations. Of a true sympathetic feeling for the past there was little or none; the past, in fact, was often frankly despised. But the historical method revived the feeling for the past, though it was itself in part created by it. Men began to realise that the past was not entirely past, but was active in a present which had absorbed all that was living in it" (p. 116). The immediate effects of this method in theology were the growth of the science of Biblical criticism, and the application

of the idea of development to Christian doctrine and organisation. But its wider influences were no less important. It revolutionised the notion of authority. It taught that "the present must always be the critic of the past, and that the past can never be imposed upon the present as an authoritative arbiter or standard" (p. 119). More, it began to break down the barriers between the Christian facts and all other facts, between the method of science and the method of faith, which centuries of dogma and devotion had set up. On this point Canon Storr's remarks are of particular value, in view of recent controversies as to the nature and claims of the historical method. "Its claim," he writes, "to interpret history causally and genetically implies the abandonment of the customary antithesis between the natural and the supernatural. The scientific historian feels that he is untrue to his ideal if he excludes any part of history from the operation of the natural forces which govern all historical movements. Traditional theology singled out a particular race and country, and asserted that here was a sphere in which the divine activity worked supernaturally by miracle or special intervention, and that only by conceding this could you explain the history of the Jews, or their peculiar religious achievement. But religion for the historical method is, equally with art or poetry, an expression of the common spirit and character of the race, and must be interpreted by reference to the general conditions, physical, moral, social, political, under which the race developed. Exclude all thought of God, and then all becomes natural. Include God, with Lessing, and then all becomes supernatural. The demand, in other words, is for a self-contained whole, developing by its own inherent powers, and the rejection of the hypothesis of an intermittent divine agency in the background, whose operation could always be invoked to explain something which seemed inexplicable by natural causes. The historical method . . . can come to no terms with the belief in an irregular or occasional supernatural activity" (p. 119). It would be difficult to put more clearly the fundamental principle of modern liberal theology; and the thorough-going acceptance of it by one who has carefully weighed its influence and results during a century of theological development is a fact of great significance. Canon Storr, of course, realises that the antinomy between the historical method and the method of faith is still far from being solved—in theory, at least; for in practice there are plenty of people who find no difficulty in it. "It is," he admits, "a problem for philosophy whether any reconciliation is possible between theology and the method" in regard to the idea of the supernatural (p. 119). And again: "What is needed is some reconciliation between the two [the natural and the supernatural], some definition of Christianity which, while it preserves its uniqueness, shall set it forth in its universal relation to all other faiths. It is in this direction that the deepest theological thought of the time is moving" (p. 158). One more quotation will show the particular problem in which Canon Storr considers that this movement comes to be a head. "It appears to me," he writes, "that all the problems which confront theology to-day are parts of the one

great problem of the place and significance in Christian theology of the Person of Christ. The quarrel between naturalism and supernaturalism comes to a head when His Person is considered. In Him centres the problem of a progressive revelation and a teleology of history. The problem of how to present Christianity as a universal religion will be best met if He is exhibited as capable of satisfying human need, and providing a spiritual power for the regeneration of humanity" (p. 159).

It will be enough to refer to the chapters in which Canon Storr describes the subsidiary parts and consequences of the historical method—the influence of physical science, philosophical idealism, and the French Revolution (ch. viii.); the course of Biblical criticism in Germany (ch. ix.) and in England (ch. x.), the results of the application of Hegelianism to criticism, as seen in Strauss and Baur (ch. xi.–xii.), and the synthesis of all these tendencies in Schleiermacher, "the creator of modern theology" (p. 247), of whose work there is an important criticism and appreciation (ch. xiii.). Throughout these chapters the details are never allowed to obscure the main line of development. We see the century thinking, and thinking in a definite way, towards a definite conclusion.

Then, almost dramatically, a new style of theology comes upon the stage. The Oxford Movement, indeed, was not quite a new thing. The protest against the theologising of religion had been anticipated by the Cambridge Evangelicals, whose theology Newman himself ridiculed in *Loss and Gain*. Not a few of its special doctrines were held by the Early Orthodox party, and can be found in the writings of Alexander Knox, who died in 1831. But, as the historical method progressed, it roused an increasing resentment among the orthodox, and Canon Storr is right in bringing out the fact that the Oxford Movement was essentially a reaction against Liberalism in politics and theology, analogous to the Catholic revival in France under Chateaubriand and Le Maître. Too little, perhaps, is made by our author of the positive side of the movement, regarded as an ecclesiastical, if not a religious, reformation. But it is inevitable that the twentieth century should judge the nineteenth more hardly than it did itself; and we stand far enough off the Tractarian movement, whilst being sufficiently familiar with its later developments, to be able to see its inherent danger and weakness. The most novel and significant part of Canon Storr's book, and the part that is most likely to arouse controversy, is his trenchant criticism of the Oxford Movement.

"The Oxford Movement . . . was an attempt to combat Liberalism in theology, and to set up the authority of the Church as that which alone could provide a principle of order and stability amid the changes which seemed to be threatening the very foundations of the national life" (p. 253). Like Romanticism in literature, it was an appeal to the past. But Romanticism was free, Tractarianism bound to authority. The Romanticist's motive was æsthetic, the Tractarian's (until Pusey did for the Oxford Movement what William Morris did for Pre-Raphaelitism) was logical. But the real weakness of this appeal to the past was that it did not go

with any real attempt to understand the present, or to make the best of the future. "The Oxford Movement had its face turned to the past, rather than to the future. There, in this idealised past, lay the Golden Age. What was wanted was to recover in their original purity the theology, the discipline, the life of the primitive Church, and hold them up before the nineteenth century as its model for imitation. But no past epoch can be so recovered in its entirety, and what of it you can recover cannot be imposed as a pattern and standard on an age which lies further down the course of history, and breathes a different atmosphere. The attempt which the Tractarians made was doomed to failure" (p. 257).

Further, the Tractarian appeal to the past was uncritical and unfair, both in the methods which it used (and which Pusey, at any rate, who had studied German theology at Göttingen, had corresponded with Schleiermacher, and had published an indiscreetly liberal pamphlet, could have corrected if he had cared to do so) and in the artificial standard which it set up—not the mind of Christ, but the mind of the Church at a particular stage of its ecclesiastical and dogmatic development.

Again, the essence of the Tractarian church-theory was the Apostolic Succession, which substituted an external organisation for an internal spirit as the test of Christianity. The doctrine is one to which recent controversies have given critical importance, and Canon Storr's deliberate verdict upon it should carry much weight. Unquestionably, he says, Christ gave a commission to the Apostles, and "it was necessary that the new society should have some organisation and government. But there is no evidence whatever that Christ taught that any special form of organisation was essential. The Church was left to develop its own structure as need arose and occasion demanded. That there was a rapid growth of the Episcopal form of government is clear; but it is equally clear that Episcopacy came into being in different areas of the Church at different times, and that full communion existed between local churches which were episcopally organised and churches which were not. Of the theory of Apostolical Succession, as interpreted by the Tractarians, there is no trace in the earliest ages of the Church, and there is no suggestion that non-episcopal bodies were lacking in any element essential to the constitution of the Church. . . . If the test of discipleship is 'by their fruits ye shall know them,' it is nothing less than a degradation of Christ's teaching to substitute for that spiritual test of membership in His society a rigid mechanical test, such as that which Tractarianism implied" (p. 263).

True, the original principles of the Oxford Movement have been considerably modified in later years. Neo-Tractarianism, "by substituting for the static a dynamic view of the Church, has brought new life and vigour to the movement. The change may be described by saying that, in place of a theory of the Church as the accredited organ for the transmission of divine truth, was set up a theory of the Church as an extension of the Incarnation, and the channel through which the living Christ works His age-long work of Redemption" (p. 261). But this view, though more

philosophical than the other, is no less open to objection. It tries to make provision for development. "It seeks to show how the Church, while still remaining true to its fundamental principles, can accept new knowledge, and harmonise it with the old. But what is meant by the Church in this connection? Not the Church Catholic, for no universal synod of Episcopal churches existed. Not that branch of the Church which is found in England; for where has the Anglican Church formally pronounced on any of the questions which interest the modern thinker? What organ does the Church possess for making any such pronouncement? The phrase 'the Church teaches this or that' means, as regards any new truth not already enshrined in its creeds or formularies, that the more intelligent minds in the Church have come to agree that certain views must be adopted. . . . If the Church were formally to pronounce upon the validity of any new teaching, it would add nothing to its reasonableness. 'The new views must commend themselves by their own inherent truth'" (p. 265). There is a similar difficulty in deciding what is the Catholic tradition, where it is deposited, and how it is to be interpreted. "The only answer is, that each individual is left free to interpret Catholic tradition as he pleases. Thus, what began as an organic theory of authority ends in individualism. Can anyone deny," concludes our author, "that the most ardent defenders of the Catholic theory of the Church to-day are just those who most strongly display the individualist temper, making themselves their own law, and interpreting Catholic practice as it suits their fancy?" (p. 265).

It is impossible not to add Canon Storr's deliberate words about the Creeds. "The statements in the Creeds," he writes, "have come down to us invested with an immense weight of authority. They represent the organic consciousness of the Christian community, the verdict of centuries of thought and experience. Lightly to set them aside is the height of folly. But to deny to any individual the right of criticising them, to fence them around with an impassable barrier, and to demand that they shall be forthwith accepted, because they have received the formal recognition of the Church, is irrational. Any attempt to set up authority as an independent principle, where the search for truth is concerned, is illogical" (p. 266).

The ritualism of the Neo-Tractarians was, as is well known, no part of the original movement, and even those who have most welcomed it as a help to devotion, and an assimilation to Catholic forms of worship, must doubt sometimes whether it does not tend towards materialistic and superstitious ideas, especially in regard to the Sacraments. "Sacerdotalism, high eucharistic doctrine, elaborate ritual, the three cohere together: and the layman can find no warrant for any of them in the teaching of Christ" (p. 269). When, side by side with this development, we mark the intellectual narrowness and sterility of the movement—"I question," says Canon Storr, "if the movement can be said to have produced any great theological work": nor did it seriously influence the

great writers of the age—we shall probably conclude that, much as Tractarianism has done to revive the religious life, and the sense of Church membership, yet “the essential temper of the movement, and the determinative principles of its theology, are incompatible with the larger intellectual forces which are moulding our present thought” (p. 272).

We have quoted largely from a single chapter of Canon Storr's volume, because his criticism of the Oxford Movement provides a natural antithesis to his approval of the Historical Method. Those are, indeed, the two banners under which the old contest between theology and religion, between faith and fact, is being fought and refought to-day. If his verdict is right, the ultimate victory must lie with Liberalism. The appeal to the past cannot permanently withstand the demands of the future.

There follow two interesting but less vital chapters dealing with the philosophy of the Oxford Movement, and especially with Newman. The latter is rightly described as “at least a thorough-going sceptic in this sense, that he utterly distrusted human reason. He fell back therefore upon two supports, his own deep-seated moral and religious instincts, and the guidance of the external authority of the Church. He cut human nature into two. Conscience was the voice of God, but reason was not. Conscience led to truth; intelligence, if not guided by authority, could only issue in scepticism” (p. 284). Was there ever greater irony than that the idea of development, which Newman (by a flash of genius that outran his conservative intentions) applied to theology fifteen years before the publication of the *Origin of Species*, should have become the mainspring of the Modernist movement?

While Newman and his friends were organising the Oxford Movement, Coleridge was talking. Talking is perhaps, as F. D. Maurice thought, the besetting sin of Broad Churchmen: but if they talked as Coleridge did, they would be forgiven. His was the “seminal mind” of theological Liberalism in England at this time, and his influence fell short of Schleiermacher's only because his work was less systematic. Like other Christian philosophers, he has been accused of Pantheism—a charge which Canon Storr has little difficulty in refuting (p. 327). He was the teacher of Maurice, Arnold, Robertson, and their friends—the founders of the old Broad Church party, which is just passing away, and the teachers, in their turn, of Stanley, Jowett, and the other authors of *Essays and Reviews*. “I do not know well,” wrote Maurice, “what the Broad Church is. I always took it to be a fiction of Conybeare's [this refers to an article on ‘Church Parties,’ in the *Edinburgh Review*, 1853]. If it means anything, I suppose it is a representation, under different modifications, of that creed which is contained in Whately's books, or of that which has arisen at Oxford out of the reaction against Tractarianism” (351). This was no doubt its historical origin. But it included from the first men of very different types: and Canon Storr is justified, when looking for “a place for Carlyle in the development of English theological thought of the nineteenth century,” in finding it on the circumference of the circle whose

centre was Maurice, Erskine, and Hare (p. 358). Carlyle, it is true, had a strain of Nietzsche, and perhaps of Calvin, in him: but, though he could not accept Christianity as a system, the positiveness of his moral and religious convictions puts him more on the Christian side than Francis Newman, Froude, Mill, Clough, and the rest whom Canon Storr classes together under the title of the Negative Movement (chap. xix.).

Some such movement, probably, precedes every constructive era: and this one undoubtedly led up to the "Broadening Influences" (ch. xx.) which culminated in *Essays and Reviews*. "English theology at this time," says Canon Storr, "was infected with a spirit of blind traditionalism. It was good for it, under the presence of a hostile attack, to be driven to become reflective. Such reflection could only make it stronger, while it would bring into clearer light the fundamental antagonism between its own presuppositions and those of negativism" (p. 397).

Canon Storr ends the present part of his work with an analysis and criticism of *Essays and Reviews*. Many of the views expressed in this famous volume, notably in Wilson's essay on the National Church, and in Baden-Powell's on Miracles, would not be out of date to-day, fifty years after their publication—so slowly does theological opinion change in England; nor would their authors be much surer of escaping episcopal censure.

"A national Church," Wilson maintains, "need not be Christian; or, if it is Christian, it need not be tied down to the forms of the past. If it is to be really national, it must assist the spiritual progress of the nation," being as comprehensive and progressive as possible, and moral rather than speculative in its interests (p. 431). The object of Baden-Powell's essay was to defend the scientific objection to miracles as breaches of the uniformity of nature, "and to show the unsatisfactory character of most of the apologies for miracles" (p. 439). But if the modernity of *Essays and Reviews* is remarkable, there are important differences between its standpoint and that of later Liberalism. The comparison with *Lux Mundi* (p. 446) is not, perhaps, very fruitful. But there is real significance in the two points in which, according to our author, the Broad Churchman of to-day differs from his predecessor of half a century ago. "The modern Broad Churchman has a keener historical sense, a truer appreciation of the value of historical facts, and in particular of the central facts of the Christian revelation. . . . Again, the modern Broad Churchman makes the Person of Christ the central figure in his system" (p. 446).

Looking back over the sixty years which Canon Storr describes, we may see in these last two principles the results won, after much controversy and misunderstanding, from the two contending forces of criticism and institutionalism. Criticism has given us a reverence for truth. Tractarianism has reminded us of the Catholic experience of Christ. With those great possessions won from the past, it will be strange if the future cannot come a little nearer to the object of its search. But the stubbornness of the raw material of religion grows no less. The problems alter, but they

hardly decrease. We are already beginning to find that to reconstruct the Christian facts does not enable us to recover the Christian religion. And even Christian experience, which seems to us the ultimate basis and standard of our religion, is by no means beyond doubt and criticism.

Nevertheless there has been clear progress in the past, and in the fruit of it lies hope for the future. No one can fail to be grateful to Canon Storr for the guidance and inspiration which his book gives. His years of patient work have not been wasted.

J. M. THOMPSON.

OXFORD.

With the Russian Pilgrims to Jerusalem.—By Stephen Graham.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1913.—Pp. 306, with illustrations.

IN the author's words this book is "an attempt to give the story of a pilgrimage and to make intelligible the religious life of the Russian peasantry." The story is delightfully told, and what the author has to say about the religious life of the peasants is extremely interesting and illuminating. It is remarkable that a foreigner should understand so well the inner life of another nation. Such understanding is the result of true sympathy. Mr Graham made the pilgrimage with the peasants as one of themselves, not only in the sense of sharing their hardships, but in the deeper sense of going to the Holy City with a religious object, just as they did. The pilgrimage to the earthly Jerusalem was for him a religious rite, a symbol of the eternal pilgrimage of the human soul seeking the heavenly Jerusalem. "The procession to the altar is a rite in the Church; the pilgrimage is a rite in the larger church of the world; life itself, the pilgrimage of pilgrimages, is a rite in the larger church of the universe—we complete in a symbolic act an eternal journey," he writes in the prologue. And it is his insistence on the inner meaning of the pilgrimage that gives a singular charm to his book and makes it of permanent value to all students of religion.

Each year some seven thousand Russian peasants go to Jerusalem. Why do they go? They are not bidden to do so by their priests. It is not an infection; large numbers do not go from one district. People go singly, or at most in twos or threes, and meet together only at the ports of embarkation. What is it that induces them to undertake the pilgrimage? Mr Graham asked this question of many pilgrims, but their answers did not really explain their action. "They knew not why they came; some force deep in them urged them—a force much deeper than their power of articulation."

The pilgrims often have to tramp hundreds of miles in Russia before they reach the coast. The sea voyage in filthy, overcrowded, unseaworthy ships is terrible. From Jerusalem they tramp to the Jordan and to Nazareth, and the journey is so hard for those going on foot that many

die on the way. Yet the peasants will not take advantage of comforts, though many of them are able to afford it. "What good is it to come if we take no trouble over it?" said one of the pilgrims. They look upon the hardships they have to endure as an essential part of the pilgrimage. "Think what He suffered," said another peasant; "what are our sufferings beside His! . . . It is good for us to suffer." This attitude to suffering is very characteristic of the Russian people, and accounts for a great deal in Russian history. In a significant passage Mr Graham compares the Russian and the modern protestant conception of life and of the relation between God and man: "The modern protestant says: 'Live well, use your wealth with a sense of responsibility to God, be sober, be just to your neighbour, be temperate in your passions.' The Russian says: 'All that is minor matter; it is chiefly necessary to die well.' Breaking the commandments means for the protestant breaking with God until repentance; but for the Russian peasant there is no such feeling of breaking with God. The drunkard, the thief, and the murderer are as intimate with God as the just man; and perhaps even more intimate." There is a great deal of truth in this statement. Mr Graham does not mean, I take it, that Russians think an evil life of no consequence so long as one dies a Christian death. He would admit that for the Russian just as much as for the protestant the ideal is that there should be holiness both in the inner life of the soul and in the external life of action. But from the Russian point of view the lack of holiness in the external life is a lesser departure from the ideal than it appears to be from the protestant standpoint. Russians regard the holiness of "the inner man" as of more importance than the conformity of behaviour to the recognised moral standards. The protestant nations, on the other hand, attach greater weight to what a man *does* than to what he *is*. What matters most to the Russian mind is a right attitude to the great things of life, right feeling and right thinking. It is the inner state of a man's soul that determines whether he is really good or bad. A drunkard who is humble and loving may stand nearer to God than an upright man who is hard and proud. But no strict line of demarcation can be drawn between the righteous and the sinful, for, from the Russian point of view, sin is essentially a misfortune, which may befall anyone. It is not in the Russian character for "the just" to feel morally superior to "the sinners." Mr Graham brings this out very beautifully when he says that the absence of self-pride among the pilgrims gave him the idea "that after death, when, after life's pilgrimage, the Russians come to the judgment-seat, there will be such a feeling of brotherhood and affection that to condemn one and reward another will be an impossibility."

From one point of view, then, religion is not for the Russian so closely connected with conduct as it is for the protestant; and yet, from another point of view, it forms a very intimate part of his life. It enters into relation with the little everyday things of his existence. Mr Graham gives a touching account, *e.g.*, of how, when the pilgrim boat was nearing Jaffa, all the pilgrims put on clean shirts and new boots, "for they counted it a

sin to face in stained garments the land where the Author of their religion was born, or to tread it in old boots." The ikons are not only in the church, but in every peasant home. The great festivals are not merely days on which one goes to church, but days of rejoicing. Russians often use such expressions as "a dress good enough to wear at Easter"; and on Easter morning people kiss one another in their joy at Christ's resurrection. The feeling of the intimate connection between the events of this life, even the most trivial ones, and the universe of the unseen is very characteristic of the religion of the Russian people. As Mr Graham says: "Life does not matter very much" to them; "what matters are the everyday ties between man and God, that for which the ikon stands and the great rites by which man enters into communion with his higher destiny." In other words, life is seen to be only a small portion of a great whole, only a stepping-stone to eternity. Hence death is an essential part of life, one never to be lost sight of. Mr Graham remarks that he was amazed to see to what extent the pilgrim's thoughts were centred on death and on the final resurrection morning. They sought in Jerusalem numberless tokens for the clothing of their dead bodies; they took home from the Holy Land crosses to wear round their necks in the tomb, earth to be put into their coffins, shrouds they had dipped in the Jordan. One of the most beautiful chapters in the book describes how the pilgrims, wearing their death shrouds, bathe in the sacred river.

If life is regarded in the light of death, things acquire a different value. One who has recognised life to be a pilgrimage can no longer attach the same importance to temporal things. That is what we find in the case of the peasant pilgrims. They face the terrible hardships of the journey, wear themselves out with fasting and prayer, not for the sake of any worldly gain but for the sake of a spiritual reality. "The pilgrim's ideal is a sweet feeling of the heart in prayer," and for the attainment of that ideal he sacrifices time, money, comfort, health—even life itself, for many die in the Holy Land or on the way to it. During the latter part of Lent every day there were funerals of pilgrims who had succumbed to the fatigue of the journey, the fasting, and the sustained mental excitement.

From the point of view of common sense, the pilgrim's sacrifice is no doubt useless and absurd. Mr Graham's book will probably make many people regret that so much enthusiasm should be wasted by the peasants on a religious rite instead of being devoted to some practical end. But, looked at with the eye of the spirit, it is just this readiness to give up the temporal for the sake of the eternal, this firm grasp of spiritual verities, that is the most precious thing in the Russian character. As Mr Graham puts it, "The seven thousand pilgrims at Jerusalem are *the* seven thousand that make a nation worth to God."

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